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THESIS ABSTRACT 
 
Thomas Evan Fischer 
 
 
Master of Arts 
 
 
Asian Studies Program 
 
 
September 2020 
 
 
Title: Sun Yat-sens: Contested Images of a Political Icon 
 
 
This thesis explores the afterlives of the Chinese revolutionary icon Sun Yat- 
sen and their relevant contexts, arguing that these contexts have given rise to 
different images of the same figure. It serves as a gallery in which these 
different images are put into conversation with one another, revealing new 
insights into each. Key to the discussion, Sun is first introduced in a short 
biography. Then, the thesis moves to his different afterlives: Sun and the fight 
for his posthumous approval in the Republic of China before 1949; Sun and 
his usage in Chinese Communist political rhetoric from 1956 through 2016; 
Sun and his changing image in the ROC-Taiwan, a change that reflects the 
contentious political environment of an increasingly bentu Taiwan; Sun and 
two of his images among the overseas Chinese of Hawaii and Penang. 
Through this exploration, the thesis shows that there is no one Sun Yat-sen. 
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“Grandson!” she says magnanimously. “Come home! You’re lost if 
you don’t. I know you don’t want to; I know you’re scared of all the 
flies, of the clouds of mosquitoes, of snakes slithering across the damp 
sorghum soil. You revere heroes and loathe bastards, but who among 
us is not the ‘most heroic and most bastardly’?” 
—Mo Yan, Red Sorghum 
viii  
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
Chapter Page 
PREFACE ......................................................................................................................1 
INTRODUCTION: THE RIPPLES OF SUN YAT-SEN ..............................................8 
i. Introduction ...........................................................................................................8 
ii. The Life of Sun Yat-sen.....................................................................................12 
iii. Four Biographies of Sun Yat-sen .....................................................................25 
iv. The Structure of the Thesis ...............................................................................59 
I. FOR CHINA, FOR ASIA!: DUELING GMD NARRATIVES 
OF SUN YAT-SEN ....................................................................................................66 
i. Introduction .........................................................................................................66 
ii. Historical Overview, 1925-1949........................................................................67 
iii. Chiang Kai-shek’s Superhuman Sun Yat-sen ...................................................80 
iv. Wang Jingwei’s Transcendent Nationalist Sun Yat-sen ...................................92 
v. Conclusion .......................................................................................................105 
II. RED SUN OVER CHINA: SUN YAT-SEN & THE CHINESE 
COMMUNISTS .........................................................................................................108 
i. Introduction .......................................................................................................108 
ix  
Chapter Page 
ii. A Brief Overview of the CCP and the PRC.....................................................110 
iii. Glory to Sun, the Democratic Revolutionary!—Commemorating Sun 
Yat-sen’s  90th Birthday in the People’s Daily ....................................................116 
iv. Down with US Imperialism and the Reactionary Elements!— 
Commemorating Sun’s Centennial Birthday in 1966 ..........................................127 
v. The Father of Modern China!—Commemorating Sun’s 120th Birthday ........143 
vi. Commemorating Sun’s 150th Birthday—Live from Beijing! ........................152 
vii. Conclusion .....................................................................................................159 
III. SHADES OF BLUE, SHADES OF GREEN: SUN YAT-SEN 
& THE BEAUTIFUL ISLE .......................................................................................161 
i. Introduction .......................................................................................................161 
ii. Taiwan, China, Japan, and China ....................................................................161 
iii. Sun, Chiang, and Changing Taiwanese Politics .............................................172 
iv. Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Wei-shui, the Anti-Japanese Martyr .......................190 
v. Conclusion .......................................................................................................213 
IV. SANDALWOOD & BETEL NUTS: SUN YAT-SEN IN HAWAII 
& PENANG ...............................................................................................................216 
i. Introduction .......................................................................................................216 
x  
Chapter Page 
ii. A Brief History of Hawaii and the Hawaiian Chinese .....................................219 
iii. Sun Yat-sen in Hawaii ....................................................................................227 
iv. The Nanyang Chinese and the Isle of Penang ................................................244 
v. Sun Yat-sen Revolutes in Penang ....................................................................253 
vi. Conclusion ......................................................................................................265 
CONCLUSION: A GALLERY OF SUN YAT-SENS ..............................................267 
i. Introduction .......................................................................................................267 
ii. Sun Yat-sen the Confucian Humanist ..............................................................268 
iii. Conclusion ......................................................................................................276 
APPENDIX ................................................................................................................286 
REFERENCES CITED ..............................................................................................287 
xi  
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
 
 
Figure Page 
 
 
 
1. Front page of the November 12, 1956 People’s Daily ..........................................118 
 
2. The November 13, 1966 People’s Daily ................................................................132 
 
3. The November 12, 1976 issue ...............................................................................145 
 
4. The November 13, 1986 issue ...............................................................................151 
 
5. Screenshot of the 2016 Ceremony .........................................................................154 
 
6. Chung-shan Hall (the Zhongshan Building), Taipei. .............................................178 
 
7. Lee Teng-hui strikes a pose ...................................................................................191 
 
8. Graph from NCCU on Taiwanese/Chinese identity in Taiwan. ............................194 
 
9. The front and back covers of the book in question. ...............................................196 
 
10. The SYS statue at HNL ........................................................................................229 
 
11. The Nuuanu statue and its plinth. ........................................................................232 
 
12. Dr. Sun Yat-sen Memorial Park ...........................................................................236 
 
13. The conference attendees visit the Sun Yat-sen Mausoleum ...............................270 
1  
PREFACE 
 
 
Bored one August morning and about to leave New York for home, a suburb 
of Hartford, I thought of ways to kill time before slouching into the red pleather train 
seats that would take me to New Haven and the black fabric car seats presumably 
baking atop the parking garage there. Since I had to catch Metro-North at some point 
and did not feel like doing anything in particular, I decided to take the slow way to 
the station and walk from my sister’s apartment on Atlantic Avenue in Brooklyn to 
Grand Central Station in Manhattan. The day was mild and the breeze pleasant, 
though clouds would gather as I crossed the blue beams of the Manhattan Bridge. I 
loved the view of the Brooklyn Bridge and lower Manhattan from the Manhattan 
Bridge, especially in the warmer months when the park below was green and lively. It 
was less crowded than the Brooklyn Bridge, at any rate. Traffic and trains clanged 
past as I walked across the span, eventually being spat out near the triumphal gates 
that mark one’s journey in and out of Manhattan onto the Bowery, a stone’s throw 
from appliance shops, bars, lighting stores, and Chinatown. 
 
Chinatown is a place I’ve seen more than a few times over the course of my 
life. When I was a kid, I would go there with my parents or with my grandparents on 
trips to the city and we’d get dinner at a restaurant there following visits to the 
Natural History Museum. As I got older, I would hear bits and pieces from my father 
about the Church of the Transfiguration, my grandmother’s childhood church, and the 
complex interplays between the Chinese and Italian denizens of Mott Street, north 
and south of Canal. Eventually, I’d even go on tours of Chinatown as part of the 
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government-funded STARTALK language program, though Mandarin was 
incidentally useful at best among the largely English-proficient and Hokkien- or 
Cantonese-speaking shopkeepers. In time, I would wander about by myself or with 
friends, Columbus Park being the constant center of my imagined Chinatown. 
Though evening walks along the Bowery are not the peak of entertainment, 
Chinatown itself had an odd charm to it. I liked the smells and noise, the foreignness 
of it. Later, I came to understand more about how neighborhoods like Chinatown, 
Little Italy, and the old Jewish slums of the Lower East Side came to be, as well as 
understand more about history in general. 
 
These days the magic charm has faded somewhat, but one figure always 
attracted me in Chinatown. Even now, many years after our first meeting, I couldn’t 
help but go check on him when I was back east for winter break, going so far as 
shelling out money for a dusty hotel room on Second Avenue and trudging down 
some forty blocks to pay my respects. It was not the peddler with his Cantonese 
sweets, the bookseller with his Taiwanese smut and Du Fu critiques, nor one of the 
old men playing checkers in Columbus Park. Rather, in the shadow of the jail tower 
and along the banks of the most vividly, unnaturally, and unsettlingly cerulean puddle 
across the bail bond row, stood and stands a bronze statue of a bald old man. The 
man, Sun Yat-sen, proclaimed “Tianxia wei gong.” Of course, when we first met, I 
could not read Chinese. Instead, I read the English inscription: “The whole world a 
commonwealth.” The exact translation of this phrase is a topic in itself: the English 
on the Columbus Park statue’s plinth has since changed to, “All are equal.” Though I 
did not really know much about Sun until recently, I found the statue noteworthy, if 
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nothing else for its central position in the park and his shiny dome. 
 
The introduction to this thesis presents a general outline of Sun’s life and 
times; it is not meant to be comprehensive, and many stones are left unturned. 
However, even when summarized, it is clear that both his life as a man and afterlife as 
a hero were complex. Although I was not yet acquainted with the twists and turns of 
this narrative in its various versions when I first saw Sun’s statue in Columbus Park, 
the more I traveled and learned about China in my studies, the more prominent Sun’s 
bust appeared. No longer was he the bronze codger, but rather a national hero of 
China, a democratic revolutionary, the Father of the Nation and Our Premier as GMD 
sources lauded him. I was indifferent towards him when I went to Hangzhou my 
junior year, otherwise I might have gone to Nanjing to see his mausoleum. Instead, I 
was mostly struck by the bustling cities of Eastern China and the omnipresent slogans 
lauding the values of justice, democracy, law, and freedom by posters framing the 
CCP as the keystone of all China. By senior year, toting books around Wesleyan 
University’s Olin Library, I saw Sun as a key facet of my thesis on Wang Jingwei’s 
attempted justification of collaboration, but only key to one chapter. Wang’s 
justification was largely negative—the war was a disaster by late 1938 and he 
believed the situation was not likely to improve—but he also invoked a positive 
argument in justifying collaboration. This relied upon tying China to the New Asian 
Order of Japan and tying the Sunist ideal of national construction to peace. Sun was 
the democratic hero of China, and Wang needed to emphasize his ties to him 
ideologically and symbolically to legitimate himself and his actions as properly 
patriotic. 
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Having spent much of that year reading propaganda about Sun, I myself began 
to think him grand. I even wrote a story inspired by his life, entitled “Walking on 
Mott Street,” in which a bum named Harry Chiang is haunted by the Columbus Park 
statue and begins spouting the cause of a vague national revival in the Baxter Street 
jail. Though I had still only scratched the surface, I began to see in Communist, 
Chongqing-GMD, and Nanjing-GMD discourses that Sun was a controversial, 
elusive, and malleable figure. No matter where I looked, I found his shadow. His 
shadow grew yet more imposing after my second trip to Taiwan. 
 
I stayed in Taiwan for about two months in the summer of 2019 for a 
translation course at National Taiwan University. While I was soon occupied with 
other things, I could not overlook Sun’s ubiquity around the Beautiful Isle: 
Zhongshan Districts, Minsheng Roads, a grandfatherly old man on the money and a 
stern man on a Lincoln-esque throne. I had seen the SYS Memorial Hall during my 
first, brief stay in Taipei, but I only really paid attention the second time I went, a 
sweltering August day shortly before I was to leave Taiwan. The same exhibit from 
two-and-a-half years earlier proclaimed Sun a “democratic pioneer”—notably 
excluding the collaborationist Wang Jingwei from a scrolling list of Sun’s associates 
and comrades—while soldiers stomped around for a crowd of iPhone and Xiaomi 
cameras. Curiously, the bookstore was filled with books on Chiang Kai-shek, Mao 
Zedong, and Xi Jinping; few were about Sun or Taiwan. This emphasis on Sun the 
democrat, in the context of this martial display with glimmering bayonets next to a 
bookstore full of dictators’ biographies struck me as odd. Sun’s scowl, compared with 
Lincoln’s bemusement in Washington and Chiang’s warm smile at the CKS 
5  
Memorial Hall, also struck me as odd. Dissonant images of Sun were clashing in the 
crash of boots and digital shutters. 
 
This dissonance was amplified as I learned in a spring seminar on Maoism 
that Mao Zedong had claimed to be the true successor of Sun. Mao pointedly coopted 
Sun’s Three People’s Principles with his New Three People’s Principles so as to 
bolster the CCP’s legitimacy with an appeal to China’s earlier revolutionary heritage. 
Browsing a proudly Taiwanese bookstore near Xinhai Road, among myriad posters 
for the Taiwanese metal band Chthonic and flags for the Pan-Green DPP, my 
curiosity was again piqued. A book printed by the SYS Memorial Hall in Taipei 
equated Sun with Chiang Wei-shui, a Taiwanese nationalist I knew nothing about and 
had indeed never heard of. Though I did not understand how it mattered, in light of 
what I knew regarding Chiang Kai-shek, Wang Jingwei, Mao Zedong, and others 
invoking his image, I could not help but find it an ideologically significant association 
given Taiwan’s own complicated history. It was with a desire to explore these 
competing images of Sun and to set them in contrast that I undertook this current 
project. 
 
Seeing Sun’s shadow in my Chinese history classes and firsthand in New 
York, Taiwan, and the Chinese mainland (though I never visited Nanjing, I had noted 
the existence of Zhongshan Roads in cities like Hangzhou and Shanghai), I decided 
that a research project that brought GMD, CCP, and distinctively Taiwanese 
narratives of Sun together may yield new insights into the shaping of political icons 
like Sun and the narratives that surround them. Remembering that my own first 
contact with Sun was in Manhattan’s Chinatown, it became apparent that including a 
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chapter on overseas Chinese would both offer relief from Chinese state-driven 
narratives and illuminate his image among Chinese communities in non-Chinese 
spaces. This, I hoped, would allow for new aspects of Sun’s afterlife to emerge. When 
I attended a Chinese studies conference at the University of Hawaii-Manoa in January 
2020, I was lucky enough to go on a tour of Sun-related sites in Honolulu. I found the 
tour useful for contextualizing Sun’s image in Hawaii. My brief visit yielded a book 
explicitly focused on Sun and his Hawaiian connections, and some time on the 
ground looking—albeit haphazardly—for traces of Sun’s legacy amidst information 
on the Chinese experience there. I resolved that Hawaii would be one of two sites for 
discussion in this chapter. 
 
Largely due to the advice of my advisor, Professor Bryna Goodman, I looked 
to Southeast Asia for comparison. I remembered a reading assignment I did in my 
first term at the University of Oregon for Asian Studies 611, an introductory methods 
class, for which I read Jing Pei Goh’s thesis on ROC/PRC loyalty politics and 
Chinese education in Penang. Consequently, I ended up exploring the feasibility of 
Penang, a city I knew nothing about, as the second site. After some reading, I decided 
it would make an interesting case, given its unique history and the city’s ties to Sun. 
Though I have little grounding in the history of Southeast Asia or Penang, I believe 
the relevant sections add much to this thesis by providing a different perspective on 
the heterogenous experiences of overseas Chinese and, indeed, a different overseas, 
non-state image of Sun Yat-sen and its relevant context. 
 
I hope that, by analyzing these discordant images of Sun and by putting them 
side by side in one paper, I may establish a sort of “gallery” of Sun Yat-sen’s heroic 
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images—borrowing the historian J. Y. Wong’s phrase. By moving from the concerns 
of one time and space to the next, we may see who was using Sun and why, and 
contrast their motivations with those of differently situated individuals. In so doing, 
we may perhaps see that the one figure of Sun Yat-sen has cast many shadows with 
vastly different implications. We may, then, be aware that we cannot help but speak 
of multiple Sun Yat-sens when discussing his legacy. While hardly revolutionary, this 
insight has significant consequences for how we discuss history in a world in which 
national histories compete for a truly global audience. Japanese textbooks downplay 
Japanese brutality in the Second World War for their own students and to preserve 
Japan’s image overseas. By the same token, Chinese and South Korean textbooks 
amplify the horrors, inciting indignation among their students and tarnishing Japan’s 
image overseas. These talking points, though emerging from particular historical 
locations, can travel quite far from their origin. 
 
Closer to home, conflicting histories have come to mark public discourse and 
the general landscape of the United States. In Eugene, the Pioneer Mother and Father, 
statues officially standing on the University campus to represent Oregon’s pioneer 
spirit and the taming of the land, were dismantled this spring as symbols of white 
supremacy and domination of native peoples. In Portland, a statue of George 
Washington himself was toppled owing to Washington’s owning of slaves. Clearly, 
battles of historical interpretation and iconography are both public and salient these 
days, and so I find that this exploration of a long-dead man’s competing legacies is 
relevant to far more than questions of Sun scholarship or Chinese national history. 
Rather, it is directly relevant to PRC-ROC political squabbling on the world stage, the 
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cultural contestation of today’s United States, and even, perhaps, questions of 
decolonization and nationalism around the world. Should Churchill be remembered as 
the wartime statesman of Britain or the starver of India (or, even, the flunkey who 
sent the ANZACs to die at Gallipoli)? Was annexation of Hawaii in some way good 
for the islanders, or was it another case of might-makes-right imperialism? The 
multiplicity of histories, perhaps even beyond Dipesh Chakrabarty’s Histories 1 and 
2,1 revealed by Sun Yat-sen’s various afterlives reflects the contentious work of 
historical interpretation in a world of competing local, national, and transnational 
agendas. 
 
Plainly, this is the work of one person; I cannot help but display my own 
limitations. Nonetheless, I hope that the personal context for this project and my 
thoughts on its broader implications help explain my motivations in undertaking it. 
Now, we turn to the introduction, in which we establish the baseline for the 
fundamental questions of this paper: who was Sun Yat-sen, who did people say he 
was, and why? Answers, we will see, are numerous and varied. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical 
Difference (Princeton UP: 2008), 50. 
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INTRODUCTION: THE RIPPLES OF SUN YAT-SEN 
 
The man I am writing about is not famous. It may be that he never will be. It 
may be that when his life at last comes to an end he will leave no more trace 
of his sojourn on earth than a stone thrown into a river leaves on the surface 
of the water. 
 
—W. Somerset Maugham, The Razor’s Edge 
 
i: Introduction 
 
Modern national narratives, if the historian Eric Hobsbawm is to be 
considered, are quasi-religious substitutions for religion itself in a capitalist epoch 
that has displaced traditional ways of living.2 These narratives make heroes and 
villains, saints and sinners, of ordinary men and women in grand dramas involving 
the destinies of countless millions. The elevation of George Washington and King 
George III to transcendental figures—the righteous Cincinnatus and the wicked 
tyrant—speaks to the needs of the church of the nation for such models of virtue and 
sin. Of course, George Washington was a complicated individual; George III was, in 
this regard, no different. Popular perspectives on these figures are largely a matter of 
faith. The spy Nathan Hale is a revered martyr, the general Benedict Arnold a scorned 
traitor—unless, of course, one subscribes to a Loyalist narrative. Indeed, our current 
cultural conflict in the United States has once again made the multiplicity of historical 
perspectives salient. In a wave of historical contestation, public statuary in particular 
has aroused strong feelings. In Richmond, VA, the fate of Robert E. Lee’s statue is up 
for debate, though the existence of Confederate memorials and iconography is a long 
 
 
2 E. J. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality 
(Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1992), 50. 
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running issue in the South. What I find interesting, however, is that the statue debate 
has moved beyond Confederate monuments. Indeed, the place of such figures as 
George Washington himself in the American historical landscape has been called into 
question, as evinced by the destruction of a Washington statue in Portland, OR, in 
June, 2020.3 Plainly, George Washington’s political afterlife as the great hero of the 
American nation is subject to contestation, as are the afterlives of any political icon. 
 
While a study of American national heroes would be eminently engaging, 
particularly at this moment, here my focus is at once more distant and direct. In 
considering the historical afterlives of national icons, I find the example of Sun Yat- 
sen, the great Chinese revolutionary, to be of particular interest and value. Sun is and 
has been claimed by many different actors—state and non-state—coming from many 
different contexts and for their own distinctive purposes. By examining Sun, I believe 
we garner a more clear understanding of the factors at play in a national icon’s 
political afterlives and the contestation of history. However, each of Sun’s images 
reveals something particular about its context. We will not find any universal truth in 
this analysis, but may come to a more comprehensive understanding of Sun’s 
legacies, their contexts, and the shaping of political narrative more generally. 
 
Several of Sun Yat-sen’s “heroic images”, taken from different contexts, may 
serve to illustrate the shaping of distinctive political narratives. This thesis takes up 
four specific afterlives: 1) Guomindang narratives created in the Republic of China 
 
 
3 Rebecca Ellis, “Statue of George Washington Toppled in Portland,” Oregon Public 
Broadcasting, June 19,2020, https://www.opb.org/news/article/george-washington-statue- 
toppled-portland/. 
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before the loss of the mainland; 2) narratives created by Chinese Communists in the 
People’s Republic of China; 3) narratives created by political actors and memorial 
institutions in the fractious society of the Republic of China on Taiwan; 4) the 
narrative of overseas Chinese, particularly in Honolulu and Penang, as constructed by 
local Chinese and interested third-parties. Sun Yat-sen appears to be a ubiquitously 
venerated figure because he serves as a political icon to modern Chinese nationalism. 
Unlike Lei Feng—a perfect symbol for one set of ideals—Sun has so many facets that 
many groups can lay claim to him as such, cast in their own respective clothes. Each 
iteration of Sun, the icon, is thus particular to its own context, as I hope to prove by 
grounding each iteration and placing them in juxtaposition—a gallery of customized 
Sun Yat-sens. While no two Suns are the same, Sun Yat-sen appears to serve 
everywhere as a symbol of Chinese nationalism: for the GMD ideologues, he was 
thus a touchstone of legitimacy for Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Jingwei during their 
final struggle for supremacy; in the CCP narratives, Sun is invoked to tie the CCP’s 
political mission to a long chain of revolutionary Chinese nationalism and to provide 
a foil with which to highlight the successes of the party-state; in Taiwan narratives, 
Sun is alternately invoked as a symbol of greater ROC nationalism and indigenized to 
hold a more parochial relevance to Taiwanese nationalists; overseas, Sun’s 
connections to Hawaii serve to elevate the place of the Chinese in Hawaiian history 
and Hawaii in Chinese and world history, while Sun’s connections to Penang do the 
same for the Chinese of Penang. Everywhere, Sun is built up as a great man, and thus 
his greatness rubs off on those who use his name for their own purposes, whatever 
that purpose may be. However, before we dig into the specifics of Sun remembrance 
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and redefinition, we must outline the basic facts of Sun’s life. 
 
ii: The Life of Sun Yat-sen 
 
Sun Yat-sen, also known as Sun Wen, Sun Zhongshan, Sun Yixian, Sun 
Deming, Sun Dixiang, and Sun Rixin, was born to Sun Dacheng and Lady Yang in 
1866 in Cuiheng, a small village in the southern Guangdong county of Xiangshan.4 
Sun was the youngest son and one of six children, two of whom died in childhood.5 
Eventually, this native son would grow so famous that the whole county of Xiangshan 
would be renamed in honor of Sun in April of 1925. The new Zhongshan County was 
later divided into several different jurisdictions, including present-day Zhongshan 
City (sister-city of Honolulu, HI), Zhuhai City, and Guangzhou’s Nansha District. 
However, few could tell at the time that Sun Deming, son of unremarkable land- 
owning peasants in peripheral Guangdong, would later be famous across the seven 
seas, subject of countless busts of bronze, odes, and a field of study. His sizeable 
family was of modest means. Though the family owned land, they owned little and 
the father Sun Dacheng made most of the family’s income as a tailor in nearby 
Macao. 
 
 
4 Some sources identify Cuiheng as a constituent village of the town of Yongning; others 
suggest Xiangshan only had just the village of Cuiheng and no towns. Jiang Xingde, Guofu 
Bainian Danzhen Jinian Congshu: Guofu Sun Zhongshan Xiansheng Zhuan (“Father of the 
Nation Centennial Commemorative Series: The Tale of Doctor Sun Yat-sen, the Father of the 
Nation”) (Taipei: Zhengzhong Publishing, 1965). 
5 “Guofu de Jiashi” (Family Tree of Sun Yat-sen), Sun Yat-sen Academic Research Site, 
https://web.archive.org/web/20110924031005/http://sun.yatsen.gov.tw/content.php?cid=S01_ 
01_02_01. 
Here is proper order of births for the children of Sun Dacheng and Lady Yang: eldest son Sun 
Dezhang (Sun Mei), eldest daughter Sun Jinxing (died at age four), second son Sun Deyou 
(died age six), third son Sun Deming (the future Sun Yat-sen), second daughter Sun Miaoxi, 
and third daughter Sun Qiuqi. 
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When he was thirteen years old by Chinese reckoning, Sun would go live with 
his shopkeeper brother Sun Mei in Honolulu, capital city of the then-independent 
Kingdom of Hawaii. Particularly when compared to the Cuiheng of 1878, Honolulu 
was a modern city with bustling streets, an active port, and an international 
population. While Hawaii was still an independent nation, British and American 
influences—particularly American business interests—upon the nation were strong 
by this point in time, and this would be reflected in Sun’s education. He would stay 
there from 1878 to 1883 to pursue his primary and secondary schooling; his elder 
brother hoped that the young Sun Deming would help him manage his businesses 
upon graduation. Sun would attend the Anglican Iolani School, and the Oahu College, 
then Oahu’s only secondary school.6 It was after his first semester at Oahu College 
that Sun began to make noise to his brother about getting baptized. Sun Mei was 
displeased and refused to further support Sun’s education there, as he believed the 
school had a bad influence on his brother. Indeed, Sun Mei was so displeased with 
what Sun Deming was learning overseas that he sent his younger brother back to 
Cuiheng in 1883. However, young Deming had already been deeply influence by his 
time in Honolulu and came to admire the accomplishments of the modern world as 
understood through Hawaii and the large ships that took him to and fro.7 This 
 
6 Marie-Claire Bergère, Sun Yat-sen, trans. Janet Lloyd (Stanford UP, 1998). Jiang, 26. 
Bergère cites these schools, while Jiang mentions a semester at a St. Louis Academy in 
between. Jiang also describes Oahu College as “Xiaweiyi Daxue”, “established by the 
American government”. This makes one wonder if Jiang conflated Oahu College, now the 
Punahou School, with the University of Hawaii-Manoa. UHM was indeed founded by the 
American government, but only in 1907, nine years after the formal annexation of Hawaii. 
Oahu College was instead founded by New England missionaries in the 1840s. 
7 I hesitate to use “modern” without qualification, and note that Dipesh Chakrabarty’s 
provincialization of Europe and modernity illustrates that “modern” is often equated with 
“Western” due to Eurocentric theories of development and social analysis. However, for the 
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admiration, presumably also a product of his education at the Iolani School and Oahu 
College, merged with his own Chinese education to inform a political ideology that 
would eventually wed Confucian moralism and a Sinicized form of Anglo-American 
liberalism, an ideology Sun articulated most explicitly through the Three People’s 
Principles. 
 
After having been sent back to China in 1883, a young Sun soon found his 
home village, Cuiheng, backwards and the reigning Qing Dynasty beyond contempt. 
Not long after his return, Sun Deming and his friend Lu Haodong damaged the 
village altar to the Beiji Huangwang (the Polar King, a local deity), an act that 
infuriated his fellow villagers and forced him to leave for Hong Kong. We lack 
precise information as regards Sun’s motivations. We may speculate that Sun, a 
teenager by this point, was lashing out in resentment of his poor hometown and those 
who lived there after having been sent back against his will. The episode is often 
related to his growing faith in Christianity, as he would seek baptism in Hong Kong 
and adopt the new name Sun Rixin shortly after settling in the colony.8 If we were to 
follow that line of reasoning, we might imagine that Sun believed the idol not only 
idolatrous in the literal sense, but also a symbol of backwardness and heathen 
simplicity. In any case, he would soon return to Guangzhou to study medicine at 
 
 
purposes of this narrative, we will simply note that the modernity Sun saw and wanted was 
embodied by the Western world and its hallmarks at the time. 
8 The name Rixin (Yat-san) comes from “苟日新，日日新，又日新,” a phrase from the 
Daxue (“Greater Learning”). It translates roughly to “If it renewed one day, it is to be 
renewed day after day, and again the next day.” One commentary suggests this refers to the 
necessity of maintaining daily cleanliness. There is resonance here for Sun’s baptism 
(cleansing of the soul). Sun supposedly adopted his more famous penname Yixian (Yat-sen) 
because it was roughly homophonous in Cantonese. 
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Guangzhou Boji Hospital with a Dr. Kerr before transferring to the Alice School, or 
the future Hong Kong College of Medicine for Chinese, under the tutelage of Dr. 
James Cantlie, Dr. Ho Kai, and Dr. Samuel Manson, earning his license by 1892. 
During this time, he adopted the penname Sun Yixian (Sun Jyat-sin in Cantonese 
jyutping and Sun Yat-sen commonly in the West). He married Lu Muzhen (1867- 
1952) through a matchmaker in Cuiheng in 1885, three years before the death of his 
father. Sun and Lu had three children together: eldest son Sun Fo (1891-1973), eldest 
daughter Sun Yan (1894-1913), and youngest daughter Sun Wan (1896-1979).9 He 
would practice medicine for a few years, first in Macao before being forced out due to 
Portuguese law not recognizing his education for licensing purposes. In 1892, he 
would meet Chen Cuifen; the two would share a twenty-year affair, with Chen 
following Sun to Japan from Hong Kong and to Penang in 1910.10 After his six- 
month stint in Macao, he would begin practicing in Guangzhou, but would soon turn 
to leveraging his extensive social network for the purpose of fomenting revolt against 
the Qing in China. 
 
Sun founded the Xingzhonghui (Revive China Society) in Honolulu in 1894. 
 
The organization was dedicated to expelling the Manchus, reviving the Chinese 
nation, and establishing a unified government. Sun Yat-sen and his allies Yeung Ku- 
 
 
 
9 Lu would not follow Sun around in his travels, but would move several times. Following the 
failure of the Guangzhou Uprising of 1895, she and their two children moved to Honolulu; in 
1907, she and their three children would move to Kowloon; eventually she would move with 
their daughters to Penang in 1910. She moved to Nanjing following the Xinhai Revolution 
but left for Hawaii following the Second Revolution. Post-divorce, she would move to 
Macao. 
10 Lu Muzhen and Sun Mei regarded Chen Cuifen as Sun Yat-sen’s concubine, as the two 
never formally wed. 
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wan (Yang Quyun, 1861-1901), Zheng Shiliang, Chen Shaobai (Chan Siu-bak, 1869- 
1934), and others would later launch the Guangzhou Uprising of 1895 with the help 
of local underworld societies. The uprising failed, purportedly due to difficulties with 
the Shantou contingent’s travel to Guangzhou. Sun was forced to flee Hong Kong for 
Japan, then the US and UK. He was blamed for the uprising’s failures by Yeung and 
his comrades, members of the Furen Literary Society that had joined the 
Xingzhonghui for the uprising, and was largely disgraced. Arriving in Kobe, Sun Yat- 
sen left for Yokohama after a day and changed his appearance. No longer would he 
don the Qing-imposed queue or Chinese-style robes. He now sported a Western suit, 
a matching hat, and a neat mustache like a made Meiji man. Though he may have 
been motivated by practical considerations, the historian Marie-Claire Bergère 
emphasizes the symbolic nature of his sartorial transformation. Shedding his Manchu- 
imposed hairstyle for modern Western dress, Sun wholly rejected the Qing and a 
possibility of returning while they reigned. Simultaneously, he embraced the modern 
as understood through the suit and hat.11 He left Tokyo to raise funds in the United 
States, stopping for a time in Honolulu en route to San Francisco. By sheer 
happenstance, according to Cantlie’s telling, Dr. and Mrs. Cantlie were also 
sightseeing in Honolulu en route to London, as Dr. Cantlie had retired and the couple 
sought to return to Britain. Though Sun recognized them on the street and stopped 
their driver, the Cantlies failed to recognize him, at first taking him to be a Japanese 
stranger. Once they realized who he was, they spent some time with him and gave 
him their London address. Sun still had business to attend to in Honolulu and in the 
 
 
11 Bergère, 60. See footnote six. 
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United States; it is known that he stopped in San Francisco, Chicago, Philadelphia, 
and New York City. He spent three months altogether in the US and presumably 
stopped in many places, though his fund-raising efforts were not met with great 
success. He thereafter left for London. 
 
Sun found trouble in London. On October 11th, 1896, Sun was kidnapped by 
the Chinese Legation in an event that Sun scholar J. Y. Wong argues was largely 
responsible for his rise in stature from a failed rebel to an inspired revolutionary.12 
Walking down Portland Place, the location of the Chinese Legation (a dangerous 
location for the wanted Sun), Sun was somehow brought into the Legation and locked 
in a room there. Through the purchased help of an English porter named Cole, who 
notified Sun’s former medical professors James Cantlie and Samuel Manson, Sun 
alerted the outside world to his plight. His release was secured by the Foreign Office, 
but not before the incident became a media sensation in London. Following his 
October 23rd release, he spent several more months in London exploring, reading, and 
socializing. Sun would then return to Japan, where he was sponsored by well- 
connected Pan-Asianists like Miyazaki Torazō (1871-1922) and would thus come into 
contact with nationalist Asian revolutionaries from China, Japan, Korea, India, and 
the Philippines. He would also see the fruits of Meiji modernization first-hand, further 
cemented by Japan’s victory in the First Sino-Japanese War. Top-down political 
modernization and industrialization seemed to make Japan, a fellow Asian nation, 
strong. His time in Japan, much as his time in Britain and the United States, had 
 
 
12 J. Y. Wong, Origins of a Heroic Image: Sun Yat-sen in London, 1896-1897, East Asian 
Historical Monographs series, gen. ed. Wang Gungwu (Oxford UP, 1986), 1. 
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significant implications for the shaping of his political ideology. 
 
In 1900, Sun mobilized his network and his resources against the Qing once 
more. The Revive China Society launched the Huizhou Uprising in 1900, but the 
uprising failed to spark a broader insurrection against the Qing. Sun lost many 
members of his network, such as the China-hand turned arms-runner Yamada 
Yoshimasa (1868-1900), and was forced to flee Japan. This was presumably a 
disappointing turn of events for Sun. He had been overseeing the uprising from the 
recently-annexed Japanese colony of Taiwan, and had been promised aid from the 
Japanese authorities that failed to materialize. His forces, bolstered by secret-society 
members, were still insufficient. 
 
Sun’s absence from Japan was only temporary. Sun returned to Japan in short 
order and would found the Tongmenghui in 1905, an umbrella organization for 
several anti-Qing revolutionary groups like the Xingzhonghui, Huang Xing’s 
Huaxinghui (Chinese Revival Society), and Cai Yuanpei’s Guangfuhui (Restoration 
Society). He made many contacts with influential Asian revolutionaries during this 
time. At some point during this stay in Japan, he would adopt the name Nakayama 
Shō (Zhongshan Qiao), thus giving rise to his best-known moniker in Chinese, Sun 
Zhongshan. In 1903, he would also marry the fifteen-year-old Ōtsuki Kaoru, the 
daughter of his upstairs neighbors. They would have a daughter, Fumiko, in 1906, but 
Sun was to leave Ōtsuki and Fumiko behind. 
 
All throughout this time Sun was traveling abroad in pursuit of allies and 
funds for his revolutionary activities. He made frequent trips to Southeast Asia, 
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Europe, and North America to build connections to local Chinese populations and 
bolster the treasury of his revolutionary societies: key locations included Honolulu, 
Penang, Singapore, Tokyo, London, and San Francisco. Minor locations range from 
Taihoku (then the name of Taipei) to Vancouver, BC. The Singapore headquarters of 
the Tongmenghui was founded in 1906, and would be Sun’s major base of operations 
until 1910, when he declared the Penang chapter the new headquarters to escape 
growing dissatisfaction and increasing challenges to his leadership in Singapore.13 
However, not all of his funding was sourced from overseas Chinese. Japanese 
patronage, official and unofficial, would be particularly key following 1914, as would 
Soviet patronage late in life. 
 
Sun Yat-sen is often credited with being the leader of the Xinhai 
Revolution.14. On October 11th, 1911, the Hubei New Army—a modern Qing army 
modelled after Western armies— seized the Viceroy’s residence in Wuchang and 
incited a broad rebellion against the Qing court. Across the Pacific and a half-day 
behind, Sun Yat-sen learned of these events from a newspaper on the train from 
Denver to St. Louis—or, as some sources say, Kansas City. Although Sun himself 
and the rest of the Tongmenghui leadership had little direct connection to the 
Wuchang Uprising, the New Army’s mutiny would be the first domino in the chain of 
uprisings and secessions that forced the abdication of the Qing emperor Pu Yi and his 
regent Zaifeng in a matter of months. The events constituted what is known today as 
the Xinhai Revolution. In 1912, the Republic of China was declared and Sun Yat-sen 
 
13 Khoo Salma Nasution, Sun Yat Sen in Penang, (Penang: Areca Books), 2008, 46-48. 
14 The revolution was named for the year Xinhai of the sexagenary Chinese calendar in which 
it occurred, corresponding to the year 1911 of the Gregorian calendar. 
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elected as its provisional president.15 He would announce his resignation after a 
month and a half in office, handing power over to the Beiyang General and old Qing 
power-broker Yuan Shikai (1859-1916) that March so as to ensure the Emperor’s 
abdication. Once installed, Yuan’s abuse of power, including his presumed 
involvement in the assassination of Song Jiaoren (1882-1913), President of the 
newly-formed big tent Guomindang (Nationalist Party), and his acquiescence to the 
infamous Twenty-One Demands imposed upon China by the Japanese government of 
Ōkuma Shigenobu in 1915, led to a GMD-sponsored rebellion. 
 
Yuan crushed this Second Revolution, forcing Sun and many GMD loyalists 
to flee China once again. Sun’s subsequent attempt to challenge Yuan through the 
establishment of the Revolutionary Party (gemingdang) would also fail. Many of his 
former comrades, including Wang Jingwei, Hu Hanmin, He Xiangning, and others, 
chafed at Sun’s insistence that members of the new party swear oaths of loyalty to 
Sun himself rather than to the nation, the organization, or the revolutionary cause, 
oaths incongruous with the revolutionary spirit motivating members of the old 
Tongmenghui. Although Sun was unable to displace him, Yuan’s ultimate attempt to 
secure his power by declaring himself the Hongxian Emperor was a spectacular 
failure. Following Yuan’s passing, shortly thereafter, the malformed Republic would 
be torn apart by rival warlord cliques. Control over the nominal capital Beijing 
passed, in turn, through the hands of the Anhui, Zhili, and Fengtian cliques before the 
Northern Expedition of the National Revolutionary Army took the city in 1928. This 
 
 
15 Though the Republic was not formally established until 1912, the Republican Calendar 
marks 1911 as the First Year of the Republic. 
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sketch oversimplifies a volatile time period and the actors working within it, but 
suggests the contours of the time. 
 
Sun, for his part, married again in 1915, this time his secretary Song Qingling 
(Soong Ching-ling, 1893-1981) over the strenuous objections of the industrialist 
Charles Soong. By this time, Sun had married at least twice, though his union with 
Ōtsuki Kaoru was not widely known, and he considered Chen Cuifen his concubine, 
marital practices at odds with Sun and Soong’s shared Christian faith. Sun divorced 
Lu Muzhen, his wife of some thirty years, to marry Song. Song was spirited back to 
Shanghai by her family, but snuck back to Japan to wed the newly-divorced Sun 
against their wishes. Their honeymoon was cut short by Sun’s departure to establish a 
military government in Guangzhou in 1917 (before he was forced to flee for Shanghai 
in 1918). However, Song became from this point Sun’s constant companion, and 
accompanied him to Guangzhou and Shanghai. Following two quiet years of writing 
and private life in Shanghai, Sun would restructure his political base as the GMD (the 
Chinese Nationalist Party, or Zhongguo guomindang) in 1919. The party would 
reunite many of Sun’s old but distanced comrades from the Tongmenghui, like Hu 
Hanmin, Wang Jingwei, He Xiangning, and Liao Zhongkai. 
 
When the May Fourth Movement broke out, Sun was quiet but somewhat 
critical. The movement, largely the province of students and intellectuals, exploded in 
response to the Treaty of Versailles, which recognized Japanese ownership of former 
German holdings in Shandong. Many decried what they saw as China’s national 
weakness in the face of foreign imperialism. A common charge leveled by writers 
like Lu Xun was that China’s history, traditions, and culture were burdens upon the 
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present, and so Confucianism in particular emerged as a key source of China’s ills. 
For some, the answer to China’s ills was a program of Western-style modernization— 
politically, culturally, and economically. Marie-Claire Bergère notes Sun’s distance 
from this viewpoint. Despite his travels and years of revolutionary organizing, Sun 
did not weigh in publicly on the movement’s critique of Chinese culture. His private 
writings of the time were in fact increasingly traditional in tone, not less.16 
After two years of relative seclusion, Sun returned to Guangzhou in 1920, 
moving the party headquarters there. He had little success in expanding the control of 
his government beyond Guangzhou and was heavily dependent on the forces of the 
militarist and federalist Chen Jiongming. In 1922, Chen’s forces bombarded Sun and 
Song’s hillside residence. Sun and Song Qingling fled separately before escaping 
together on the gunboat Yongfeng, where a young officer Chiang Kai-shek (Jiang 
Jieshi/Chiang Chung-cheng, 1887-1975) was present. Presumably aware of his shaky 
political footing, Sun accepted Soviet aid in reorganizing the Nationalist Party along 
Leninist party-state lines in 1923. Per the terms of the Soviet offer, he accepted the 
Chinese Communist Party as members of a United Front and promulgated the Three 
New Policies of the Nationalist Party: alliance with the Soviet Union, alliance with 
the Chinese Communist Party, and reliance upon and aid for the workers and the 
peasantry. On Moscow’s end, this plan was formulated partly by Comintern 
representative H. Sneevliet, who believed that the fledgling CCP would be able to 
operate successfully as a “bloc within” the larger GMD and eventually co-opt the 
party machinery for its own purposes. However, as per the promise of Soviet 
 
16 Bergère, 278-279. 
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representative Adolph Joffe outlined in the Sun-Joffe Accords, neither the Soviet 
Union nor United Front would work to establish socialism in China, as China’s 
situation did not meet the historical requirements for the socialist stage of revolution. 
Rather, it was the era of the nationalist bourgeois revolution against feudalism, and 
thus Sun and his forces could be considered historically progressive and appropriate 
actors. 
 
Though not yet elderly, Sun was severely ill from cancer by 1925. He spent 
his final years leading the United Front and articulating a codified version of the 
Three People’s Principles, his ideological legacy: the Principle of Nationalism (minzu 
zhuyi), the Principle of Democracy (minquan zhuyi), the Principle of the People’s 
Welfare (minsheng zhuyi). Sun had invoked the Principles of Nationalism and 
Democracy (or the People’s Sovereignty) for decades. His comrades Wang Jingwei 
and Hu Hanmin, skilled orators and writers both, had worked to provide intellectual 
meat for these slogans in revolutionary papers like the Minbao for years. Sun’s 
Principle of the People’s Welfare was a later innovation and somewhat contentious. 
Sun described it as a socialism based upon the writings of Henry George,17 a famous 
Single Tax advocate in the United States, combined with the traditional notion of the 
Great Unity (datong).18 While Sun was plainly influenced by George and chose to 
 
 
17 Henry George was a Philadelphia economist and an inspiration for the Progressive 
Movement of the fin de siècle United States. One of George’s chief concerns was unearned 
profit on real estate speculation. Arguing that profit from the hard work of others without 
adding value to society was intolerable, he proposed a new land-value tax scheme to reduce 
economic inequality and disincentivize land speculation. Bergère and M. N. Roy trace Sun’s 
ideas on land reform to Henry George. 
18Datong is one of two stages of perfected society as described in the Daxue (“Greater 
Learning”). Xiaokang, the first stage, is a stage of moderate prosperity, in which none have 
severe want. Datong, the second stage, is something of a utopia, in which there is no want 
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emphasize elements of a mythic Chinese past evoked in historical writings, what 
exactly he meant by minsheng zhuyi was not entirely clear and would later become a 
key issue in his contested legacy. He died without completing his discussion of this 
third principle. Afflicted with gallbladder cancer, he passed away on a trip north to 
meet with the Beijing government and rival warlord cliques to discuss prospects of 
unifying China. His political will charged the people of China with continuing his 
revolutionary work, while his personal will left his modest worldly belongings to 
Song Qingling. An ultimate “letter of farewell”, drafted by Mikhail Borodin and 
addressing the Soviet Union, would later emerge among Communist ideologues to 
bolster their ties to Sun and his legacy.19 
While Sun was famous in the latter half of life, his image became hallowed 
and ubiquitous following his death. His eye-catching funeral train to Nanjing, the 
construction of the Sun Yat-sen Mausoleum in the Purple Mountains outside Nanjing 
near the Ming tomb of the Hongwu Emperor, the portrait veneration practiced under 
the Nanjing government and continued, to some extent, under the People’s Republic 
and ROC-Taiwan regimes suggested and reinforced an almost-saintly significance for 
Sun Yat-sen in the tale of the Chinese nation. However, it was only in 1940 that Sun, 
who had before been referred to as “Mister Sun”, “Doctor Sun”, or “the Premier” 
(zongli), was formally declared “father of the nation” (guofu) by the provisional 
Chongqing-GMD government of Chiang Kai-shek. Chiang was then in a second 
 
and all is in harmony with the Great Way. Kang Youwei repurposed the concept of datong in 
his own thought exercise, Datong shu (“Book of the Grand Union”). Xiaokang has, in recent 
years, been repurposed by the Chinese Communist Party as an aspirational milestone for 
economic development. 
19 Bergère, 406. 
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United Front partnership with the CCP against Japanese invasion and several 
collaborator governments, including Wang Jingwei’s Reorganized Government at 
Nanjing. Wang, for his part, also made ample use of Sun to legitimate his own 
government, and similarly adopted the term guofu. 
 
The preceding outline is not meant to be comprehensive; however, it is clear 
from this sketch that Sun Yat-sen’s complex life lends itself to a variety of 
interpretations. Some of the malleability of Sun’s character may be conveyed by 
examining four biographies: one from his early friend in James Cantlie, one from a 
revolutionary acquaintance and detractor in M. N. Roy, and two others by scholars 
writing from different perspectives and locations: one by Republican historian Jiang 
Xingde, a new zhuan narrative of Sun’s life written at the end of the Second Sino- 
Japanese War and reprinted in commemoration of his one-hundredth birthday; the 
other by Marie-Claire Bergère, academic historian and author of the most recent 
authoritative Western-language biography of Sun, a biography that seeks to separate 
Sun the hero from Sun the man. I hope that, by briefly contrasting these biographies 
here, we may observe the evolution of Sun Yat-sen’s “heroic image,” to borrow the 
language of J. Y. Wong,20 and see how it fared in different contexts. 
iii: Four Biographies of Sun Yat-sen 
 
James Cantlie (1851-1926), a Scottish doctor who helped establish the 
College of Medicine in Hong Kong, was an intimate acquaintance of Sun Yat-sen. If 
J. Y. Wong’s Origins of a Heroic Image is to be trusted, Cantlie was largely 
 
 
20 Wong, Origins of a Heroic Image. 
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responsible for Sun’s elevation from an aspiring but failed rebel to China’s 
revolutionary hero.21 To understand the significance of Cantlie in creating Sun’s 
image, it is necessary to outline the details of Sun’s London affair. In 1894, Sun 
founded the Xingzhonghui (the Revive China Society), an organization dedicated to 
toppling the Manchu throne, in Honolulu. Subsequently, in 1895, Sun and his 
organization launched an uprising in Guangzhou from Hong Kong that failed to 
depose the local government. Forced to flee abroad and no longer welcome in Hong 
Kong or Macao, Sun fled to Hawaii and, later, the continental United States. After a 
long fundraising tour, in the fall of 1896 he made his way to Britain from the port of 
New York. He arrived in London by way of Liverpool, and found housing near 
Gray’s Inn in London, thanks to the help of the Cantlies. Between the Inn—one of the 
Inns of Court that trained barristers and so was surrounded with cheap student 
housing—and the Cantlies’ home lay the Chinese Legation, an unmarked building on 
Portland Place near the Oxford Circus. 
 
Sun was purportedly kidnapped one day en route to the Cantlies’ by Chinese 
agents and imprisoned on the top floor of the Legation. From the top floor, he tried to 
alert passerby to his plight by throwing notes from the window. These were 
summarily collected by the British porter-cum-prison-guard Cole, until Sun managed 
to bribe him into relaying a message to Dr. Cantlie and Dr. Manson, another former 
teacher. Cantlie recalled his wife receiving a message from the doorstep, written in a 
woman’s hand. It urged him that a “Sin Yat-sen” was imprisoned in the Legation and 
 
 
21 To avoid oversimplification, we should note that Wong additionally credits Chen Shaobai, 
the British press, and the Japanese press as other major contributors. 
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was soon to be deported to China to be tried and hanged for treason.22 Cantlie worked 
diligently, pressing Scotland Yard to intervene and eliciting the help of the Foreign 
Office to prevent Sun’s deportation. Cantlie’s efforts to prevent deportation and 
ensure Sun’s release eventually caught the attention of the press, which blew the story 
into a media sensation by October 22nd, 1896. Eventually, Sir Halliday Macartney, 
Scottish secretary in service of the Chinese Legation and descendent of the famous 
Lord Macartney, released Sun on behalf of the Legation. Macartney was subsequently 
pilloried in the press as an “Orientalized” Brit who betrayed his race and nation in 
service to the Qing.23 The criticism was particularly intense given that some papers 
identified Sun as a Hong Konger (per Sun’s own words at a press conference 
following his release) and thus a subject of the Crown unjustly held by the Chinese 
Legation.24 
J. Y. Wong, in his Origins of a Heroic Image, explores Sun’s London 
captivity and the roles of outsiders in the incident and the media response. Wong 
suggests that Cantlie, an esteemed but largely unknown doctor with some colonial 
service at the peak of the British Empire, was not just Sun’s benefactor and guardian 
angel, but also, effectively, his first press agent. He helped manage Sun’s 
conferences, coached his statements, and even wrote Sun’s famous Kidnapped in 
London account. Wong comes to this conclusion as a result of comparing Kidnapped 
in London and Cantlie’s later work, Sun Yat Sen and the Awakening of China. He 
 
22 James Cantlie and C. Sheridan Jones, Sun Yat Sen and the Awakening of China (London: 
Fleming H. Revell Company, 1912), 42. 
23 Sun Yat Sen, Kidnapped in London, (London: China Society, 1969), 126. 
Wong, 67. 
24 Wong, 145, 166. 
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finds strong stylistic resemblance and a mastery of English language and Scottish 
humor that Sun lacked. While I personally cannot comment on Scottish humor, a 
comparison might help illustrate the grounds for Wong’s suspicions. In Kidnapped in 
London, “Sun” writes as follows: 
 
The fact of the rescue was the all important measure in the minds of the little 
group of Englishmen present; not so, however, with my astute countryman; 
not so especially with Sir Halliday Macartney, that embodiment of retrograde 
orientalism.25 
James Cantlie, in his later book, makes ample use of Sun’s earlier book, explicitly 
quoting “Sun.” The following passage is openly from Cantlie’s hand: 
 
Though deep-seated discontent simmered in the land, it seemed impossible to 
develop a master-mind in China fitted for the great task of reform from 
amongst the rich, the powerful, the families of ancient lineage or the 
philosophic literati: so Providence selected a man from the humbler 
classes…26 
The books are different in form, but share elements of style that would seem foreign 
to Sun. Sun offers a logical answer to questions of authorship in his preface to 
Kidnapped in London: 
 
I must beg the indulgence of all readers for my shortcomings in English 
 
 
 
 
25 Sun, Kidnapped in London, 96. 
26 Cantlie, Sun Yat Sen, 24. 
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composition, and confess had it not been for the help rendered by a good 
friend, who transcribed my thoughts, I could never have ventured to appear as 
the Author of an English book.27 
It seems entirely reasonable that Sun would rely upon a native speaker whose 
transcription presumably included editorial services as well.28 Bergère suggests this 
version of events, stating that Cantlie helped write the book.29 
If we entertain Wong’s conclusions about Cantlie’s likely authorship, we 
might ask: why would Cantlie do this? What did he gain from turning Sun into a 
celebrity? Sun was at that moment a failed rebel. His uprising in Guangzhou was a 
flop, and Sun was derided as inept if not cowardly for having called off the campaign 
while the Hong Kong contingent was still en route, leaving them to their fates as 
traitors.30 Unbeknownst to Cantlie, Sun’s former comrade-at-arms Yeung Ku-wan 
had denounced Sun as a coward. Sun’s only dedicated follower at this point, 
according to Wong, was his old friend Chen Shaobai, who fled to Kobe and wrote an 
article on Sun’s London affair that presented an entirely different narrative. However, 
by recasting Sun as an Anglicized Chinese Christian—well-versed in English and in 
the liberal arts and sciences, with big hopes for the Chinese and great hatred for the 
Manchus—Cantlie effectively positioned Sun to gain British sympathy for his cause. 
 
 
27 Sun, Kidnapped in London, Preface. 
28 The rest of Sun Yat Sen (the part that does not concern Sun) is presumably the work of the 
co-author C. Sheridan Jones. Cantlie states in a foreword that he only gave his input directly 
relating to Sun. Later chapters on opium, Chinese history, and China’s future are presumably 
the work of Jones. The first two chapters of Sun Yat Sen are thus presumably the most 
relevant chapters to sample. 
29 Bergère, 64. 
30 Wong, 170. 
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Both Kidnapped in London and Sun Yat Sen emphasize Sun’s connection to Britain. 
Since the latter book, published in 1912 after Sun became the provisional president of 
the ROC, served to reintroduce Sun to the English-speaking world, we will consider it 
in greater detail. 
 
In Sun Yat Sen and the Awakening of China, Sun is presented as a humble, 
diligent patriot, selfless and charitable in the most Christian sense of the word. With a 
liberal education and pure intentions, he tirelessly worked to arouse the people of 
China to overthrow the Manchus, who mismanaged the country and forced the 
Chinese to live in ignorance and shame. His establishment of the Republic was 
groundbreaking and appropriate to China’s historical trajectory, as China had 
essentially functioned as a federal state for centuries. Cantlie curiously omits Sun’s 
childhood move to Hawaii; placing him in Cuiheng (where he reportedly learned 
English from an Englishwoman in the vicinity) prior to moving to Canton as a young 
man. In this account, Sun’s father was an ardent Christian connected to the London 
Missionary Society: 
 
His father was a convert to Christianity, and was employed as a missionary 
agent by the London Missionary Society. An English lady connected with the 
mission interested herself in the young lad, and by her help Sun was well 
grounded in English. At the age of eighteen Sun became attached to the 
hospital of the Anglo-American Mission in Canton, then under the direction of 
a surgeon of considerable repute, Dr. Kerr. He became deeply interested in 
medicine and surgery, and when twenty years of age he came to Hong Kong 
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to prosecute his studies in the newly opened College of Medicine.31 
 
This curious account of Sun’s early life is worth exploration (this will be aided by 
discussion of Marie-Claire Bergère’s authoritative biography on Sun). Cantlie and 
Jones evidently aimed to present Sun favorably to a British audience.32 Telling 
moments include discussion of why a constitutional monarchy could not work in 
China, how exactly Cantlie and the British public aided Sun during his London 
tribulation, and what the Xinhai Revolution signified for China. Also telling, a great 
deal of miscellanea–from an odd history that combines the Qin and Han to discussion 
of Chinese physiology–pads the book’s length with content designed to contextualize 
Sun and the Chinese people he stood to represent. This vaguely Orientalist miscellany 
includes some material relevant to Sun’s politics, such as his views on women’s 
rights (in favor, but not for all women).33 The authors noted that Sun did not consider 
illiterate, uneducated people eligible to participate in politics. Nonetheless, Cantlie 
and Jones also argued that Sun believed the people of China were ready for 
republicanism. These positions are not mutually exclusive, but the account does chafe 
with some other later interpretations that present Sun as an icon of democracy and 
egalitarianism.34 Indeed, throughout his life Sun consistently believed in what he 
 
31 Cantlie, 27. 
32 The final section of the book (ibid, p. 246) consists of an address from Sun on the 
likelihood of civil war in 1912. Sun compared the Beijing-Nanjing capital split to a 
hypothetical debate on moving the capital from Washington, D.C., to Augusta, ME, 
downplaying the gravity of the actual dispute and the possibility of civil war. The address, 
directed towards an American audience, illustrates the book was not meant solely for the 
British market. 
33 Ibid., 181-182. Cantlie and Jones also note that Sun was against foot-binding, but that foot- 
binding was not as bizarre as unnamed writers made it seem, bringing in European women’s 
wearing of excessively small shoes as a comparison. 
34 Sun’s depiction in American statuary is a topic of limited discussion in Chapter IV, Section 
II of this thesis. 
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termed “natural inequality.” He referenced this in his 1924 lectures on minquan zhuyi, 
or the Principle of Democracy, stating that true equality was equality of opportunity 
and not of outcome or ability.35 We may understand Cantlie’s narrative as an appeal 
to an elite audience. It is also revealing of both Sun and Cantlie’s assumptions about 
elite qualifications for citizenship and political participation. 
 
Cantlie’s book clearly presented Sun as a noble, humble revolutionary and 
patriot who worked hard to liberate his people from the heavy yoke of Manchu 
tyranny. Sun was not a demagogue as unnamed detractors supposedly alleged, but a 
gentle speaker preaching: 
 
A simple sermon, during which his hearers neither applauded nor gave sign of 
dissent–a spellbound audience listening to a message which had been denied 
them for centuries. A message of hope to escape from a thralldom [sic] 
compared with which the monarchical and religious tyranny of the Middle 
Ages in Western Europe appears as comparative freedom…36 
He reframes Sun’s life to make him more appealing to a British and American 
audience. In an address directed towards an American audience, Sun sought to 
assuage fears of civil war brewing in China. That such an address targeted American 
readers suggests the salience of civil war memory in the United States of 1912, unlike 
in the Britain of the same year. Unfortunately, the Republic would indeed devolve 
into civil war among feuding warlord cliques; the end, arguably, would not come 
 
 
35 Bergère, 374 
36 Ibid., 49. 
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until the end of active PRC-ROC conflict in the 1960s.37 It is worth noting that 
Cantlie and Jones paint Sun and China as victims. The Chinese people were victims 
of the Manchus and Sun himself was kidnapped by the agents of the Legation: the 
vile Legation assistant Ting Kang (Deng Tingkang), the wicked Halliday Macartney, 
and the specter of the Chinese minister issuing orders from his sickbed. 
 
Wong helpfully discusses Chen Shaobai’s alternative portrait of Sun’s London 
kidnapping, which was published in an English-language newspaper in Kobe. Chen 
stated that Sun, a fearless revolutionary risking all in pursuit of his country’s destiny, 
voluntarily and knowingly entered the Legation to proselytize revolution.38 Hu 
Hanmin and Dai Jitao, GMD leaders with close connections to Sun, later reported 
having heard the same narrative from Sun.39 Wong explained Chen’s intervention as 
an effort to reshape Sun’s public image in response to scathing insults published by 
the faction loyal to Sun’s former partner Yeung Ku-wan. Wong suggests that Sun 
later adopted this image to illustrate his bravery and selfless dedication to the 
revolutionary cause. However, Sun never publicly endorsed or repeated this narrative. 
The fact Sun completely changed his appearance upon leaving China suggests an 
appropriate level of prudence for a wanted man. Had he been fearless, why would he 
disguise himself? Of course, the Western suit would presumably serve him better in 
 
 
 
 
 
37 One could also argue that the civil war never ended, given the lack of a formal peace 
arrangement between the PRC and ROC, or that the phase of internecine warlord conflict 
more or less ended with the success of the Northern Expedition of the GMD and the Central 
Plains War. 
38 Wong, 122. 
39 Ibid., 115. 
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Japan and the West, but the facts of Sun’s life do not support reckless action.40 
 
According to Wong, it is likely that Sun was tricked into entering the Legation 
by the ministerial assistant Deng Tingkang, but that Deng was not entirely sure he 
had encounted Sun. The Legation had been informed by the Chinese Minister in New 
York that Sun had left for London, but they did not know where he was or what he 
looked like. Deng, as Wong’s narrative goes, was from Xiangshan and knew that Sun 
was as well; thus, Deng tested the suspect man by greeting him on the street in 
Xiangshanese dialect. The man’s reported response confirmed his Xiangshan origin. 
Wong suggests, as Sun wrote in Kidnapped in London, that Deng and the Legation 
believed this confirmed Xiangshanese was possibly Sun, and that it was worth 
detaining him and then investigating his identity on the off-chance it was Sun. A 
detective hired by the Legation noted Sun’s frequent travel past the Legation between 
Gray’s Inn and the Cantlies’ home. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that the Legation 
had more significant information on Sun and his whereabouts than “London, 
currently”. This narrative, of Sun tricked into captivity and indebted to a porter for his 
rescue, is less inspiring, but it may be more accurate. It also more closely aligns with 
Sun’s own narrative in Kidnapped in London and with Cantlie’s later narrative in Sun 
Yat Sen and the Awakening of China. 
 
In discussing Cantlie and Chen, I have touched upon two biographers (to use 
the term loosely, as Chen only wrote a newspaper article) who constructed particular 
images of Sun for specific uses. Chen’s image of Sun was one of a selfless 
 
40 The Chinese Legation did not necessarily know he was in London, given that travelers to 
Britain did not need a visa or passport at this time. Ibid., 6-7. 
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revolutionary who could not be cowed by the oppressive Manchu dynasty that had sat 
atop China for centuries. Cantlie, for his part, also emphasized Sun’s revolutionary 
selflessness and revolutionary goals, but he took care to present Sun in a way likely to 
appeal to British readers so as to endear Sun and his cause to them at a time when 
many Britons preferred the idea of propping up the Qing Dynasty. This British 
preference might be seen in Major General Charles Gordon’s leadership of the Ever- 
Victorious Army, a Qing force of Chinese soldiers, in squashing the Taiping 
Rebellion. Halliday Macartney, for his part, served in the Ever-Victorious Army as a 
surgeon and later served the Qing government as a civil servant. 
 
However, Cantlie flipped the script. He recast the Taiping Rebellion as a 
Christian and patriotic revolution against the corrupt and insatiable Manchu despots, 
thus implicitly connecting Sun with Hong Xiuquan as Christian patriots who learned 
from the West in order to save China. This implicit connection is reinforced by 
Wong’s historiographical analysis of various Sun studies.41 Reframing the Taipings 
as heroes also entailed casting the Manchus and their representatives in Britain as 
villains; therefore, Halliday Macartney was slandered as an Orientalized Briton with 
no integrity despite his previous work to prevent the execution—in line with the Qing 
Code—of a servant in the Legation some ten years before.42 Cantlie’s image of Sun 
clearly sold well in Britain, but it is unclear how well it endured following Sun’s 
resigning of office and the Republic’s plunge into chaos, particularly seeing that 1914 
 
41 Wong 296-8. 
42 Wong helpfully complicates the picture by exploring Macartney’s motivations and history, 
as well as those of the minister-in-residence Gong Zhaoyuan. Long ill and with a disgraced 
brother, he needed a win to help him advance up the government hierarchy. Detaining Sun, a 
known rebel, presented a reasonable solution. 
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would bring more pressing matters to the forefront of British media. 
 
While the colonial doctor Cantlie tailored an image of Sun well-suited to the 
British public of the late Victorian and Edwardian periods, M. N. Roy (1887-1954), 
an Indian Communist, portrayed a very different Sun Yat-sen in his 1946 work 
Revolution and Counter-revolution in China. The book was first published in German 
in 1930; the long-delayed English version added chapters to treat new 
developments.43 Roy was one of the Comintern’s men on the ground in China in the 
late 1920s. He had previous experience in Indian independence activities and had 
helped to found the Indian and Mexican Communist Parties. Though he had only 
arrived in China in 1927 and was forced to leave shortly thereafter by Wang 
Jingwei’s expulsion of Communists from the Wuhan government that same year,44 he 
later undertook a Marxist analysis of the state of revolutionary progress in China. 
 
While Cantlie wrote Kidnapped in London and Sun Yat Sen and the 
Awakening of China to present a sympathetic image of Sun for a British audience, 
Roy wrote his report for two audiences. The first was for a general German audience 
in 1930, the second a general Anglophone audience in 1946. His book, as he 
described it, was chiefly written to analyze China’s history “scientifically” according 
to Marxist theory so as to explain the failures of the Xinhai Revolution and the 
success of the GMD counterrevolution. His analysis elucidated the special nature of 
 
43 Robert Gale Woolbert, “Capsule Review: Revolution and Counter-revolution in China, by 
M. N. Roy,” Foreign Affairs, 1947, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/reviews/capsule- 
review/1947-10-01/revolution-and-counter-revolution-china. 
44 For further details on the breakdown of the Wuhan government, see Wang Fanxi’s 
Memoirs of Wang Fan-hsi: A Chinese Revolutionary or Anna Louise Strong’s I Change 
Worlds. 
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Chinese feudalism45 and the lack of a proletarian basis for a socialist movement in 
China after 1927.46 Roy noted in the introduction that the release of the English 
version had been delayed for more than a decade due to difficulties resulting from his 
six-year imprisonment in India for his pro-independence organizing. He also referred 
to a heightened sensitivity on the part of British censors in India to criticism of the 
United Front and its constituent parts as a result of the Second World War. 
Consequently, it was only in 1946 that the English version was published. As 
mentioned above, Roy ended with an epilogue updating the book to the present day. 
He argued that the Chinese Communist Party was no longer truly Communist—and 
had not been since the loss of the urban movement in 1927. Rather, the Communist 
Party of 1946 was really a Radical Democratic Party. For Roy, this was historically 
appropriate according to Marxist historical materialism and was thus a progressive 
development. 
 
Roy painted an unflattering picture of Sun Yat-sen and the Xinhai Revolution, 
both key elements in later Chinese Communist narratives. Roy had met Sun 
 
 
45 M. N. Roy, Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China, (Calcutta: Renaissance 
Publishers, 1946), 24. The crux is that, because China lacked draft animals and large 
concentrations of land (and that land ownership was controlled by the Emperor, forestalling a 
sufficiently independent nobility), an insufficient population was displaced from the land into 
slavery. Agriculture remained labor intensive and did not become more extensive, 
particularly following the population transfer into South China away from the more slavery- 
conducive northern plain. The retardation of development into a slave society in turn retarded 
the development of feudal society, creating a “particular” feudal state given the land 
ownership pattern mentioned above. Despite moments of progress in the Qin, Song, and 
Ming, ultimately the destructive forces of counter-revolution—designed to “harmonize” 
society by controlling the chiefs and kings—and foreign domination (the Qing) disrupt the 
evolution of Chinese society along the universal dialectic of history. For Roy, this partially 
explains why the Comintern failed in in China, as they and the CCP simply sought to “copy 
Russia” without realizing that China was fundamentally different. 
46 Ibid., 569. 
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previously in Japan in 1913. At that time, Sun had declined to help Roy in organizing 
anti-British activities in India. Roy thus had negative personal experiences with Sun. 
However, Roy did not write a personal attack, but rather based his analysis of Sun on 
Marxist historical analysis as well as various records, such as imperial edicts, 
newspaper articles, and ideological tracts, in an effort to understand the players 
involved in the Chinese democratic revolution and counterrevolution. 
 
Of course, Roy’s expansive account was not solely concerned with Sun. 
Rather, he aimed to present a scientific history of China, from the earliest days 
through the present, according with Marxist understandings of history. Although Sun 
is only a part of this, he is significant in Roy’s narrative. In discussing Sun and the 
Xinhai Revolution, Roy described Sun as a foolish petit-bourgeois adventurer without 
the courage or foresight to hold onto power in 1912, and with a dangerously 
reactionary outlook on Chinese history in line with Confucian desires to find harmony 
between disparate and “natural” social classes. Sun was also representative of China’s 
underdevelopment, as the grand bourgeois were small and largely in league with the 
feudal elites, leaving incompetent and incapable petit bourgeois like Sun to organize a 
revolution. According to Roy there was nothing revolutionary about Sun Yat-sen, an 
insight integral to understanding the failure of the Xinhai Revolution. 
 
First, Roy highlighted Sun’s distance from the Xinhai Revolution. Roy 
explicitly stated that Sun had nothing to do with the fall of the Manchu court, arguing 
that the Xinhai Revolution did not even destroy the authority of the imperial system. 
The first edict of abdication presented republican government as a gift from the 
Emperor and explicitly called upon former Beiyang General Yuan Shikai, a 
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conservative figure with vested interest in the existing system, to form the 
government. The second edict, likewise, ensured that the emperor preserved his 
position as the “high-priest of society”. Arguing that this was not merely a symbolic 
position, Roy wrote that “the function of the Emperor as the High priest of society 
was the cornerstone of the feudal-patriarchal social relations, on the basis of which 
the Chinese monarchist State had been constructed.” The Emperor’s continuation of 
this role meant that the social relations of the feudal empire had not changed.47 Since 
the social relations were not democratized, the Xinhai Revolution was neither a real 
revolution nor historically progressive. 
 
Why was the Xinhai Revolution such a failure? Roy stated that it did not 
advance social relations from feudalism to capitalism. He argued that this was the 
fault of China’s cowardly bourgeoisie, more frightened by the empowered masses 
than by the constraints of the feudal system. Roy granted that the abdication presaged 
the overdue collapse of feudal government and that, to the feudal elites, Yuan Shikai 
was a more acceptable choice to head a new republican government than Sun Yat- 
sen, who appeared as the compromise candidate of the bourgeoisie and the “less 
reactionary feudal elite.”48 However, Sun and the bourgeoisie “capitulated” to Yuan 
and his supporters in order to secure the conditional abdication of the emperor. Sun 
thus lost the Republic: 
 
Nothing more than a mere hint was needed for making the bourgeoisie cower. 
Replying to the telegram announcing the abdication of the ruling dynasty, Sun 
 
47 Ibid., 226 
48 Ibid., 233. 
49 Ibid., 231. 
50 Ibid., 238. 
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Yat-sen, on behalf of the revolutionary Convention and its constituents, 
expressed pleasure at the development in the North, and congratulated Yuan 
Shih-kai upon his conversion to the Republican faith. But the Provisional 
President of the new-born Republic dared question then right of the abdicating 
monarchy to name the head of the Republican Government. However, in the 
same telegram, Sun Yat-sen declared his willingness to resign in favour of 
Yuan Shih-kai...That act of his was greatly praised as a noble example of 
idealistic patriotism. In reality, it represented sheer cowardice on the part of 
the bourgeoisie, which surrendered without a struggle. The resignation of Sun 
Yat-sen meant the fall of the Republic.49 
Moreover, the bourgeoisie worked to disavow and suppress the mobilizing masses, 
their only source of power and legitimacy. In doing so, “they turned their face against 
mass revolt, and thus supported the sinners [i.e. domestic feudalists, foreign 
imperialists] against the interests of the country.”50 Not only did Sun not lead the 
Xinhai Revolution, Roy argues, but due to the cowardice of Sun and the bourgeoisie, 
“the Republic was a stillborn child,” and the nation soon devolved into anarchy. 
Feudalism was dead, but capitalism was not yet established, and there was much 
chaos. 
 
While Roy did address the historical specificities of the Xinhai Revolution, his 
primary focus in this chapter was an analysis of Sun Yat-sen. His analysis may 
generously be described as a methodical character assassination. Though we see 
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elements of this narrative in his discussion of the Xinhai Revolution—Sun was a 
bourgeois coward who had nothing to do with his supposed crowning achievement— 
Roy’s attack became more personal as he discussed Sun’s ideology, the Three 
People’s Principles, and the basis of his less-than-revolutionary nationalism. In Roy’s 
analysis, Sunism necessarily negated the existence of the masses’ suffering and was a 
reactionary doctrine that looked to China’s mythical past as inspiration.51 This had to 
do with Sun’s class origins. As small landowners in Cuiheng, his family had vested 
interests in the system of feudal-patriarchal relations. Moreover, Sun Yat-sen also 
was influenced by bourgeois thought, a likely result of his time in capitalist zones like 
Hawaii, Britain, Hong Kong, and the United States. His impressions of capitalist 
modernity, as shaped by the West, were favorable: 
 
In Hawai [sic], he found the foreign rule to be beneficial for the natives. He 
was very much impressed by the law and order established there by American 
Imperialism. The father of Chinese nationalism was on the point of becoming 
an admirer of foreign Imperialism. But he was saved because his faith in the 
superiority of the Confucian culture remained unshaken.52 
Roy noted disapprovingly that Sun’s brother, Sun Mei—described by Bergère and 
Jiang as the good and filial son with a keen business sense who enabled his younger 
brother’s globetrotting misadventures—was a capitalist who had profited from human 
trafficking between Xiangshan and Hawaii.53 We should note here that the only basis 
 
 
51 Ibid., 251. 
52 Ibid., 253. 
53 Bergère, 75. 
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for understanding Sun as a nationalist that Roy could see was his chauvinistic faith in 
Confucian culture, the same culture Roy characterizes as “a threadbare corpse.” He 
thus attached Sun to the reactionary relations of feudal patriarchy that subject the 
masses to “brutal pre-capitalist exploitation.” 
 
According to Roy, Sun distrusted the masses and had “no appreciation for 
social issues” despite his family’s being essentially landless in the decayed feudal 
system. His revolutionary rhetoric was limited to jeremiads against the Manchu 
monarchy, lacking any positive considerations or inspiring practical solutions to the 
many pressing problems of the Chinese peasantry. Roy continued to disparage Sun by 
discussing his “quixotic” attempts—Roy bemoaned Sun’s ideological inconsistencies 
over time—at positive theoretical construction in the Three People’s Principles. The 
Three People’s Principles of Nationalism, Democracy, and the People’s Welfare 
fundamentally sought to balance Confucian cultural and social considerations with 
the political demands of capitalist democracy. They succeeded more as Confucianism 
than as a plea for capitalism.54 Moreover, Sun’s inaugural address deployed the 
language of a monarch (“plan and beget the blessings for the people”). For Roy, this 
betrayed a feudal conception of political power, as did the very notion of political 
tutelage.55 Sun’s somewhat Kantian idea of natural inequality based upon moral 
capacity, intelligence, and agency also revealed his disdain for the masses, or the 
buzhi bujue zhe (“those who neither know nor think”) to use his terms. At best, his 
undemocratic meritocracy was a “benevolent despotism” that kept the people away 
 
 
54 Roy, 255. 
55 Ibid., 257. 
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from the levers of power. 
 
Key to Roy’s criticism of Sun’s ideology was that Sun was not adequately 
bourgeois and thus failed to create appropriate revolutionary ideology for this stage of 
history. Roy blasted the Chinese bourgeoisie for their cowardice and ineptitude. Sun 
was not even properly bourgeois in Roy’s telling. Despite his brother’s business and 
Sun’s extensive time overseas in capitalist metropoles and their colonies, Sun failed 
in many ways to represent a positive political break from feudalism. His reverence for 
Chinese tradition was already suspicious, as Confucian gentlemen were critical of 
profit and uninterested in practical issues (one must think only to Fan Chi or 
Mencius’ discussions with King Hui of Liang) and were—by even their historical 
standards—reactionary in their reverence for the long-gone rule of Yao, Shun, and the 
Duke of Zhou. Beyond this, Sun argued that excessive individualism was a problem 
in China, a most un-bourgeois sentiment. Roy considered it a matter of faith that 
individualism represented the freeing of the individual to pursue unfettered self- 
interest, a motivating factor in the economic vivacity and revolutionary nature of 
bourgeois capitalism (in that it changes the relations of production, unbinding serfs 
from their land and lords, and lords from their kings; now every man is free to pursue 
profit, squeezed from wherever it may be found, to the heart’s delight). However, 
their desires will never be satiated, regardless of how much capital they accumulate 
and reinvest for yet greater returns. According to a Leninist analysis to which Roy 
subscribed, the reinvestment of capital eventually builds the decadent and idle rentier 
class, whose primacy is based upon buying off national opportunists at the expense of 
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laborers in the colonies.56 These colonial subjects eventually bring about the downfall 
of the capitalist system through anti-colonial national revolutions. 
 
In contrast to Roy and Lenin’s Marxist conceptualizations, Sun argued that 
individuals in a still-feudal China were too self-actualized, like “loose grains of sand” 
unable to bear the weight of any great structure.57 Building the Chinese nation 
required a communalism based on the realization of a vibrant national spirit.58 
According to Roy, such an ideology could not bring about the necessary development 
of capitalism in that it would not establish bourgeois relations of production. Sun’s 
idea for land distribution, often portrayed by Chinese communists as Sun’s sloppy 
attempt to introduce socialist policy to China, was also framed by Roy as reactionary. 
Following Henry George, Sun’s original conception of land reform did not actually 
redistribute land. Rather, “unearned profit’ stemming from land speculation was 
redistributed. Roy argued that this was inappropriate in China, where soaring land 
value was not a common problem. Moreover, he suggested that Sun’s idea 
functionally served to preserve the feudal-patriarchal system of land ownership.59 
Despite his harsh criticisms, Roy gave Sun some credit. The Principle of 
Nationalism correctly recognized the evils of imperialism and so in this sense had 
revolutionary character, in appropriately identifying an enemy of the Chinese people. 
 
 
56 V. I. Lenin, Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism (Durham, UK: Aziloth Books, 
2018), 98-99. 
57 Sun Yat-sen, “The Principle of Nationalism I” (Minzuzhuyi di yi jiang), 3, 
http://sunology.culture.tw/cgi- 
bin/gs32/gsweb.cgi/ccd=DW8oq5/grapheviewer1?dbid=CF7777777779&initpage=141. 
58 J. Y. Wong speculates Sun’s fixation on the national spirit came from his observing Queen 
Victoria’s Diamond Jubilee in June of 1897 and the public celebration it engendered. 
59 Roy, 291-292. 
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Roy also applauded Sun’s recognition of the Chinese Communist Party’s potential as 
a force for societal transformation and as an ally of the GMD, as well as his “belated” 
abandonment of “reactionary principles” in his reformulation of the GMD along 
Leninist lines. Nonetheless, Roy believed that Sun’s first two principles were 
necessarily principles of “class domination”, and that the Three People’s Principles as 
group constituted “deceptive reformism” aimed at forestalling the coming revolution 
by an alliance of petit-bourgeois and feudal elites.60 Roy even went so far as to accuse 
Sun of being pro-imperialist, as Roy equated Pan-Asianism with Japanese 
imperialism and noted Sun’s approval of Pan-Asianist discourse. On the whole, Roy 
painted a highly unflattering picture of the revolutionary forebear. 
 
In conclusion, Roy framed Sun Yat-sen as a reactionary figure. His sins were 
many: Sun was a coward, an opportunist, a shallow petit-bourgeois thinker, a 
paternalist, an elitist, a Confucian essentialist, a confused would-be revolutionary 
mired in contradictions (nationalism mandated action against foreign powers, and yet 
Sun advocated cooperation). Therefore, Roy denied him a place in China’s 
revolutionary pantheon, as he neither mobilized the masses to overcome their 
suffering nor did he oppose the true foe of China, foreign imperialism. Sun did not 
lead any revolution, as is shown by his lack of participation in the revolution, in his 
first instance, and by his inability to maintain in position as president of the Republic. 
His main contribution to China’s revolutionary progress was only that he saw the 
potential importance of the CCP as a political entity. Roy bolstered his case that this 
did not mean that Sun was a Communist or even remotely inclined in such a direction 
 
60 Ibid., 295. 
61 Jiang. See footnote four. 
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by reference to the Sun-Joffe Accords and the details of Sun’s life. In a forceful 
argument, Roy aired a long list of faults, undermining Sun’s posthumous reputation 
as a revolutionary forebear. 
 
Moving beyond these formative, if contrasting, accounts of Sun’s 
contemporaries, it is instructive to turn now to those of the professional historians 
Jiang Xingde and Marie-Claire Bergère. Sun had already been crowned “Father of the 
Nation” (guofu) by the GMD and a “revolutionary pioneer” (geming de xianqu) by 
the CCP by the time of these historians’ works. Here again we confront widely 
differing portraits. 
 
Jiang Xingde, a Chinese historian who would follow the GMD regime to 
Taiwan after 1949, offered a new biography in the Chinese zhuan narrative tradition 
dedicated to Sun’s life. Chinese biographies in the zhuan tradition tend to be 
expressly moralistic and aestheticized, and Jiang’s is no exception. Before this work, 
first published in 1945, Jiang’s most famous work chronicled the life of Zeng Guofan, 
a Qing-dynasty general who suppressed the Taiping Rebellion. Jiang’s biography of 
Sun was reprinted in 1965 to mark Sun’s fast-approaching centennial.61 As the 
centennial of Sun’s birth, 1966 was an ideologically significant year for the 
Nationalists in Taiwan. Indeed, they used the occasion to launch the Chinese Cultural 
Renaissance Movement in response to the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution on 
the mainland. This ideological landscape of mid-60s Taiwan must inform our reading 
of Jiang’s reissued work. Nonetheless, we should not overlook that the book had 
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originally been written for a different context, that of the wartime ROC. Jiang’s book 
served to bolster the image of Sun according to traditional cultural mores as espoused 
in the GMD’s New Life Movement, a moment of radical traditionalism, according to 
Arif Dirlik, that arose as a counterrevolutionary challenge to the Jiangxi Soviet. 
Invoking New Life virtues of cleanliness, simplicity, and duty, Jiang reshaped Sun to 
fit in the mold of a traditionally-moral revolutionary at a time when the Communist 
challenge was gaining the upper hand.62 The 1965 reprinting further underscores the 
importance for the GMD of providing a compelling ideological alternative to 
Communism, and the necessity of a heroic Sun Yat-sen to exemplify this ideology. 
 
Jiang’s narrative begins with the assumption that Sun was destined to be a 
great revolutionary leader. He begins the first chapter, “The Early Life of the Father 
of the Nation,” describing a new dawn for China: “A great revolutionary leader’s rise 
is certainly not accidental. The Father of the Nation was born on the forty-sixth year 
before the Republic, only about eighty years ago…” From here, Jiang suggested that 
the natural environment of Xiangshan played into his revolutionary destiny.63 The 
unstable weather of the southern maritimes, subject to squalls and typhoons, damp 
cold and blistering heat, pensive clouds and brilliant skies instilled a deep 
understanding of natural change and impermanence in the young Sun, Jiang writes.64 
His early life as one of six children, two of whom died young, in a humble, simple, 
and clean poor family instilled good values into a young Sun. We might note that 
 
62 Arif Dirlik, "The Ideological Foundations of the New Life Movement: A Study in 
Counterrevolution," Journal of Asian Studies (1975): 34 (4): 945–980. 
63 Jiang, 1. The original text is: “一個偉大的革命領袖，他的產生不是偶然的。國父生於
民國紀年前四十六年，離開現在恰恰是八十年了。” 
64 Jiang, 4. 
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these values resembled those of the former New Life Movement, the ideological 
movement that was to take the backwards citizens of China and raise their spiritual 
and physical character through disciple to that of civilized people.65 Jiang periodically 
emphasized the traditional character of Sun’s upbringing. He emphasized that this 
was not a nuclear family, and that Sun Dacheng took on his late brothers’ widows as 
his daughters in addition to his own four surviving children. This detail serves to 
amplify the moral benevolence of the Chinese past through him, thus illustrating how 
Jiang used Sun Yat-sen and his family as a model of good and virtuous living in his 
zhuan. As Marie-Claire Bergère states, this type of depiction is a hallmark of Chinese 
biographical norms held over from imperial historians, who were charged with 
making moral heroes and villains of historical figures.66 By projecting New Life 
values, salient values for the GMD party-faithful at a time of ideological struggle, 
back into Old China through the Sun family, these values are given a stronger 
“traditional” foundation and a success story to promote them. Indeed, in both 1945 
and 1965 (the dates of the first and second printing), the precarious place of the GMD 
in relation to the CCP seems to explain the revival and reinforcement of New Life 
values. 
 
The detailed picture Jiang painted of Sun’s early life is unique among the four 
biographical narratives discussed here. Although Jiang himself noted that he aimed to 
avoid zhuan tropes of childhood heroism and myth-making, an American reader 
cannot help but think of George Washington and the cherry tree when reading about 
 
65 New Life Society, Xinshenghuo Yundong Xuzhi (“The Necessary Knowledge of the New 
Life Movement”), (Nanjing: New Life Book Series Society, 1935), 3. 
66 Bergère, 2. 
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the precocious Sun Deming’s courageous and inquisitive acts and his willingness to 
upset the social order in his pursuit of truth. We are treated to tales of Sun questioning 
his traditional school-master and the rote memorization of texts, absent discussion of 
their meaning. Sun wondered why the sky was blue, and, we are told, why China was 
ruled by Manchus and not Chinese. Jiang’s framing of Chinese rulership of China as 
akin to the sky being blue, equates the two as equally natural, retroactively 
undermining claims of rightful Manchu rule. By his questions, Sun is shown as 
refusing to accept things as they were. His inquiring mind needed to know why. 
 
Likewise, his refusal to accept irrational answers figures in these anecdotes; 
his curiosity and rationality thus frame his later life as a rational journey to 
revolution. Jiang further treated to the reader to apocryphal stories, like that of a 
pirate raid and its aftermath, to emphasize the rationality of Sun’s revolution: 
 
The pirates set sail, leaving only a man—deeply pained in body and mind—to 
emerge from the smoldering ruins of the house. He shouted wildly, “I’m 
finished! The pirates took everything! The money I earned through sweat and 
blood living among the Westerners, that which I had for so many years risked 
my life—they took it all! I regret not staying there among the Westerners; 
there they have the protections of law, but here in China we only have 
prohibitions! 
 
After Father of the Nation heard this, he thought, “Why is it that China lacks 
laws like those the foreign countries have? Why could this villager, who had 
worked so hard to earn that money, not find any protection here in China?” He 
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then began to think of going abroad to see the many kinds of laws that 
foreigners used to preserve peace and order.67 
As seen in this passage, Sun was framed as an ever-rational, ever-curious, and ever- 
empathetic hero-to-be. The seeds of the man Sun became—the Father of the Nation— 
were planted in a childhood stuffed with lessons and acts of early heroism. 
 
Sun’s time in Hawaii was notable in that he learned English, business 
administration, and Christianity there. However, there is some confusion, as Jiang 
stated he somehow learned English while in Cuiheng from an American named Kerr, 
but that he also knew no English upon his arrival in Honolulu. Indeed, where, when, 
and how Sun learned English seems to be a point of contention (recall Cantlie’s 
assertion that he learned English from an Englishwoman in Xiangshan as a child). If 
we consider the broader notion of English lessons as indicative of the lesson of 
recognizing English superiority, as J. L. Hevia suggests,68 then discussion of Sun’s 
English lessons can be read as “Western influences” as learned through colonial 
didacticism. Thus, this facet of his life is quite important in this and later narratives. 
In any case, Jiang described Sun as impressed by the modern city of Honolulu and the 
large ship that took him there, as well as deeply incensed by the irrational 
 
 
67 Jiang, 12. The original text is: “水盜開船走了，接著從那毀壞的屋子裏，走出一個身體
和心靈都受了重大創痛的人，瘋狂地而頹喪地喊道：  ‘我完結了！水盜把我所有的都搶去
了，許多來我冒了生命的危險，在養人的地方辛苦積聚的金錢，都被强盜搶去了。我懊
悔沒有留在洋人的地方—那邊有法律的保護，而在中國只有禁令而沒有保護的！’國父
聽後，心理想： ‘爲什麽中國沒有外國那樣的法律？爲什麽這個村人，冒了危險辛辛苦苦
掙到了錢，在中國竟得不到保護？’從此他便想到外國去，看看外國人維持治安的種種
方法。” 
68 J. L. Hevia, English Lessons: The Pedagogy of Imperialism in Nineteenth-Century China 
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2003). 
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backwardness of China and the Qing regime upon his return five years later. Looking 
to guide his fellow villagers out of their superstition and complacency, he broke the 
idol of the Polar King (beiji huangwang) before a crowd of his appalled peers. 
Subsequently forced to leave town, Sun went to study in Hong Kong, where he also 
underwent baptism. He later decided to study medicine to cover his revolutionary 
tracks, as he decided to embark upon revolution following the Sino-French War of 
1884. Thus, he enrolled in the affiliated school of Guangzhou Boji Hospital before 
transferring to the superior Alice School in Hong Kong. Founded largely as a result of 
the charitable efforts of businessman Ho Kai, it was there that he would meet James 
Cantlie. Both Ho and Cantlie would be key contacts and supporters later on. 
 
Throughout the book, Jiang’s vision of Sun was consistent: Sun was always 
destined for revolutionary greatness, an intelligent, truth-loving, courageous, and 
righteous Great Man. The Xinhai Revolution, though not directly involving him, 
could not have happened without him, and so Jiang thus credited Sun for its success. 
Indeed, Sun was now not only the Father of the Nation but also the “gentle mother of 
the Republic” (minguo zhi cimu): 
 
The Republic of China was made by the hard work of the Father of the 
Nation’s own two hands; indeed, the Father of the Nation was the gentle 
mother of the Republic, and the care and education of the Republic could not 
leave the hands of the Father of the Nation, especially in those early times. 
 
But, given the times he was in, the Father of the Nation had no choice but to 
cease his care for the Republic and cede the responsibility to outside, giving it 
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to a neglectful person. This could not but have a negative impact on the 
infant—the Republic of China.69 
Unfortunately for the infant Republic, the monstrous Yuan Shikai emerged from “his 
Beijing nest” among the warlords and imperial toadies of the north to rip the baby 
from the warm bosom of its Cantonese mother-father and its Nanjing crib.70 Jiang 
made no mention of Chen Cuifen or Ōtsuki Kaoru. His divorce of Lu Muzhen is 
touched on only through fulsome praise to Song Qingling as a modern revolutionary 
woman and lament of Lu’s old-fashioned sensibilities. This brief overview illustrates 
what Chinese biographies of Sun in the zhuan tradition look like, particularly in a 
GMD discursive space, and how they create and reinforce heroic images. Destined to 
be a hero, Sun’s entire life demonstrated a hero’s journey to greatness, reflected 
moral values and political ideals then promulgated by the GMD. 
 
Writing in an entirely different context, Marie-Claire Bergère had less 
expressly political goals in writing her biography, Sun Yat-sen. Published in 1994, 
Bergère’s work continues to be the most recent, comprehensive, and scholarly 
biography of Sun Yat-sen for an academic audience. Written originally in Bergère’s 
native French, an English translation by Janet Lloyd was published in 1996. Because 
Bergère’s account is so widely regarded, it served as the basis for much of this 
 
 
 
69 Jiang, 95. The original text is: “中華民國是  國父一首辛苦造成的，     國父是民國
的慈母，民國的養育是不能離開  國父的，尤其當它還在襁褓的時期。但    國父爲
了當時的環境，不得不把撫育民國的責任讓出來，交給一個痛癢不關心的人，於是這
出生的嬰孩—中華民國，不得不曹禺到不幸的命運了。” Note the reverential space 
Jiang uses before 國父. 
70 Ibid., 96. 
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chapter’s earlier biographic sketch of Sun. The discussion that follows highlights 
several critical and overarching characteristics of Bergère’s portrait. Bergère 
articulates a few key points about Sun and is explicit in her aim to find the real Sun in 
between the hagiographic images of Sun as seen in Chinese biography, academic and 
otherwise, and the considerably less-flattering image that has been painted in Western 
academia.71 Sun, Bergère reiterates, was a complicated individual who altered his 
message for different audiences. She goes so far as to call him a media superstar who 
consciously reconfigured his persona for his various audiences: 
 
The real Sun Yat-sen, not the frozen image presented by his eulogists but the 
man revealed by his adventures and words, his successes and failures, is a 
figure of the contemporary world: a communicator, a kind of media genius, 
born for jetliners, the Fax, and television, despite having had to content 
himself with steamers, the telegraph, and the press. He did not stamp his mark 
upon the history of his time...but Sun himself was fashioned by the historical 
context in which he lived and which he has come to embody: that of China 
moving towards modernity.72 
One wonders what Bergère’s Sun would have done with cell phones and the Internet, 
let alone television and fax machines. In any case, it is clear that Bergère intended to 
respond to perceived biases, either affirmative or negative, in the existing literature on 
Sun Yat-sen. Her narrative aims to illustrate Sun as he was in the world, not as the 
retrospective lens of love or hatred makes him appear. Therefore, her account of Sun 
 
71 Bergère, 5. 
72 Ibid. 
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attempts to make sense of his life without the distortion of posthumous legend. To 
make sense of Sun’s life, she distinguishes between three key periods, identified as 
those of “Sun the adventurer,” “Sun the Founding Father,” and “Sun the revolutionary 
nationalist.” Throughout, whether he proclaimed himself a theorist, a marshal, a rebel, 
a Christian lamb, or a doctor of medicine, Bergère argues he was always first and 
foremost an agile, mobile, and perceptive communicator from coastal China. His 
coastal origin is part of a significant dichotomy for Bergère: dynamic coastal China 
and stagnant inland China, blue China of the trader and yellow China of the 
mandarin. This narrative locates Sun and his revolution as a product of this outward- 
looking, Western-friendly region at arm’s length from the loess plains of yellow 
China and its accompanying strict imperial supervision. 
 
Bergère’s account of Sun emphasizes that he was a peripheral figure, an 
outsider looking forward, and that this was indeed one reason for his success. 
Because Sun was a son of humble means in the far south of China, because he went to 
work and study in Hawaii, Hong Kong, and Macao, because he was not a member of 
the literati elite, Sun was well-acquainted with the zeitgeist of the late Qing ; with 
Chinese problems on the ground; and aware of the relative strength and prosperity of 
modern nations like Japan, the United States, and the United Kingdom. Japan and the 
West play an integral role in Bergère’s narrative. The treaty ports, particularly in 
south China, served as a contact zone between China and the modern powers; Bergère 
traces the origins of a competitive, cooperative modern Chinese nationalist ideology 
to the treaty ports, which stand in opposition to the xenophobic “anti-Christian and 
anti-foreigner“ movements of inland China. She writes, 
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The coastal Chinese were the first to understand that the Western challenge 
had to be taken up in the same terms as those in which it was presented: with 
economic development, and with social and political progress. The precocious 
and vigorous nationalism of the coastal Chinese went hand in hand with their 
relative cultural alienation and their economic subordination.73 
This discussion of coastal nationalism suggests how Bergère sees Sun and his societal 
context. Sun, raised in Xiangshan, educated in Honolulu, exiled to Hong Kong and 
later forced to leave Macao for Guangzhou, was immersed in and connected to the 
culture of maritime China. Indeed, Bergère’s understanding of two Chinas, the 
maritimes and the inland, the blue and the yellow, calls the controversial documentary 
Heshang (River Elegy) to mind.74 This is a distinctly different understanding of China 
than that offered by Cantlie or Roy; Cantlie painted a monolithic picture of China and 
the Chinese in opposition to the Manchus, while Roy invoked Marxist class 
terminology to differentiate among Chinese actors, terminology that placed China 
within a global and unequal system of capitalism and imperialism. 
 
Bergère does consider Sun’s attempts to reach the center of Chinese society, 
but these attempts fit neatly into her overall narrative of the Sun the outsider. For 
instance, she notes that, in 1894, Sun attempted to send a missive to Li Hongzhang, a 
key Qing official, to discuss China’s problems and their solutions, but that this 
 
73 Ibid., 20. 
74 The documentary series River Elegy (Heshang) aired on CCTV in 1988. It presupposed the 
existence of dynamic, open blue China and stagnant, insular yellow China, presenting the 
tension between the two as an engine in Chinese history, narrated as a history of national 
decline. The colors yellow and blue refer to the silty waters of the Yellow River—heart and 
sorrow of ancient China—and the open waters of the ocean. It was quite controversial. 
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attempt to reach Li and meet with him failed. Despite at least one serious attempt to 
gain the support of Qing officials (Cantlie cites a missive to the Guangxu Emperor, 
but it was presumably the same 1894 memorandum mentioned previously) Sun was 
never taken seriously.75 Not even reformists like Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao of 
the Baohuanghui (Protect the Emperor Society) took Sun seriously, though they did 
meet with him on several occasions. Sun, unlike Kang and Liang, was poorly 
educated by Chinese standards and was famous largely for being a radical 
troublemaker, while Kang and Liang had held prestigious positions in the government 
before sacrificing these posts to preserve their lives and independently pursue 
constitutional reform. 
 
Although Bergère framed Sun as a “media superstar”, she agreed with J. Y. 
Wong’s earlier study that Sun’s heroic image was not his entirely of his own making. 
Rather, the figure of Sun Yat-sen was largely fashioned by others (not least of all the 
imperial police tasked with finding him). The London affair proved critical: 
 
...The essential role in Sun Yat-sen’s metamorphosis fell to his British friends 
and protectors. In the mirror that they held up to him, the Cantonese 
adventurer appeared as a revolutionary thinker, a strategist of vast designs. 
Only too pleased to slip into this new personality, Sun Yat-sen worked hard to 
develop the necessary characteristics and, to a certain extent, to conform to its 
behavior pattern. The reading and discussions in which he engaged in London 
broadened his intellectual horizon and sharpened his political awareness. Now 
 
 
75 Ibid., 50. 
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all he had to do–and it would be the most difficult challenge–was to get his 
compatriots to accept his new image.76 
However, Bergère does not begin her story of Sun’s myth-making with the London 
affair. She traces the evolution of Sun’s image back to the failed Guangzhou Uprising 
of 1895. Instead of an uprising, a qiyi, the Japanese press had labelled it a revolution, 
a geming. Bergère thus slightly modifies, but generally agrees with Wong that Sun’s 
image was largely the creation of others, and that Sun the hero was a role that Sun the 
man would have to work to fill. 
 
Contrary to Cantlie’s account and to later official remembrances of Sun the 
hero, in Bergère’s narrative, Sun often appears as a peripheral figure even in 
organizations he nominally led. When he and Yeung Ku-wen broke ties, he was on 
the short end of the Revive China Society’s split, with Chen Shaobai and Zheng 
Shiliang as his only followers. His time atop to the Tongmenghui was marred by 
factional disputes with Huang Xing and most of the younger members of the 
organization. Bergère goes so far as to say that Sun was largely despised by members 
of the Tongmenghui, but that due to a confluence of a factors, he was simply the only 
feasible leader for the organization. Had Liang Qichao not fully supported Qing 
reform, had Miyazaki Torazō’s flattering account of Sun, The Thirty-three Years’ 
Dream, not been recently translated into Chinese, and had Sun not been an 
experienced, well-traveled revolutionary with a sizeable transnational network, Sun 
would have presumably not been chosen.77 In 1910, after some fifteen years of failed 
 
76 Wong, 59. 
77 Bergère, 128 
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uprisings, Sun was forced to relocate the Southeast Asia Tongmenghui office to 
Penang to escape his detractors in Singapore (not to mention those at the main branch 
in Tokyo). During Sun’s brief, unimpressive period in formal office as the President 
of the Republic he failed to demonstrate any significant leadership. He had little to 
show beyond a cabinet bogged down in quarrels and a unilateral issue of some 
$300,000 worth of war bonds. After the conditional abdication of the Xuantong 
Emperor Puyi in February of 1912, Sun resigned in favor of Yuan Shikai, who moved 
the capital from Nanjing back to Beijing.78 Cantlie could not anticipate the future, but 
it seems notable that he never again wrote another book by or about Sun, despite 
surviving him by a year. The revolutionary Roy, meanwhile, explained Sun’s tenure 
in office as a sham presidency by a cowardly and small-minded petit-bourgeois rebel 
with little talent for administration. Bergère, a professional historian writing for a 
contemporary academic audience, more carefully contextualizes what was happening 
around Sun, with the benefit of time and access to source materials and a perspective 
of academic research rather than engaged partisanship. Nonetheless, her Sun Yat-sen 
is not heroic or grand; rather, he seems to have been a master of branding with a 
particular hatred and determination to topple the Manchu monarchy. 
 
Despite her significant skepticism of Sun’s heroism, Bergère recognizes that 
Sun is revered in both the PRC and the ROC. She thus frames him as a key figure of 
historical contestation, not only for his role in competing Communist and Nationalist 
narratives, but also as a means of grasping historiographical difference, specifically 
between an ongoing moralistic Chinese hagiographical tradition and more critical 
 
78 Ibid., 234. 
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historical writing that recognizes the contradiction and complexities of human 
character and historical moment. These competing visions of Sun the man, Sun the 
hero, history, and political legitimacy offer useful reference points for the analysis of 
Sun’s image in different spaces. 
 
iv: The Structure of the Thesis 
 
This study presents and analyzes four distinctive representations of Sun Yat- 
sen that emerged from four distinctive political contexts. In undertaking this project, I 
hope not only to explore the conflicted legacy of Sun Yat-sen, but also to raise 
broader questions of political need, legitimation, and narrative. The core question is: 
why do so many different people and organizations, steeped in such different contexts 
and with different modes of legitimation, rely upon the same figure? How do their 
uses of Sun differ? The particularities of each reconstruction of Sun help illustrate the 
different priorities and methods of legitimation that characterize different contexts. 
The basic argument is consistent throughout the contexts, as I believe Sun is so 
ubiquitously recognized and commemorated, albeit in different ways and for different 
things, because Sun is well-suited to serving as an icon of modern Chinese 
nationhood and nationalism, both state and non-state, due to his prominence as a 
revolutionary and the many hats he would don. Of course, state constructions of Sun 
are somewhat different than non-state constructions; in the former, Sun primarily 
serves as a touchstone for political legitimacy; in the latter, Sun is a touchstone of a 
modern Chinese identity. The identity he represents and the politics he serves to 
legitimate are distinct in different times and places, and even for different people of 
the same time and place. In exploring the specifics of this argument, I take up four 
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temporal, spatial, and political contexts: Republican China from 1925 through the fall 
of the mainland Republican government in 1949; Communist China from 1949 
through today; Taiwan from the 1940s on through the 2000s; overseas communities 
in the United States and Malaysia in the late 20th and early 21st centuries. Though I 
am casting a wide-net, I believe that this allows for a more varied and comprehensive 
understanding of how Sun’s image is used beyond the obvious ROC/PRC dichotomy 
and so helps decenter our understanding of Sun Yat-sen’s legacy. Changing 
circumstances in today’s Taiwan and in overseas Chinese communities will hopefully 
add valuable perspectives on how this Father of the Chinese Nation is used in light of 
competing nationalisms, state and non-state. 
 
The first chapter shows how the figure of Sun Yat-sen was used by different 
GMD figures—notably Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Jingwei— in the Republic of 
China. Chiang’s China’s Destiny,79 assorted writings and statements from Wang80 
like “Implementing the Three People’s Principles and Pan-Asianism to Revive China 
and East Asia,” and Chen Lifu’s Stormclouds Part over China81 constitute the 
primary texts for analysis, with supplemental secondary readings on the history and 
politics of this period informing the analysis. I hope to show how GMD leaders relied 
upon and used Sun to legitimate their own positions in the party hierarchy, thus 
 
 
 
79 Chiang Kai-shek, China’s Destiny and Chinese Economic Theory, ed. and trans. Philip 
Jaffe (NY: Roy, 1947). 
80 Wang Jingwei, “Shixing Sanminzhuyi ji Dayazhouzhuyi, fuxing Zhonguo yu Dongya” 
(Implementing the Three People’s Principles and Pan-Asianism to Revive China and East 
Asia), Wang Jingwei Irrevocable Trust, 11-22-1941, http://wangjingwei.org/wp- 
content/uploads/2012/12/wjw-pws-2748-2755.pdf, 2752-4. 
81 Ch’en Li-fu [Chen Lifu], The Storm Clouds Clear over China: the Memoir of Ch’en Li-fu 
1900-1993, ed. Sidney H. Chang and Ramon H. Myers, (Stanford UP, 1994). 
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illustrating the political value and different uses of Sun in a Republican context. Sun 
emerges as the ideological and symbolic lynchpin of the fractious GMD. He was 
useful in bolstering political legitimacy in the party and so was invoked in a wide 
array of contradictory projects, as perhaps best illustrated by the Wuhan/Nanjing split 
of 1927 and the Chongqing-Nanjing split of the Second Sino-Japanese War. Given 
constraints particular to the GMD’s ideology and history, Sun’s usage always 
required invoking certain political tracts and tropes, such as the Three People’s 
Principles, his plans for national construction, and his political will. 
 
The focus shifts temporally, not spatially, in the second chapter. Here the 
focus is Chinese Communist narratives of Sun, specifically tracked through 
commemorations of Sun’s birthday as reported in the People’s Daily in the years 
1956, 1966, 1976, 1986, concluding with a 2016 address from sitting Paramount 
Leader Xi Jinping. The chapter describes how CCP and PRC figures like Mao 
Zedong, Zhou Enlai, He Xiangning, Song Qingling, Peng Zhen, and Xi Jinping used 
Sun as a key part of a national history of revolution based on Marxist dialectic but not 
so rigorously tied to it. The focus shifts from Sun the democratic, anti-colonial 
revolutionary during the Mao years to Sun the nationalist, modernizing revolutionary 
following Deng Xiaoping’s Reform and Opening Up. While the invocation of Sun’s 
image is a call to action always, invoking his name also allows CCP figures to look 
back on the achievements of the PRC regime and so proves quite useful for showing 
how the CCP has met his call. Recalling Sun and his mission also provides a platform 
to push for the unification of Taiwan with China, thus this tone varies from rabidly 
martial in 1966, pacific in 1986, to somewhat ominous in 2016. This chapter also 
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provides an overview of how different Communists, with differing relations to the 
Chinese and international Communist projects, interpreted and portrayed Sun and 
why, further exploring the malleability and utility of Sun’s image. 
 
The third chapter shifts spatially to Taiwan to examine how Sun has been used 
in the increasingly nativist bentu environment of the post-dictatorship ROC-Taiwan. 
Key here is a book Chiang Wei-shui82 produced by the Sun Yat-sen Memorial Hall in 
Taipei that connects Sun to the Taiwanese nationalist Chiang Wei-shui, as well as a 
commemorative address from Chiang Kai-shek on the occasion of Sun’s centennial 
birthday. With these sources, I hope to illustrate how Sun’s legacy and image have 
fared in a changing society, well-illustrated by the relegation of Sun to “foreign 
history” by the Chen administration’s education minister in the early 2000s and a 
subsequent protest-suicide by a veteran in 2003. Sun, still at the core of GMD 
ideology after the loss of the mainland, must also be adapted to fit an increasingly 
local political context. This stands in tension with the standard Blue narrative of 
Chinese Taiwan, counterpoised with the Green Taiwan, “the heart of Asia.” We see 
that Sun’s image as guofu has declined along with the prestige and station of the 
GMD and its associated figures, like Chiang Kai-shek. In response, some have turned 
to Sun’s early revolutionary days and his influence on local nationalists like Chiang 
Wei-shui to bolster Sun’s place in an increasingly nativist Taiwanese historical 
landscape, a response that distorts both Sun and Chiang. Feelings run hot in these 
matters, as the 2004 suicide of Li Qiyu in Kaohsiung illustrates, and so this should 
 
82 Jiang Yanmei and Luo Ailing, The New Founder of Taiwan History—Chiang Wei-shui 
(Taiwan xianjian xielie—jingwei fenming changliu: Chiang Wei-shui xiaozhuan), (Taipei: 
SYS Memorial Hall, 2009). 
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not be dismissed as historical navel-gazing. 
 
The last chapter is loose and takes the analysis into overseas Chinese diaspora 
communities to loosely sketch issues raised in non-state Chinese contexts. Here I 
discuss how Sun is remembered spatially in Penang and Honolulu, given Sun’s close 
ties with these two cities. The chapter also tentatively formulates more general trends 
as regarding the particulars of these communities and their images of Sun Yat-sen. I 
believe that Sun, as a hero of the Chinese national revolution closely associated with 
modernization and with democratic ideals—due to the standard English translation of 
minquan zhuyi as the Principle of Democracy—proves a useful figure for Overseas 
Chinese communities. Recognition of Sun allows for Overseas Chinese to present an 
agreeable and acceptably democratic homegrown modern hero to their broader 
communities and so enable the Chinese communities to project a positive image. This 
chapter relies chiefly upon Sun Yat Sen in Penang83 by Khoo Salma Nasution and Sun 
Yat-sen in Hawaii84 by Yansheng Ma Lum and Raymond Mun Kong Lum. Both the 
Penang and Hawaii books are published by historical associations concerned with 
Sun’s time and connections in the local community, and so present non-state 
narratives regarding Sun’s life and posthumous significance. The Hawaii narrative 
emphasizes Hawaii’s place in Sun’s life and, accordingly, the place of Hawaii and 
Hawaiian Chinese in Chinese history; the Penang narrative uses Sun more to discuss 
the history of the Chinese in Penang. Nonetheless, the Penang narrative also serves to 
elevate the role of the Penang Chinese in cosmopolitan Penang, Malay Malaysia, and 
 
83 Khoo, Sun Yat Sen in Penang, see footnote thirteen. 
84 Yansheng Ma Lum and Raymond Mun Kong Lum, Sun Yat-sen in Hawaii: Activities and 
Supporters, (Honolulu: Hawaii Chinese History Center, 1999). 
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the world at large through their connection to Sun at a pivotal moment in his career. 
In considering Sun’s overseas afterlives, we may also find it useful to consider Sun 
statuary in the United States, as well as heroic statuary at large. Whether a statue of 
Christopher Columbus overlooking the Connecticut River, Sun Yat-sen brooding in 
Columbus Park in lower Manhattan, or the Pioneer Mother and Father looking for one 
another on the grounds of the University of Oregon, such statues make statements 
about the past and about the present of those who erect them.85 
This project’s methodological strength lies in bringing together different 
narratives to simultaneously explore different images of the same figure. Although 
Sun Yat-sen is a figure that has drawn much attention, scholarly and otherwise, for 
well over a century, the study here, with its wide comparative net, enables a careful 
and nuanced reading of the man and of historical myth-making by juxtaposing and 
denaturalizing familiar Sun images in different places. In an increasingly global and 
interconnected academic community, such a study contributes to the understanding of 
political icons and the pitfalls that necessarily entail studying contested figures like 
Sun. The narrative relies on straightforward comparative analysis of a curated 
“gallery” of Sun’s heroic images. In the process, I have sought out narratives 
produced by political elites and remembrances from museums and memorial 
institutions. Secondary literature serves to contextualize these narratives, as the 
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historical context of each is integral to the resulting Sun Yat-sen. 
 
Sun Yat-sen is a contested figure, invoked in widely different contexts. I 
believe this is because Sun generally represents a modern Chinese hero with a unique 
and ubiquitous positivity. This is largely due to the formation of a political cult 
postmortem but is also a result of Sun’s words and deeds in life. Although the 
invocation of Sun is ubiquitous among those that hold both Chinese nationalism and 
modernity in high esteem, this is not to say that there is one Sun. The following 
chapters serve to explore several of Sun’s heroic images. We first turn to Republican 
China to explore Republican politics, war, and a tug of war over Sun Yat-sen’s 
posthumous endorsement. 
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I 
 
FOR CHINA, FOR ASIA!: DUELING GMD NARRATIVES OF SUN YAT-SEN 
 
“It is the state which makes the nation, and not the nation the state.” 
— Józef Piłsudski 
 
i: Introduction 
 
During the heated years of the Second Sino-Japanese War, Chiang Kai-shek 
and Wang Jingwei, two rivals jockeying for power atop the Guomindang power 
structure, invoked the figure of Sun Yat-sen to shore up their claims to legitimate 
rulership. We might describe this battle as one over xuetong, or the correct—but 
metaphorical—ideological “bloodline”. As Zhu Xi claimed to inherit the mantle of 
the ancient sage by way of Mencius, so Sun’s former revolutionary comrades and 
disciples Chiang and Wang claimed his mantle. 
Nonetheless, these modern “bloodline’ claims, were in various respects 
distinctive. Chiang positioned himself as a successor to Sun’s line equal, if not 
superior, to Sun, while Wang played the part of the faithful disciple reclaiming the 
teachings of the late master. This may be seen in the differences between Chiang’s 
ideological magnum opus China’s Destiny, a book that editor and translator of the 
English edition Philip Jaffe compared to Mein Kampf for what he perceived as its 
sinister aggrandizement of Chiang, and assorted writings and statements of Wang 
Jingwei. Though Wang too proposed a guidebook for reviving China, China’s 
Problems and Their Solutions, it was less fully developed ideologically than China’s 
Destiny, focusing more on pragmatic questions of national construction and its 
obstacles. Thus, it will not be a primary focus. Rather, I will build a general picture 
from two of Wang’s addresses and China’s Problems so that we may see the political 
67  
differences between the two men and thereby contextualize how they framed Sun 
Yat-sen for their own purposes. 
Both men used Sun to strengthen their claims to national leadership. Chiang 
created a radically traditional yet revolutionary nationalist superman Sun Yat-sen. 
Wang, in turn, depicted a noble transnational figure driven by ideals and principles in 
the face of great challenges. Chiang’s image of Sun worked to support his claim to 
ideological equality with Sun, which in turn entitled him to the same levels of 
authority as his imagined Sun Yat-sen, while Wang’s image of Sun emphasized “far- 
sightedness,” bravery, and patriotic self-sacrifice. This emphasis served to cast Wang 
as Sun’s devoted follower in what he framed as the right and difficult choice of 
working with the Japanese against the Second United Front of the Communist and 
Chongqing-Nationalist governments against the Japanese invasion. 
ii: Historical Overview, 1925-1949 
 
Sun Yat-sen died on March 12th, 1925. This was the beginning of the end for 
the First United Front, the allied bloc of GMD of CCP born of the Sun-Joffe Accords, 
and the beginning of Sun’s political afterlives. While Sun, the man, lived a 
complicated public life, it was only after his passing that other individuals, like 
Chiang or Wang, could and needed to repurpose his life for their own ends. A brief 
history of the Republic following Sun’s death is necessary to contextualize narratives 
of Sun in the Republican era. 
When Sun died in 1925, he had already left behind his Guangzhou base in 
order to negotiate with the northern warlords Feng Yuxiang, Duan Qirui, and Wu 
Peifu about possible terms for China’s reunification. Sun and the GMD had 
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reestablished their Guangzhou powerbase following the betrayal of the federalist 
warlord Chen Jiongming in 1922. In this effort, Sun relied upon the help of Soviet 
advisors, who brokered a cooperative arrangement with the fledgling Chinese 
Communist Party. The resulting GMD-CCP United Front was effectively one of 
several warlord governments operating in South China. The founding of the 
Whampoa Military Academy, the GMD military school, in 1924 enabled the rise of 
the Guangzhou government to regional power, as it now had a larger proportion of 
loyal troops comprising its forces—the remainder being mercenary forces or those 
under the employ of friendly warlords. The Guangzhou government proved to be a 
center of labor radicalism under Soviet influence, giving safe haven to strikers from 
Hong Kong during the 1922 Seamen’s Strike and leading the Canton-Hong Kong 
Strike of 1925-6 in response to the May 30th Incident, in which striking workers in 
Shanghai were killed in the International Settlement by British police.86 Soviet and 
Communist influence was indeed strong in the Guangzhou government. Mikhail 
Borodin and Zhou Enlai represented Comintern and Chinese Communist influence, 
respectively, at the upper echelons. Many Whampoa cadets, like Lin Biao, would 
later be prominent figures in the CCP. Numerous Guomindang figures like Chiang 
Kai-shek and Wang Jingwei expressed support for the Communist Party and for 
elements of its revolutionary goals at this time. In keeping with the Soviet-sponsored 
United Front, Chiang even sent his son by his first wife, Chiang Ching-kuo, to study 
at the Communist University for the Toilers of the East in Moscow. 
However, the United Front could not endure. Despite the close cooperation of 
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the GMD and the CCP under Soviet influence, tensions increasingly permeated the 
bloc. A pronounced source of tension was the Guangzhou Communist contingent’s 
support for Chen Jiongming in his fight with Sun, support that CCP General Secretary 
Chen Duxiu would later lament as a “serious mistake” on the part of the local party 
members.87 Moreover, the aims of the various parties in the alliance were not always 
aligned. While Sun and the Soviet diplomat A. A. Joffe agreed that the economic 
conditions in China called for national bourgeois revolution, not socialist revolution, 
many land-owning members of the GMD were discomfited by the CCP’s extensive 
agitation of labor, industrial and agricultural, in the cities and the countryside.88 
Indeed, even some Communist members of the Wuhan government, such as Chen 
Duxiu or Soviet advisor Mikhail Borodin, were alarmed by “excesses” among the 
peasantry.89 Similarly, many Communist distrusted the Nationalists and subsequently 
ridiculed their symbols. For instance, Communists like Wang Fanxi found the beliefs 
and practices of the Guomindang, including the veneration of Sun Yat-sen and his 
Three People’s Principles, “too laughable for words.”90 Wang emphasizes, 
nevertheless, that he and his comrades were shocked by Chiang’s bloody purge in 
Shanghai, illustrating that many Communists within the alliance had imagined the 
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GMD were indeed their revolutionary comrades.91 
 
Despite the growing tensions, the alliance lasted well into the Northern 
Expedition, the drive north to militarily unify China under Chiang Kai-shek’s 
leadership and to replace the internationally recognized Beiyang government. Three 
events were key to the end of the United Front: the Zhongshan Incident; Chiang’s 
April 1927 purge of Communists; Wang’s July 1927 purge of Communists and the 
dissolution of the Wuhan government. First was the Zhongshan Incident. On March 
20, 1926, the gunboat Zhongshan (formally named Yongfeng, the same gunboat that 
had whisked Sun and Song Qingling to safety and away from Chen Jiongming’s 
troops in 1922) passed by the Whampoa Academy. Chiang Kai-shek, the 
Commandant of the Academy, claimed that the gunboat was behaving suspiciously 
while under the command of a Soviet captain. Although the specifics are disputed, 
contemporary Chen Lifu (then an official close to Chiang and later an influential 
leader of the GMD’s CC Clique) and historian Jay Taylor write that Deng Yanda— 
political director of the army—called upon Chiang’s residence in person92 and Wang 
Jingwei’s wife Chen Bijun called his wife Chen Jieru over the phone to ascertain his 
movements and schedule in the days prior.93 Fearing a Communist coup, Chiang 
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launched a midnight coup the night of March 20th, 1926. His loyal men surrounded 
the residence of Wang Jingwei, placing Wang (sick in bed) and several Soviet 
advisors (who had been visiting his residence) under effective house arrest while 
rounding up and expelling Communists from the ranks of the National Revolutionary 
Army.94 
Second came Chiang’s April 1927 purge, beginning with Shanghai’s 
Communists. This may be understood in the context of the unfinished Northern 
Expedition and in GMD factional politics. Building off an earlier attempt by Sun 
himself in 1922, the National Revolutionary Army of the United Front pushed north 
from its Guangzhou stronghold with two armies, one (led by Chiang) aiming first for 
the Wuhan tri-city and second working up the coast. Following the fall of Wu Peifu’s 
forces in summer of 1926, the GMD Political Conference declared the cities of 
Wuchang, Hanyang, and Hankou the new Capital District in early 1927.95 As for the 
eastern army, by spring of 1927, the NRA general Bai Chongxi would chase the 
warlord Sun Chuangfang’s forces into Shanghai, where a worker’s uprising organized 
by the CCP took the city in the name of the National Government; however, Bai’s 
forces and Du Yuesheng’s Green Gang butchered the workers and any known 
Communists in the city in what is now called the Shanghai Massacre (also called the 
April 12th Incident for the date it occurred).96 Following the purge, Chiang declared 
Nanjing the national capital and formally broke with the CCP, thus setting his 
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government in opposition to the Wuhan government, which still included many 
Communist members and advisors. While Chiang and his rightist allies purged 
Communists throughout the territory of the Nanjing government, the Wuhan 
government initially refused to break with the Communists and their Soviet advisors. 
Comprised of the GMD Left and the CCP, the Wuhan Government would be ground 
down by a downriver blockade from the newly-founded Nanjing Government. Chiang 
claimed Nanjing was the true and rightful capital of the Republic. 
In a third and final crucial shift, Wang and the Wuhan GMD broke with the 
Communists and conducted their own violent purge in July, following the failure of 
an alliance with Feng Yuxiang’s Guominjun and the grave attrition of economic and 
military resources.97 A final factor was a telegram sent from Soviet leader Joseph 
Stalin— in the midst of a leadership struggle with the internationalist Leon Trotsky— 
to the sitting Comintern advisor, M. N. Roy. The telegram called for the arming of the 
workers and peasants under the jurisdiction of Wuhan. Roy showed this telegram to 
Wang Jingwei, who blanched, worrying that the Wuhan Government was under the 
thumb of the Soviets and their Chinese Communist juniors. Efforts from Mikhail 
Borodin to assuage Wang and the GMD Left, many of whom were economic elites 
who felt threatened by violent mass uprisings, failed. Thus, the Wuhan government 
recognized Nanjing as the legitimate capital of the Republic. Wang would once again 
go abroad, having only returned to China that April.98 Chiang would also step away 
from public life for a time following the purge. 
Following the Wuhan purge, the CCP engaged in urban uprisings, notably in 
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Nanchang and Guangzhou. All failed to instigate a broader insurrection and were 
suppressed by the GMD. These failures marked the end of the CCP’s reliance on 
urban, proletarian movements and a retreat to the countryside, where founding rural 
Soviets became the order of the day.99 Crushing these Soviets would be the 
paramount concern of Chiang Kai-shek, who would rise from the Wuhan-Nanjing 
Split as the chief leader of the Guomindang and the party-state it sought to create. 
However, the GMD remained a fractious entity, as did the Republic of China. There 
were three key factions: political cliques within the Guomindang, militarist cliques 
ostensibly within the Guomindang, and groups outside the party-state apparatus.100 
The preeminent clique within the Guomindang following Chiang’s powerplays would 
be the CC Clique (CC pai) of the brothers Chen Guofu and Chen Lifu, a right-wing 
faction that would succeed the rightist Western Hills Faction (xishanpai) associated 
loosely with Hu Hanmin and Lin Sen as the chief clique of the GMD Right.101 There 
were other cliques on the right, such as the quasi-fascist Blue Shirts. However, 
centrists like the elite Political Study faction remained a key component of the GMD 
party-state, as did leftists. Wang Jingwei would reemerge as a leader of Chen 
Gongbo’s left-leaning and fervently anti-Chiang Reorganization Clique (gaizuopai). 
Though Chiang would be the preeminent figure within the Guomindang, he 
was not always the titular leader, and would indeed step down and go overseas after 
initiating the anti-Communist purges of 1927. He would never be gone for long. His 
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opponents Wang Jingwei and Hu Hanmin periodically posed a threat to Chiang’s 
rule, but did not succeed in supplanting him or his followers. Wang generally 
travelled abroad when he met obstacles, purportedly for medical treatment. Hu, on the 
other hand, would be confined to his home by Chiang in 1931 just before the People’s 
Congress. Following great outrage among party members, Chiang released Hu. In 
1931, Hu would go to Guangzhou and established a rival GMD government there 
with the military support of the warlord Chen Jitang, a government opposed to 
Chiang’s personalistic rule, Japanese aggression, and the CCP until its collapse 
following Hu’s death in 1936.102 Chiang stepped down again at the end of 1931, but 
soon returned to the helm of the Nanjing Government. 
Outside the political arena of Nanjing, individual militarist cliques retained a 
great deal of power even past the end of the Northern Expedition in 1928, which 
ostensibly unified China. The Guominjun, Shanxi, and New Guangxi cliques 
marshalled forces against Chiang and the Nanjing regime in 1929 following a failed 
demilitarization conference. The resultant war would be the largest of the chaotic 
Warlord Era. Chiang staved off the challenge of the three cliques owing to the aid of 
the of the Fengtian Clique and the Ma Family Armies of the Northwest. Wang 
Jingwei, having been tapped by Feng Yuxiang of the Guominjun to head a new 
government in Beijing (renamed Beiping following the establishment of the Nanjing 
government), once again went abroad. Chiang and his Nanjing government survived 
the challenge, but it was costly in lives, in productivity, and in territory. It hardly 
meant that Nanjing now ruled unopposed; regional generals and governors retained a 
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high degree of autonomy, and other oppositional regimes would be established, like 
Sheng Shicai’s Soviet-friendly regime in Xinjiang and Hu Hanmin’s Guangzhou 
government. Zhang Xueliang’s Fengtian Clique once again proved instrumental to 
Chiang’s regime, recognizing Nanjing despite initial sympathies for the Guangzhou 
government. However, Zhang would soon force Chiang to swallow a bitter pill, 
illustrating the power that factions had in the Nanjing decade despite or, perhaps, 
because of Chiang’s personalistic dictatorship. 
The Fengtian Clique of Zhang Zuolin and, later, Zhang Xueliang controlled 
Manchuria and its environs till September 18th of 1931, and would prove a decisive 
clique in the political fate of Chiang Kai-shek. Under Zhang Zuolin, it had long 
received support from Japan. By the late 1920s, however, Japanese imperialists in the 
military command, the government, and throughout broader society looked to 
Manchuria as a lifeline for the imagined crises of the Empire.103 For his failures in 
hamstringing the GMD’s Northern Expedition, Zhang Zuolin was assassinated by 
soldiers of the Japanese Kwantung Army in a railroad bombing in 1928 known as the 
Huanggutun Incident. Following this, his son Zhang Xueliang pledged allegiance to 
the Nanjing government, sensing Japanese responsibility in his father’s death. In 
response, the Kwantung Army manufactured the Mukden Incident and subsequently 
seized Manchuria, there establishing the puppet-state of Manchukuo. This displaced 
the Fengtian army into China proper. 
Without territory of its own, the Fengtian army worked to suppress 
 
 
 
103 Louise Young, Japan’s Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism 
(University of California Press, 1999). 
76  
Communist activity in the northwest as per the orders of Nanjing, a task Zhang and 
his soldiers purportedly found senseless given the growing and apparent threat of 
Japanese encroachment. By this time, Chiang’s Encirclement Campaigns had almost 
succeeded in crushing Communist forces in Jiangxi and Hunan. In October 1934, 
surviving Communist forces broke the tightening encirclement and fled overland 
through Yunnan and Sichuan to the desolate reaches of Shaanxi Province in the truly 
arduous and later mythologized journey known as the Long March. Zhang’s forces 
were tasked with stamping out the newly-transplanted Communists, but instead 
worked with them to entrap Chiang Kai-shek at his lodgings outside Xi’an to force a 
deal. Instead of prioritizing “internal pacification” ahead of “external defense,” 
Chiang agreed on December 26, 1926—two weeks after his initial capture—to work 
with the CCP and form a Second United Front against Japanese aggression. This 
outcome was no foregone conclusion, particularly given that some Nanjing generals 
favored risking Chiang’s life to achieve internal pacification.104 Nonetheless, Chiang 
returned to the regional stronghold of Luoyang and resumed his duties as paramount 
leader. By this point, the new Communist stronghold surrounding the towns of 
Yan’an and Baoding drew in revolutionaries from throughout China. 
On July 7, 1937, open conflict once again broke out between Chinese and 
Japanese troops. Suffice it to say that the war did not well for the Chinese. By late 
1938, the Japanese had seized most of North and East China and most strategically 
important ports. The Communist leadership remained in Yan’an, while the Nationalist 
leadership retreated first to Wuhan, then to Chongqing. Following the National 
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Army’s burning of Changsha and the loss of Guangzhou, the National Government at 
Chongqing was dependent largely on reestablishing war industries in the mountainous 
hinterland of Yunnan and Sichuan. Following British and American entry into the 
war after the Japanese invasions and attacks of December, 1941, the Chongqing 
government was resupplied via the Burma Road. However, Chiang’s wartime 
Chongqing regime was challenged by Wang Jingwei’s puppet Nanjing regime 
starting in 1940. Wang defected in December of 1938, calling Japanese Prime 
Minister Konoe Fumimaro’s terms of surrender reasonable and preferable to 
continuing the disastrous war. Wang’s government would claim supremacy over 
existing collaborator governments in East and North China, but was itself largely 
restrained by Japanese military administration. Meanwhile, the Communist regime 
continued operating out of Yan’an and carrying out guerrilla operations in North 
China. Despite the ostensible peaceful alliance between Chongqing and Yan’an, there 
were several of intentional attacks on the Communist forces by Chongqing- 
Nationalist forces such as General Shangguan Yunxiang’s raid on the New Fourth 
Army in January of 1941. 
Following years of fighting, the Japanese war effort—having expanded 
beyond China to span the Pacific and South Asia—collapsed. Final attempts to retake 
the initiative, like Operation Ichigo, failed to change the course of the war. Wang 
Jingwei died in Nagoya in 1944 and the Reorganized Republic of China was then 
headed by Chen Gongbo, Wang’s earlier partner in the gaizuopai. A major 
propaganda victory for Chongqing came in 1943 with British and American 
renunciation of extraterritorial privileges in China. Nonetheless, Chiang’s government 
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was not to endure long on the mainland following the end of the Second World War, 
the broader global conflict that came to encompass the Second Sino-Japanese War. 
Faced with empty coffers, rebellious soldiers, and dwindling American aid, the GMD 
lost control of greater areas of China in the face of rising Communist forces. 
Mounting defeats, like the siege of Changchun in 1948 and the Battle of Huaihai in 
1949, illustrated the increasing weakness of the GMD military apparatus. In 1949, the 
national government retreated from Nanjing several times, landing at old provisional 
capital locations for brief periods before finally abandoning the mainland for Taiwan, 
only recently reclaimed as Chinese territory.105 
Throughout this tumultuous history, Chiang labored to cultivate his 
connection to Sun’s legacy. He oversaw the construction of Sun’s Nanjing 
mausoleum, the reinternment of Sun’s remains, and the large-scale building of Sun’s 
personality cult. The construction of the mausoleum and the reinternment were 
foundational to this effort. Sun, having died in Beijing in March of 1925, was buried 
in the Xiangshan district of Beijing not long after. However, to emphasize the place 
of Nanjing as the new capital and the heart of a new republic as well as to connect 
Sun to the founding Ming emperor entombed in the Purple Mountains, which would 
viscerally connect the Republic with the last “native” dynasty, Sun’s body was moved 
to a newly-built tomb in the mountains in the spring of 1929.106 The move was a 
momentous occasion for Chiang’s propaganda team. Song Qingling was called back 
from Moscow, where she had moved after the collapse of the Wuhan government in 
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1927, to walk alongside Chiang to underscore Chiang’s now personal connection 
through marriage to Song and, by extension, her late husband Sun. Song notably 
refused to walk with Chiang, but her presence was still significant to this effect and 
indeed helped legitimate Chiang’s connections to Sun.107 
Chiang was not merely concerned with Sun, of course. Sun was instrumental 
to Chiang’s claim to rightful leadership and to his vision for China’s future. However, 
Chiang did not rely solely on Sun in consolidating his own power and reshaping 
Chinese society, as the New Life Movement, the enduring White Terror, and the 
development of his own personality cult illustrate. Mentioned previously, the New 
Life Movement, a Guomindang attempt at cultural revolution based upon Confucian, 
Christian, and political-scientific values of public hygiene is worth a second look, as 
it was a key part of Chiang’s attempt to build a compelling GMD ideology. The 
citizen of Old China was held in opposition to the citizen of New China. The Old 
Chinese, perhaps descended from the late Qing trope of “the sick man of Asia”, was 
filthy, lazy, small-minded, petty, and weak, closer to beast than human in Chiang’s 
own words. The New Chinese was the foundation of New China. New Life 
publications and later GMD publications influenced by the movement established a 
connection between the values of the New Life and the life of Sun Yat-sen. Indeed, if 
we think back to Jiang Xingde’s zhuan-style biography of Sun Yat-sen, we may recall 
that Sun’s upbringing was explicitly described in the terms of the New Life 
Movement: cleanliness, simplicity, and so forth.108 In the context of the Encirclement 
 
 
107 Israel Epstein, Woman in World History: Life and Times of Song Ching-ling, Volume I 
(New Star Press: Beijing, 2015), 301. 
108 Jiang Xingde, Guofu, 3. 
80  
Campaigns of the early 1930s, the New Life Movement was developed as an 
ideological answer to Communism, then spreading throughout China and Jiangxi in 
particular. Though scholars disagree as to how to interpret the New Life Movement, 
we may simply note that it was tinged with Confucian-Christian moralism, social 
Darwinism at the national scale, and a desire for modernity as envisioned through 
modern cities and modern hygiene. On a tour of Jiangxi in 1934, Chiang and his wife 
Song Meiling launched the New Life Movement there in the provincial capital of 
Nanchang, which was to be a model city of New China. Nanchang was thus also 
connected to Sunist plans of modernization as expressed in New Life terms.109 
iii: Chiang Kai-shek’s Superhuman Sun Yat-sen 
 
We have briefly touched upon Chiang Kai-shek’s actions and prominence in 
the years after Sun’s death. Before examining his political usage of Sun, there are 
several biographical details to bear in mind. First, Chiang was born in 1887 in the 
prefecture of Ningbo to a family of modest means. Second, he died in Taipei in 1975, 
where he and his government fled in 1949. Throughout his life, Chiang was a military 
man. He had studied abroad at a Japanese military school, the Shikan Gakkō, and 
returned to China with modern military knowledge. This led to his appointment as 
Commandant of the Whampoa Academy, which, in turn, led to his prominence in the 
GMD as the effective leader of the party’s army. After the Northern Expedition and 
his rise to supremacy in the GMD, Chiang consistently leaned on his military 
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background, connections, and values. Even when he held no formal role in the 
government, like his “retirement” during the short-lived Sun Fo government of 1932, 
his deep ties to the GMD/ROC military made him a key player and foretold his return 
to power.110 His ties to the Green Gang may have also strengthened his grip on 
power. Long-time associate Chen Lifu adamantly denied that Chiang was a member 
of the Green Gang; nonetheless, he corroborated Chiang’s reliance upon coercion and 
personalistic authority in ruling.111 
Chiang’s marital history suggests his inclination to instrumental alliances. He 
famously left his first wife Chen Jieru in Cikou while he courted another woman in 
Shanghai, before ditching her to pursue Song Meiling. Whatever his motivations, 
marrying a Song daughter was plainly economically and politically advantageous, 
given that Ailing was wed to the financier H. H. Kung and Qingling was the widow 
of the late Dr. Sun. Chiang’s political alliances also lend themselves to charges of 
opportunism. Despite becoming synonymous with anti-Communism following 1927, 
he was at an earlier time known as the Red General and sent his son Ching-kuo to 
study in the Communist University for the Toilers of the East in Moscow during the 
time of the First United Front.112 For good measure, he later sent his other son Wei- 
kuo to study military science in Nazi Germany during the 1930s.113 
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While Chiang’s political authority derived largely from his military authority, 
access to Shanghai money, and personal connections, his political career and beliefs 
were his own creation. After 1927, he believed that Communism was a “disease of 
the heart’ and so the greatest danger facing the Chinese nation, even greater than 
foreign imperialism or endemic rural poverty. Moreover, Chiang believed that the 
poor physical, mental, and spiritual hygiene of the Chinese citizenry was largely 
responsible for China’s national decline, and so launched the New Life Movement 
with Song Meiling’s active participation in 1934. This is significant in that it shows 
Chiang placing the onus of the national revival at the level of the individual citizen, 
an onus that—to him—warranted extensive mobilization and regulation of life by the 
government. Related to this point, Chiang also believed in martial solutions to social 
and economic phenomena, and his authority in Nanjing was personalistic and vast.114 
In the midst of his many pursuits, successes, and failures, Chiang invoked the 
name and figure of Sun Yat-sen, asserting Nationalist pedigree of his plans. Nowhere 
was this more apparent than his final split from his long-time rival Wang Jingwei 
during the Second Sino-Japanese War. Both men needed Sun to shore up their own 
footing. My analysis of how Chiang used the figure of Sun Yat-sen to legitimate 
himself politically thus focuses on the war years of the late 1930s through the 1940s, 
looking at how he presented himself in relation to Sun and to GMD challengers like 
Wang Jingwei. In this context, the key text is China’s Destiny, Chiang’s most 
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significant attempt to position himself not only within Sun’s own lineage but also as a 
political thinker and visionary in his own right. The book is part history, part policy, 
part sacrament, an effort to narrate China’s rise from backwardness and depravity 
through a revival of national strength and virtue under Chiang’s leadership. Published 
first in 1943 and translated into English in 1947, China’s Destiny was intended to 
motivate the Chinese nation and to provide an ideological path forward for the 
beleaguered Chongqing government during the Second World War and, 
subsequently, during the resumed Chinese Civil War. 
Chiang begins China’s Destiny with a brief history of China, a story of 
national decline in line with Confucian longing for the mythic past. The Zhonghua 
nation split into five “stocks”, which grew estranged and came to think themselves 
separate races: Han, Tibetan, Muslim (Hui), Mongol, and Manchu. Through cycles of 
dynastic vigor and decline, the Chinese nation somersaulted through history before 
arriving at its most pitiful moment: the humiliations of the late Qing. The nation was 
so far gone that Chiang described it thus: 
During the last hundred years, China’s national position and the morale of the 
people deteriorated to such an extent that an unprecedented situation 
developed. Territories required for the survival of the Chinese nation 
experienced the painful process of partition. The oppression and bondage of 
the unequal treaties further undermined the vitality of the Chinese state and 
the nation. A survey of our long history of five thousand years reveals the 
alternate rise and fall of states and the survival and extinction of nations. Yet 
the national decay during the last hundred years reached a point unequaled in 
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our history. The state and the nation became weakened and encountered inner 
crises in the political, economic, social, ethical, and psychological spheres 
until the basis of rebirth and recovery was almost destroyed.115 
Indeed, Chiang’s vision of the late Qing was not one of simple dynastic decline, but a 
veritable precipice of national and racial extinction (wanguo/zhongmie respectively). 
The central government from the mid-19th to mid-20th century lost control of key 
territories: Hong Kong, Tibet, the Ryukyu islands, the newly minted province of 
Taiwan, the northern marches of Burma, Outer Mongolia, Xinjiang, Manchuria and 
Rehe, Chahar and Suiyan, and significant chunks of cities throughout China proper. 
In this narrative, strategically important territory seems to constitute China and its 
environs, including former tributary states like the Ryukyu Kingdom, not simply the 
borders of the Qing Empire.116 While the loss of territory was deeply concerning, the 
establishment of foreign settlements in cities like Tianjin, Shanghai, and elsewhere 
was perhaps even more pernicious. These settlements brought with them consular 
extraterritoriality, which undermined the sovereignty of the Chinese national 
authorities and worked against China in international trade and affairs, bringing forth 
severe political and economic disadvantages. 
In Chiang’s narrative, the onset of this severe decline “was not only due to the 
inferiority of her guns and steamships to those of the West, but was mainly caused by 
her political degeneration, the chief source of which was absolute monarchy.”117 This 
characterization of the Qing monarchy affirms the significance of Sun Yat-sen, who 
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grasped the source of China’s weakness and sought to overthrow the monarchy and 
expel the Manchus, establish a republic, and redistribute land, goals that the people 
came to fervently support. Phillip Jaffe, editor of the 1947 English-language 
translation of China’s Destiny, comments that later editions of China’s Destiny 
omitted the latter two goals from Sun’s revolutionary program, thus highlighting the 
desire of GMD censors to suppress mention of these Sunist goals in light of the long- 
standing GMD dictatorship and failure to remedy land discontent.118 Here we may see 
a notable example of the political editing of Sun’s image to meet present political 
considerations. 
Chiang charged that although Sun understood the cause of decline and led the 
democratic revolution to save China, few of Sun’s colleagues or followers understood 
what democracy actually entailed. The public and some party members like Song 
Jiaoren believed democracy meant simply importing Western models of 
constitutional democracy with the separation of powers. Sun, however, grasped the 
necessity of educating the people to be good citizens, promoting industry, and, in this 
fashion, realizing the Three People’s Principles.119 This portrait conveys Sun held a 
top-down understanding of democracy, with an emphasis on hierarchy rather than 
representative elections. Chiang did not value elections or parliamentary government. 
Rather, he believed the people needed to be properly educated by the revolutionary 
organs of the GMD so that they could participate in government. This latter point 
conforms with Sun’s idea of tutelage, echoing Sun’s belief that the first Republican 
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government failed because China was not yet ready for democracy.120 This sense of 
the backwardness of the people and their lack of preparation to meet the challenges of 
citizenship was not particular to Chiang, but he is perhaps notable for his emphasis on 
disciplinary indoctrination and state-directed modernization. 
 
Chiang did not simply argue that China’s poverty resulted from Qing 
weakness and mismanagement. He asserted that the declining morality of the Chinese 
people at large was fundamentally responsible for the humiliation of the formerly 
great Chinese nation: “Our numerous historical national humiliations all resulted from 
the fact that we debased ourselves and scorned our own cultural heritage.” These 
observations hearkened back to his pet project, the New Life Movement, as the path 
toward national salvation. Each citizen, all descendants of the Yellow Emperor 
according to Dai Jitao’s famous “National Flag Anthem” (guoqige), was responsible 
for honoring the sacrifices of revolutionary forebears like Sun and the Huanghuagang 
Martyrs of 1911. All were tasked with realizing the Three People’s Principles to 
achieve national revival. This meant that mild dissent or any lack of active 
compliance meant that the citizen was undermining the very health of the nation. In 
this framework, public expectoration was not simply physically unhygienic, but also a 
corruption of China’s very moral fiber and an attack on the national polity. Such 
behavior was “lower than that of beasts,” to use Chiang’s language.121 This 
understanding of the nation as a single constitutive body is reminiscent of Gotō 
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Shimpei’s kokutai model of national well-being, with each citizen a cell.122 Gotō 
developed this model while studying medicine in Germany in the 1880s, which 
perhaps explains its resemblance to later National Socialist understandings of the 
nation as a body and associated anti-smoking campaigns. Though I find no direct 
links, I speculate that Chiang’s understanding of national health was informed by his 
time in Japan at a point when Goto’s ideas were mainstream. 
 
According to Chiang’s understanding of China’s problems and solutions, Sun 
Yat-sen correctly identified the burdensome character of the Manchu monarchy on 
China and the need to violently excise it from the national body. He thus led a 
popular revolution against the Manchu monarchy—according to the earlier editions of 
China’s Destiny—in order to establish a republic and redistribute land to the tiller. He 
was a great man of unusual insight and ability, able to correctly infer the true nature 
of democracy, the true nature of China’s ills, and their rightful solutions. Chiang 
labeled Sun as a man of great authority who demanded unquestioning obedience in 
the name of ancient virtue: 
 
Previously, the members of the Revolutionary Party and the people as a whole 
did not clearly understand the theories of the Father of our Country, nor did 
they have complete confidence in them; therefore, the Father of our Country 
took upon himself the entire burden of reorganizing the Revolutionary Party. 
Reviewing the situation at that time, he said: “The fact that, although our 
revolution achieved several military successes and yet was not completed, was 
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88  
because the Party itself lacked a solid foundation. All Party members did not 
observe Party rules, but acted independently. They did not even display the 
ancient virtue of unquestioning obedience to their leaders, much less grasping 
the new ideal of winning of freedom. At that time, I had no alternative but to 
take up the burden single-handed and reorganize the China Revolutionary 
Party.”123 
Sun’s reorganization of the Revolutionary Party into the Guomindang in 1919, 
referred to above, took place in 1919. However, Chiang’s deployment of this 
quotation of Sun appears in regard to Chiang’s reference of the reorganization of the 
Guomindang in 1924, about which no details are given. Chiang’s positioning of this 
quotation thus leads the reader to assume that the GMD was also single-handedly 
reorganized by the great and correct Father of the Nation. Jaffe, editor of the 
translation, notes that no mention whatsoever is made of the substantial involvement 
of the Soviet Union or the Chinese Communist Party in reorganizing the GMD. Here 
we may see an illustration of how Chiang attempted to purify Sun’s mixed political 
associations so as to bolster Sun’s alignment with Chiang’s anti-Communist stance.124 
Throughout Chiang’s narration, nonetheless, Sun is not just a leader, but a figure of 
such authority that he single-handedly reshapes parties and China’s national destiny. 
 
Chiang’s insistence on Sun’s singular greatness and worthiness for absolute 
authority is curious in light of other depictions of Sun, particularly given his antipathy 
towards the monarchy and his explicit embrace of democracy as a goal. An early 
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passage in Chiang’s book clarifies Chiang’s line of thought: 
 
If the Father of our Country [SYS] had not promoted the Three People’s 
Principles and led our National Revolution, China would have suffered the 
same fate as Korea [then a Japanese colony]… Fortunately, Sun Yat-sen, with 
his prophetic foresight, applied his great courage and wisdom to the task of 
establishing China’s freedom and equality, and of arousing the whole nation. 
He fought for forty years, directing the common aspirations of all the Chinese 
people into the right channels. On his deathbed, he designated the abolition of 
the unequal treaties as the first objective of the Chinese Nationalist 
Revolution, and left to us, the comrades who survived him, and to the citizens 
of the entire country, the accomplishment of this great task. We have 
continued the fight till this day, and have finally succeeded in the first step. 
Thus the opportunity for the recovery of the nation and the hope for the rebirth 
of the state are now presented to the citizens of the entire country. I, Chiang 
Kai-shek, have been identified from the beginning with restarting the 
Republic of China on the road to independence and freedom… (42-43) 
The purpose of Chiang’s narrative, needless to say, is not simply to present the words 
of his teacher, the Father of the Nation. Rather, when he talks about Sun’s goals, 
problems, and character, he is also talking about himself. If only Sun’s authority had 
been recognized and followed, if only Chiang’s authority was recognized and 
followed, then China’s rightful destiny as a great, prosperous, and free nation would 
be realized. In remembering Sun, Chiang was really commemorating himself and 
bolstering his standing as a paramount leader. 
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China’s Destiny memorialized Sun as charging the Chinese people with 
eradicating the unequal treaties as the chief concern of the national revolution in his 
final statement, his will. While this was plainly one of Sun’s aspirations, as the 
abolition of the unequal treaties was one the main and immediate tasks entrusted to 
the Chinese people in his will, Chiang curiously ignored the other specific immediate 
task, namely, convening a “People’s Congress”. The precise wording of this line in 
Sun’s final testament is, “The present tasks are to convene a People’s Congress and 
do away with the unequal treaties. These ought to be accomplished as soon as 
possible, and are the charges of this will.”125 Chiang ignored this other task in 
celebrating his government’s success in achieving the goals of Sun’s will. The 
relinquishing of treaty privileges by Britain and the United States on January 11th, 
1943 was a major propaganda boost for Chiang’s regime and the Alliance. This 
boosted his claim that the Nationalist Government in Chongqing was not only 
fulfilling the will of Sun, but also reestablishing the national strength of China (which 
had been sapped by the treaties, he argued) and working tirelessly to establish a more 
just and righteous world order.126 
Nonetheless, Chiang’s evasion of the second task is not insignificant. At this 
moment, remembering Sun’s other charge would not be productive or effective. In 
contrast to the accomplishment of eliminating extraterritoriality, the first People’s 
Congress, convened from May 5th-17th of 1931, was a political disaster that resulted 
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in the previously mentioned Nanjing-Guangzhou Split, as Chiang had arrested Hu 
Hanmin to prevent his participation and disorganize his supporters. Chen Lifu notes 
that the congress, held for the purpose of drafting and ratifying a provisional 
constitution for the period of political tutelage, “only looked good on the surface” and 
that Chiang, in arresting Hu, had “made too many enemies” and nearly provoked a 
civil war.127 While Chiang stepped down from leadership for a time and the Mukden 
Incident of September 18, 1931 presented more immediate concerns, the People’s 
Congress of 1931 was surely not what Sun had in mind. Therefore, Chiang found it 
more useful and timely to remember the abolition of the treaties, a new event with 
bearing on the regime’s latest policies and efforts, than to remember the more distant 
embarrassment of the People’s Congress and the political turmoil it involved. 
To conclude, in China’s Destiny, Chiang labored to paint a coherent picture of 
Sun Yat-sen as a revolutionary traditionalist. His Sun prized obedience and loyalty, 
anti-foreignism and nationalism (though not “narrow nationalism” or xenophobia), 
unity and strength. In short, his Sun evoked elements of Chiang’s quasi-fascistic 
leanings in ways that might betray his own self-image, but this formulation risks an 
oversimplification of Chiang’s at-times contradictory political beliefs. Authors like 
Jay Taylor, Lloyd Eastman, Arif Dirlik, Fukamachi Hideo, Li Guannan, and Liu 
Wennan disagree on the precise character of Chiang’s beliefs, in any event. 
Chiang defined Sun’s revolution as being “aimed at realizing the Three 
People’s Principles”. He claimed that few understood what this what actually meant 
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to Sun. Chiang’s Sun also focused on the realization of true democracy, and so argued 
that Song Jiaoren and the parliamentarian GMD missed the point; they imitated the 
outer form of Western democracy without engaging in the cultural revolution and 
revival necessary for the deeper realization of minquan zhuyi. Chiang’s Sun focused 
on realizing the Principle of the People’s Livelihood, but this—as the editor points 
out—did not necessarily include “land to the tiller” and had absolutely nothing to do 
with Communism. Indeed, Chiang’s account erased the Chinese Communist Party 
and the Soviet Union from Sun’s life, despite his close dealings with the CCP and 
Soviet advisors like Borodin and Galen in the last years of his life. One of the key 
emphases of Chiang’s narrative was to highlight the ability of Chiang’s government 
to realize a key task in Sun’s will, thus reinforcing his claim to Sunist legitimacy. 
iv: Wang Jingwei’s Transcendent Nationalist Sun Yat-sen 
 
Wang Jingwei, like Chiang, had a substantial following within the galaxy of 
established Guomindang power. In fact, his revolutionary career was longer than 
Chiang’s and indeed went back to the days of the Tongmenghui. His revolutionary 
credentials were so impeccable that he was initially selected to lead the Guomindang 
Executive Committee following Sun’s death in March 1925, though his leadership 
would be partial and short-lived. Key to Wang’s revolutionary prestige was his skill 
with the written and spoken word, his close personal connection with Sun Yat-sen, 
and the cachet of his assassination plot against the Prince Regent Zaifeng in 1910. 
Though he and his co-conspirators failed to assassinate the Prince Regent, who ruled 
in the name of the boy emperor Puyi, Wang achieved national fame as a revolutionary 
martyr as a result of his writings from jail and his media savvy. He was spared a death 
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sentence, which was the standard sentence for treason, and was released only a year 
into his prison sentence due to the collapse of the Qing in late 1911. 
Though he was close to Sun, having served as his personal secretary in Japan 
in 1905, Wang did not support him during the days of the Revolutionary Party (1914- 
1919). During this time, he largely stayed out of national politics and traveled, going 
to France to remove himself from the situation and, officially, to learn about national 
consciousness: 
Since the nation has been unified, those who think deeply have realized that 
although the tyrants have been done away with, most people’s thinking hasn’t 
progressed. For the future of our countrymen, we must change their 
thought…For years I have been on the run, detained, unable to fulfill my 
aspirations. Somewhere in the course of my studies, I long ago resolved to go 
to Europe, partly for my own education, but also to tirelessly study the 
people’s psyche and how to correct it. 128 
However, he returned to China after Sun re-founded the GMD in 1919, and 
accompanied Sun to Beijing on his trip to negotiate with Feng Yuxiang and the 
northern warlords in 1925. Following Sun’s turn for the worse, Wang drafted Sun’s 
personal and public wills; the public will, previously quoted, would become a 
mainstay of Guomindang propaganda, with its charge to finish the national revolution 
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and realize the Republic of China. 
 
Despite his prominence and nominal position atop the Executive Committee, 
Wang ultimately played second fiddle to Chiang Kai-shek after the Northern 
Expedition. This disappointment, Chen Lifu and others argued, was the root cause of 
his collaboration in 1940.129 Wang’s GMD Left coalition had been undermined 
during the Canton Coup of 1926 and was ultimately destroyed in the summer of 1927. 
Although Chiang forced the issue by his April purge of the Communists, Wang 
himself dealt the killing blow to the First United Front and his Wuhan government 
that July by executing his own purge on July 15.130 After this, he went abroad to 
Europe for a time before returning during the Central Plains War of 1930 to discuss 
heading a rival Beijing government with the support of Feng Yuxiang and Yan 
Xishan.131 After these maneuvers fell through, he would exit politics again, 
collaborating briefly with Hu Hanmin in Guangzhou before returning in 1932 after 
the failure of the Sun Fo government.132 At this point, Wang became the President of 
the Legislative Yuan and the central figure in the Reorganization Clique. Until his 
late 1938 defection from Chongqing, he would work with Chiang within the GMD, 
being granted a deputy leadership position second only to Chiang as head of the 
National State Council. Though Chiang and Wang collaborated during this time, the 
period is clouded by a mysterious assassination attempt. According to Chen Lifu, on 
November 1, 1935, Wang was shot while posing for a photograph to inaugurate the 
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sixth plenary session of the Central Executive Committee at the Fourth National 
Congress. Chiang Kai-shek was conveniently not present, and so some observers, like 
Wang’s wife, Chen Bijun, implied Chiang was involved in the incident.133 
In any case, Wang defected from Chongqing and would, on December 29, 
1938, issue a telegram from Hanoi addressed to Chiang and the Chongqing Central 
Party Commission.134 In this telegram, Wang praised the peace terms offered by 
Japanese Prime Minister Konoe Fumimaro in a public statement on December 22, 
1938 and advocated for ending the war on these terms: 
The point of the War of Resistance is to preserve the independent existence of 
the nation. Since the war began, our wounds have been grave and the pain 
deep. If the war can be ended in a just peace, then the nation’s independent 
existence can be protected. If this can be done, then the goal of the war is 
already met.”135 
Wang’s defection from Chongqing leads us to the chapter of Wang’s life that is key 
to our account of contending GMD usages of Sun. At this point, Wang became leader 
of the Peace Movement and of the Reorganized Government in Nanjing. 
There are several key threads to Wang’s political career and thought that we 
should consider when appraising his wartime politics. One, Wang believed in the 
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primacy of national construction (jianguo). All other things, including territorial 
integrity, military supremacy, political democracy, and so forth were secondary to 
national construction, which was itself shorthand for the institutional and economic 
modernization of China.136 Wang compared revolution to building a highway. The 
present was the time for laying the foundation of gravel, not for the asphalt. Also fond 
of medical metaphors, Wang claimed that “China was sick” and that the primary step 
was to raise the baseline health of the national body through national construction; 
once the patient was stronger, more strenuous operations could be commenced.137 
Wang’s plan for national construction was identified as Sun’s plan as outlined in his 
Plan for National Construction. Wang argued that construction required peace and 
that only this construction would resolve the socioeconomic issues tearing at the 
fabric of the Republic. For this reason, Wang indirectly decried Chiang’s focus on 
prioritizing the eradication of the Communists, arguing that: 
Armed force is a destructive element, as wasteful as it is expensive. Huge 
numbers of men are engaged in destruction who should be employed on 
construction, and the wickedness of it all does not end there, for after the fury 
of the fight has passed there remains want, misery, and suffering among the 
wretched people whose homes and fields have been trampled down by the 
warring factions.138 
This leads us to our second point: Wang was a gradualist in all things. He argued that 
“Economic conditions in China are such that the objects expounded by the late Dr. 
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Sun Yat-Sen cannot be attained by radical but by moderate and peaceful 
measures.”139 Three, Wang was more of a party man and a constitutionalist than 
Chiang, and so he often was invoked as the rightful constitutional leader of 
Guomindang by his supporters.140 Four, Wang agreed with Chiang on some points. 
Both were against importing foreign political systems, both favored a period of 
tutelage, and both opposed immediate action against Japanese imperialism. Wang 
applied the same logic for opposing the costs of fighting the Communists to fighting 
the Japanese; in regard to the latter, he highlighted the added factors of Japanese 
military supremacy and international indifference.141 Nonetheless, while he argued 
against aggressive action, he did call for “spirited resistance” and no compromises 
with the Japanese; Manchuria would be retaken, in time. 
Even so, in late 1938, Wang praised Konoe Fumimaro’s peace terms. By 
March of 1940, Wang would be the President of the Reorganized Government in 
Nanjing. Given his prior writings, this is perhaps surprising, but it was consistent with 
principles such as the primacy of national construction and the necessity of peace to 
these ends. In any case, defecting and collaborating with the Japanese was not a 
popular decision. In a propaganda tract titled Guanyu Wang Jingwei panguo 
(“Regarding Wang Jingwei’s Betrayal of the Nation”), Chiang, He Xiangning, Zhou 
Enlai, Bai Chongxi, and others all denounce Wang as a traitor, a coward, and a 
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shadow of his former self while arguing for the inevitability of Chinese victory.142 
Wang, a skilled orator and ideologue facing intense pressure, thus crafted a new 
image for Sun Yat-sen in an effort to legitimate his decision to collaborate with the 
Japanese. To create this new image of Sun Yat-sen—a transnational, Asian, and yet 
still very Chinese Sun Yat-sen—Wang turned to several key figures and moments in 
Sun’s life. First, he turned to Sun’s Asian connections, especially his Japanese 
connections. Second, he invoked Sun’s 1924 speech in Kobe to illustrate Sun’s East 
Asian regional consciousness. Third, he tied Sun’s Three Principles to the Japanese 
ideology of Pan-Asianism with the goal of establishing a Chinese Pan-Asianism and 
an Asian image of Sun Yat-sen. 
In the first regard, Wang invoked Sun’s ample Asian connections. Sun was a 
sociable man with extensive connections in many networks, and so this was not 
difficult. Sun was, moreover, indeed sponsored by Pan-Asianist organizations in 
Japan like the Black Dragon Society, well-familiar with Pan-Asianists like Miyazaki 
Torazō and Toyama Mitsuru, and at least acquainted with Asian revolutionaries like 
the Filipino diplomat Mariano Ponce or the Indian revolutionary M. N. Roy. 
By looking at how Wang remembered Sun’s connections with one of these 
Asian contacts, his friend, neighbor, and revolutionary collaborator Yamada 
Yoshimasa, we may see that establishing Sun’s Asian linkages was a key part of 
Wang’s effort to establish Sun as more than just a Chinese revolutionary. This idea of 
transcending of mere nationalism in favor of shared regional interests was crucial to 
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the ideology of mid-Shōwa Pan-Asianists like Rōyama Masamichi.143 Wang’s 
narrative surrounding Sun and Yamada helpfully illustrates how this worked: 
So, why am I talking about realizing the Three People’s Principles and Pan- 
Asianism, why is there an “and” there? Well, it’s because Pan-Asianism does 
not stand in opposition to the Three People’s Principles, Pan-Asianism is a 
part of those principles…Pan-Asianism was the topic of the Father of the 
Nation’s speech in Kobe on November 23, the thirteenth year of the Republic 
[November 23, 1924]. In accordance with the times, the Chinese Nationalist 
Party emphasized alliance with Russia, but the reason the Father of the Nation 
was giving this speech was because the Father of the Nation knew that 
alliance with Russia wasn’t enough. The completion of the Chinese 
Revolution required the understanding of the Japanese, and so he specifically 
went out of his way to give this speech in Kobe. Moreover, this focus [on Pan- 
Asianism] didn’t just begin there, it was there from the very start of the 
revolution. Now, I have hard proof to show everyone, an inscription from a 
memorial stele the Father of the Nation established on February 27, the 
second year of the Republic [February 27, 913]. More than ten years before 
this, during the Huizhou Uprising of the year Gengzi (1900), a Japanese 
comrade, Yamada Yoshimasa, died for the Chinese Revolution. The Father of 
the Nation erected that stele for him in the second year of the Republic, and on 
the stele was “the vanguard of the Asian revival” (xingya zhi xianjue). From 
 
143 Though I have not found any direct mention of Royama’s work in Wang’s speeches, 
understanding contemporary Pan-Asianist trends in Japan is useful for seeing what was 
distinctive about Wang’s usage of Pan-Asianism and Chinese nationalism. 
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this we can see the raising of Pan-Asianism…Now, why did Yamada 
Yoshimasa participate? Because ever since the Jiawu War (First Sino- 
Japanese War), many aspiring knights of Japan already realized that Sino- 
Japanese war was not good, and that anything less than Sino-Japanese 
cooperation would not be enough to revive East Asia, that anything less than 
assisting the Chinese Revolution would not reach the standard of Sino- 
Japanese cooperation, and so they took part in the Chinese Revolution and 
became the pupils of the Father of the Nation. They followed the Father of the 
Nation into revolutionary war. Yamada Yoshimasa was but one of those who, 
for the Chinese Revolution, fully exhausted their loyalty, completed their 
benevolence [ren]. The Father of the Nation deeply understood this, and so 
called them the vanguard of the Asian revival. That was the year Gengzi. It’s 
already been forty-one years since then. Pan-Asianism is not a piece of trendy 
oratory, but a pillar of the Father of the Nation’s revolution.144 
 
 
 
144 Wang Jingwei, “Implementing the Three People’s Principles and Pan-Asianism”, 2752-4. 
The original text is: “。。。爲什麽說實行三民主義及大亞洲主義呢，爲什麽用一個“
及”字呢，因爲大亞洲主義，不是與三民主義對立的，而是民族主義之中的。。。 
大亞洲主義是民國十三年十一月二十三日 國父在神戶講演的，以時代論，中國國民
黨正主張聯俄，何以   國父有此講演，這因爲 國父知道聯俄是不夠的，中國革
命的成功，一定要得到日本的諒解，所以特地繞道神戶，做這演講，而且   國父的這
種主張，絕不是始於那個時候，從發起革命之始，就這樣主張了，我如今將一種確實
的證據，給各位看，這是民國二年二月十七日 國父在日本所立碑文的拓本，在
民國二年之前十多年，庚子年（一九〇〇年）惠州擧義，日本的同志山田良政君，爲
中國革命而死。 國父於民國二年，爲他立了這塊碑，被上寫著“興亞之先覺” 
由此可知大亞洲主義的提倡，是如何的陳舊了。。。山田良政君，爲什麽加入呢，因
爲自從甲午之役以後，許多日本有志之士，已經覺得中日戰爭是不辛的，非中日合 
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Key to Wang’s argument in this passage was that Pan-Asianism, itself, was a Sunist 
concept and an integral part of his revolution from the very beginning. Yamada 
Yoshimasa, a former China-hand for the Meiji government during the First Sino- 
Japanese War and Sun’s former neighbor, does not particularly matter to Wang as an 
individual; indeed, he is simply useful as a symbol of Sino-Japanese cooperation.145 
By remembering Yamada, Wang is firmly establishing Sun—from his early 
revolutionary days—as concerned with the “Asian revival”, of which the Chinese 
revolution was an integral part. In this way, Wang extended Sun’s revolutionary 
concerns beyond the borders of China and thus linked Sunist Chinese nationalism 
with Pan-Asian regionalism. 
In considering how Wang attempted to link Sunism and Pan-Asianism, we 
should consider what Pan-Asianism was. Pan-Asianism was a largely Japanese 
doctrine of Asian regionalism based upon vague notions of shared culture, economic 
 
 
作，不足以復興東亞，非援助中國革命，不能達到中日合作，所以參加中國革命，做
國父的信徒，跟着 國父為革命作戰，山田良政便是其中一位，終於爲中國 
革命，盡了忠、成了仁， 國父深知其意，故稱之爲興亞，那時是庚子年，距今已
四十一年了。大亞洲主義不是趨時的辭令，而是 國父致力革命以來一貫的主 
張。。。” 
145 The Japan China Friendship Association, 《孫文の革命事業に殉じた日本人く》[Sun 
Yat-sen’s Revolutionary Japanese Martyr] 2-25-2011, http://www.jcfa- 
net.gr.jp/shinbun/2011/110225.html. 
The following narrative comes from my undergraduate thesis: “Yamada Yoshimasa was a 
good friend and revolutionary ally of Sun Yat-sen. Sun had fled to Japan after the failure of 
the first Canton Uprising, and Yamada happened to be Sun’s neighbor there. Yamada, a 
former Chinese interpreter for the Imperial Japanese Army in the First Sino-Japanese War, 
paid Sun a visit one day. While talking, Yamada found himself so moved by Sun’s 
revolutionary vision that he pledged Sun his aid and joined the Revive China Society. As a 
member, he was tasked with procuring arms and other materiel for Sun’s mainland allies. He 
was dispatched as an envoy to Zheng Shiliang’s army during the Huizhou Uprising of 1900, 
and was executed by the Qing government for his role in supplying revolutionary groups.” 
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interests, faith, destiny, race, and geographic proximity. Key to the ideology in all its 
iterations was its anti-Western, anti-colonial bent, which is best summarized by the 
phrase “Asia for the Asians”. At its peak, the Tokyo Conference of 1942, 
representatives from Indonesia, the Philippines, China, India, Siam, and other Asian 
nations came together to preach the gospel of Asian unity. However, while Pan- 
Asianism today is largely associated with Shōwa-era Japanese chauvinism, one 
scholar, Chao Hsun-ta, argues that Pan-Asianism had three main iterations. These 
were, first, the aftermath of the Russo-Japanese War, in which Japanese triumph 
illustrated new possibilities for Japan and the Asian nations against Western powers; 
second, the aftermath of Sun’s 1924 Kobe address, in which he charged that post- 
Meiji Japan was following the martial Hegemonic Way of the West, but could still 
return to walk the virtuous Kingly Way of the East; third, the aftermath of the 
establishment of Manchukuo and the Lytton Report, after which the Japanese 
government resolved to go its own way and pay no heed to the objections or concerns 
of the Western powers.146 Pan-Asianism chiefly differed from its predecessor, 
Japanese Asianism, in that instead of Japan simply being a regional power with 
Monroe Doctrine-esque aspirations, Japan now aspired to liberate Asia and guide its 
lesser, abused neighbors forward into a prosperous Asian modernity. Read less 
charitably, liberation facilitated domination. 
Beyond general rhetoric and broad points of agreement, however, Pan- 
Asianism was not a unified ideology. Different thinkers had different understandings 
 
146 Chao Hsun-ta, “Sun Zhongshan “Dayazhou zhuyi" zai Taiwan de xingqi yu fazhan 
gaikuang (1924-1937)” [The Rise and Development of Sun Yat-sen’s ‘Pan-Asianism’ in 
Taiwan], National Development Research, 10.2, 6-2011, 77-116, 79-80. 
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of what Asia was, what was Asian about it, and what Asian regionalism was supposed 
to accomplish. Okakura Kakuzō (1862-1913) believed that Asianness was necessarily 
rooted in the ancient and the spiritual, and that Meiji modernization risked 
undermining the very essence of Asia itself.147 Pan-Asianism, it follows, must then be 
built upon the basis of Asia’s spirituality and not on industrial force, however 
necessary industrial force may be in the modern world. Later, a young Mitsukawa 
Kametarō would argue that the essence of Pan-Asianism was in Asia’s shared culture, 
race, and interests in resisting Western colonization, and that Japan—the model Asian 
nation, both modern and knowing the pain of colonialism—was perfectly suited to 
liberating and leading its neighbors.148 An elder Mitsukawa, however, believed that 
Pan-Asianism was simply license for rightful Japanese expansion across Asia, as 
Japan was the rightful liberator and leader of its backwards, helpless neighbors. 
Finally for our brief consideration of Japanese Pan-Asianists, Rōyama Masamichi 
argued for a Pan-Asianism of collaboration and cooperation, with Japan the first 
among equals in a regional body of Asian nations. This, while far less chauvinistic 
than the elder Mitsukawa’s Pan-Asianism, still privileged Japan; in any case, 
Rōyama’s conception of Pan-Asianism aptly described the ideal nature of Greater 
East Asian Coprosperity Sphere, but the reality of the sphere more closely resembled 
a Japanese sphere of dominion than an Asian Union of equal member-states, as 
illustrated by the pigeon-holing of Prince Demchugdongrub in the allegedly 
 
147 Okakura Kazuko, Ideals of the East, (NY: Dutton, 1920), accessed through Google Books: 
https://www.google.com/books/edition/The_Ideals_of_the_East/gHk4AQAAIAAJ?hl=en&g 
bpv=1&printsec=frontcover, 224. 
148 Christopher W.A. Szpilman, “Between Pan-Asianism and Nationalism”, Pan-Asian in 
Modern Japanese History: Colonialism, regionalism, and borders, ed. Sven Saaler and J. 
Victor Koschmann, (NY: Routledge, 2007), 90. 
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independent Mongol state of Meng Jiang.149 
 
As we can see from our brief look at Japanese Pan-Asianism, the status of 
Japan was generally privileged, regardless of whether the thinker in question 
articulated a nationalistic or regionalistic Pan-Asianism. However, Wang’s attempt to 
tie Pan-Asianism to Sunist nationalism is notable when we consider that thinkers like 
Rōyama Masamichi believed nationalism was an impediment to regionalism, not an 
integral engine within it. Rōyama argued that: 
The unity of the East must be born of the transcendence of nationalism. Where 
is the motive force capable of accomplishing that transcendence? It is latent in 
the very expansion of Japanese nationalism toward the Asian continent…The 
principle intrinsic to Japan’s advance is not imperialism but rather regionalism 
for the purposes of defense and development. This principle of regionalism 
has become manifest only recently. It is entirely natural that the immature 
Chinese nationalism should misunderstand and distort this as imperialism.150 
In contrast to Rōyama, Wang does not try to contort Sun into such an understanding 
of anti-national regionalism. His attempt to create a Pan-Asian Sun relies upon the 
unity of the nation and the region, the linked fates of China and Asia, the 
 
 
 
149 Hsu Shu-hsi, Whither Japan, (Shanghai—HK—Singapore: Kelly & Walsh, 1941), 68. 
Though the foundation of Meng Chiang in the territory of Suiyan and Chahar under the rule 
of Prince Demchugdongrub was supposedly the establishment of an independent Mongol 
state freed from Chinese hegemony, the prince’s government was so hampered by layers of 
Japanese civil and military advisors that it was unable to function without the approval of 
Tokyo. 
150 J. Victor Koschmann, “Constructing destiny: Royama Masamichi and Asian regionalism 
in wartime Japan”, Pan-Asian in Modern Japanese History: Colonialism, regionalism, and 
borders, ed. Sven Saaler and J Victor Koschmann, (NY: Routledge, 2007), 192. 
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complementary nature and shared origins of Pan-Asianism and the Three People’s 
Principles. 
v: Conclusion 
 
Both Chiang and Wang emphasized their personal connections to Sun Yat- 
sen. While this emphasis on a lineage of personal closeness was not a new 
phenomenon, it intensified during the time of the Chongqing-Nanjing split. This 
increasing stress on personal connection to Sun was largely due to a need on the part 
of both Chiang and Wang to prove themselves and their government as the legitimate 
ROC government, a need more pronounced than possibly at any other time in GMD 
history. Though the Wuhan-Nanjing split was also a time of pronounced tension 
between Wang and Chiang, these tensions resolved within months by the concession 
of Wang and the Hankou GMD. However, following the assassination of Wang’s 
secretary Zeng Zhongming in Hanoi by agents of Dai Li151 and Japanese PM Konoe 
Fumimaro’s aite wo sezu telegram,152 which declared a Japanese policy of non- 
communication with regards to Chiang Kai-shek and the GMD-Right, there was 
presumably no way for Wang and Chiang to truly reconcile their break.153 Combined 
with the high stakes of what was framed a war of national survival by Chiang and a 
 
 
151 Chen Lifu, Storm Clouds, 138. 
152 Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “特別展示「日中戦争と日本外交」 
III トラウトマン工作と「対手トセズ」声明”[Special Exhibit on the Sino-Japanese War 
and Diplomatic Relations…] 
https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/annai/honsho/shiryo/nitchu_nihon/03.html. 
The full phrase used was “爾後国民政府ヲ対手トセズ”, meaning essentially that “We, 
henceforth, refuse to deal with the Nationalist Government.” 
153 Gerald E. Bunker, The Peace Conspiracy: Wang Ching-wei and the China War 1937- 
1941, (Harvard UP, 1972), 46. 
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war of national destruction by Wang, this was not simply a power struggle like during 
the war of unification. The dire stakes of the wartime split, framed as a battle for the 
survival of the Chinese nation, meant that each side was locked into their position and 
needed to legitimate it by all means necessary. 
The elevation and redefinition of Sun Yat-sen as the Father of the Nation 
(guofu) was an effect of this struggle for power; both sides turned to calling Sun, who 
had previously been known as Dr. Sun or the Premier (zongli), guofu. While he had 
been called guofu before, it was not until spring of 1940, in direct response to Wang’s 
huandu—return to the capital—ceremony that officially marked the founding of his 
Reorganized Government, that Sun was legally enshrined as the Father of the Nation 
by Chiang’s regime.154 Scholar Du Yue argued that this elevation of Sun as the guofu 
also served to firmly tie the GMD party-state to the Chinese nation itself.155 
Moreover, while guofu had been a superlative in the past, it now subsumed Sun’s 
very name. Also around this time, Chiang Kai-shek began referring to himself as 
Director-General (zongcai) in emulation of Sun’s previous epithet, zongli.156 At this 
point, we should remember that Chiang Kai-shek generally referred to himself as 
Chiang Chung-cheng (Jiang Zhongzheng), a name directly connected with Sun’s 
most commonly known Mandarin name Sun Zhongshan through the zhong character. 
We can see through the politics of naming and titles like this, as well more indirect 
methods like his earlier marriage to Song Meiling and the wide circulation of 
 
 
 
154 Yue Du, “Sun Yat-sen as Guofu: Competition over Nationalist Party Orthodoxy in the 
Second Sino-Japanese War”, Modern China 2019, Vol. 45(2) 201 –235, 204. 
155 Ibid., 213. 
156 Taylor, “Contradistinction”, 672. 
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photographs with Sun and Chiang together, that Chiang was clearly concerned with 
establishing links between himself and Sun.157 
Wang also made ample use of the Father of the Nation epithet, as seen above, 
but did not try to connect himself to Sun in the same ways as Chiang. While Chiang, 
through his personal stylings and publishing of original ideological tracts like China’s 
Destiny, seemed to equate himself to Sun, Wang portrayed himself more as Sun’s 
disciple than co-conversant, partly per the norms of collaborator contradistinction, in 
which figures like Wang or Petain found it preferable to present an image of a 
reluctant patriot more than a superhuman leader.158 Wang relied heavily upon his own 
revolutionary credentials, his personal ties to Sun, and the invocation of Sun’s own 
ideology and history to forward his claims and authority as legitimately Sunist. 
In conclusion, Wang and Chiang offer two different visions of Sun Yat-sen, 
born of their political needs. Wang’s Sun was an Asian revolutionary who sought 
peaceful reconstruction, thus incorporating and justifying Wang’s own politics. 
Chiang’s Sun was a traditionally-minded national leader of extraordinary ability and 
wisdom who emphasized strength, discipline, and obedience, and so provided 
ideological grounding for Chiang’s own politics. However, both Chiang and Wang 
made Sun a figure of paramount importance, unlike the Chinese Communists. 
Nevertheless, the Chinese Communists laid their own claims to Sun and invoked their 
own images of him, images quite distinct from what we see in GMD narratives. 
 
 
157 We might note that Jeremy Taylor argues that Chiang was far more concerned with 
making himself Sun’s equal and promoted Sun to also promote himself through this 
equivalence. 
158 Taylor, “Contradistinction”, 676. 
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II 
 
RED SUN OVER CHINA: SUN YAT-SEN & THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS 
 
But Lao Quan didn’t buy it: the more I explained, the more confused he got. 
In the end, he threw in the towel and said: “To be perfectly honest, who the 
hell has time for this crap? At our level, we just do as we’re told. You people 
with pens are just full of bullshit.” 
—Cao Nancai in Mao’s Lost Children 
 
i: Introduction 
 
Although Sun Yat-sen was the founder of the Guomindang, the chief rival of 
the Chinese Communist Party and the perennial enemy of the Chinese people in CCP 
narratives, Sun himself has been frequently honored by the Chinese Communists 
since the founding of the People’s Republic of China. In this chapter, we consider 
differing Chinese Communist narratives surrounding Sun Yat-sen and the contexts 
that produced them. My main sources for examination will be a collection of 
commemorative articles published in the People’s Daily, the official newspaper of the 
CCP-PRC party-state, on the recurring ten-year anniversary of Sun’s birth (November 
12th, 1866). Some articles provide overviews of the festivities, others are published 
speeches; all will help illustrate official uses of Sun’s image in Communist political 
narratives. In this way, I hope to explicate Sun’s pre-reform and post-reform 
trajectory in CCP hagiography. Finally, I will bring these historical remembrances of 
Sun together in a brief conclusion to illustrate how figures like Mao Zedong, Song 
Qingling, Zhou Enlai, Jiang Zemin, and Xi Jinping view and use Sun. 
When put in their relevant context, we see that Sun, first honored largely for 
his work towards the democratic revolution in the 1950s, is later honored and 
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defended from culture warriors on the basis of his fervent anti-imperialism in the 
1960s. Following the reform years, Sun is remembered more so as a patriot and a 
modernizer, with his nationalism becoming the key point of his worthiness by the 
administration of Xi Jinping. 
We may note at this point Sun’s own frequent hobnobbing with marginal 
figures of empire, such as the Straits Chinese of Penang, the colonial doctor James 
Cantlie, and the members of the Pan-Asianist Black Dragon Society. We may also 
note Sun’s own turn to petty militarism after the failure of the Second Revolution and 
the Indian Communist M. N. Roy’s biting criticism of Sun for being a petit bourgeois 
adventurer. However, these aspects and interpretations of Sun’s life are not explicated 
in these narratives. Rather, we see an idealized Sun helpfully buffed to fit neatly into 
the reigning CCP narrative of the day. This Sun, generally, was a poor boy from the 
countryside with a deep peasant consciousness, a logical hatred of the feudal Qing 
monarchy and the semi-colonial straits of China’s fin de siècle, a revolutionary 
nationalist spirit, a set of bourgeois goals for his revolution, and a poor if sympathetic 
understanding of socialism and the destiny of the Chinese Communist Party. 
In short, honoring Sun Yat-sen became newly useful for the Communists after 
the establishment of the PRC, as honoring Sun establishes a revolutionary lineage that 
predates the CCP and so has a longer and broader influence than Party history. 
Incorporating Sun not only helps to delegitimize the GMD by claiming their guofu as 
a forebear of the socialist revolution, but also gives the CCP a foil of earlier days with 
which to compare the PRC and its various achievements. Moreover, defining Sun, his 
achievements, and his values at these grand decadal commemorations allowed CCP 
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leaders and figures to make broader value statements and set the tone of the era. We 
might note that one aspect of this tone is the place of Taiwan, which shifts from the 
domain of the American running-dog Chiang Kai-shek and his lackeys to be liberated 
by force to the residence of misguided “Taiwan compatriots” who ought to help 
realize Sun Yat-sen’s dream of reunifying China and thus completing his revolution. 
ii: A Brief Overview of the CCP and the PRC 
 
As mentioned in the prior chapter, the Chinese Communist Party was founded 
in 1921 and allied with the Guomindang in 1924 under the guidance of the Soviet 
Union. Representative H. Sneevliet and others had believed that the CCP would be 
most effective operating as a “bloc within” the GMD, which they argued was not 
really a political party so much as it was a revolutionary nationalist movement. 
Following the Hanning Split between Nanjing and Hankou and the subsequent 
reunification of the GMD under the rightist Chiang Kai-shek’s leadership, the 
Communists were driven out of the cities and into the countryside. Desperate urban 
uprisings in Nanchang, Guangzhou, and other cities ended in failure. The 
Communists would regroup to form rural Soviets in the hinterlands of Jiangxi and 
Hunan provinces, the largest being the famous Jiangxi Soviet. Chiang and the GMD 
Right made the immediate destruction of these Soviets top priority, and the 
subsequent encircling campaigns pressed in on the territory of the Soviets. In a daring 
attempt to escape the encirclement, the Red Army fled the Soviets for west China, 
then northwest China; the grueling Long March from the Soviets to the new 
revolutionary base of Yan’an in Shaanxi Province would take months and put the 
Communists through great hardship. However, the Long March now stands as an 
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event of mythic proportions in the PRC, providing the CCP with a tale of hardship 
and suffering that also serves as a player’s stage for the fine qualities and heroic 
selflessness of the Communists. It also is the teleological starting point for Mao 
Zedong as Chairman Mao; though he had been an influential leader in rural Hunan, it 
was the Long March that thrust him to a prominent place in the Party. 
Following the move to Yan’an, many revolutionaries flocked to the area to 
participate in the building of Communist rule in the area. Among these were notable 
figures like the author Ding Ling, but many more were people of little renown and 
much enthusiasm. However, enthusiasm waned among some cadres as the society at 
Yan’an did not live up to its revolutionary creed. Ding Ling, for instance, criticized 
her comrades for treating female cadres with a double-standard,159 while the journalist 
Wang Shiwei criticized the Communist Party elite for their privileged, elitist attitudes 
in Yan’an.160 Ding Ling, for her part, was officially reprimanded and would be 
rusticated some years later on charges of rightism, while Wang Shiwei met an 
unfortunate end in 1947, executed under murky circumstances as the Communists 
fled a GMD attack against Yan’an. 
By late 1946, full hostilities between the Guomindang and the CCP had 
resumed; by 1956, the CCP formally controlled all of mainland China aside from the 
southeastern marches of Fujian Province. While GMD activities in the Northwest and 
along the Yunnan-Burma border continued during this time, the foundation of the 
 
 
159 Ding Ling, “Sanbajie yougan” [Feelings on International Women’s Day], 3-9-1942, 
Marxists.org, https://www.marxists.org/chinese/reference-books/yanan1942/2-02.htm 
160 Wang Shiwei, “Yebaihehua” [Wild Lilies], 3-17-1942, Marxists.org, 
https://www.marxists.org/chinese/reference-books/yanan1942/1-02.htm 
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People’s Republic in 1949 meant that the CCP already claimed formal, exclusive, and 
legitimate authority over all of China. The continued threat of the Nationalists was 
certainly not lost on the CCP authorities, given their continued activities in the 
Northwest, the Southwest, and fortification of Taiwan and coastal Fujian outposts like 
Kinmen. Therefore, political legitimation was not yet constructive in 1946, as the 
PRC did not exist and the CCP only needed to discredit the sitting power and promise 
pragmatic changes. The high-octane smear campaign against Chiang Kai-shek— 
among other propaganda efforts—and promises of land reform in New China 
constitute evidence of this situation. While certainly positive ideological efforts were 
taken within the Communist Party, the CCP was not yet a party-state, and so this had 
not been nationalized. However, by 1956, the party-state had been established, and 
the masses now needed to be brought into the ideological fold. Legitimation now 
required some constructive efforts, and Sun Yat-sen evidently proved a useful figure 
in the CCP’s narrative of national liberation and self-strengthening. 
 
Much changed between 1956 and 1966. For instance, the PRC and the USSR 
turned from partners to adversaries. Mao Zedong, himself the subject of a strong 
personality cult and distrustful of Nikita Khrushchev, denounced “Soviet 
revisionism” and articulated a way forward for a more purely Chinese Communist 
revolution. Khrushchev, for his part, distrusted Mao and what Khrushchev saw as his 
Stalinist tendencies, tendencies which Khrushchev had unequivocally denounced in 
his midnight address “On the Cult of Personality and Its Consequences” on February 
25, 1956. Though this had not been an issue for the 1956 commemorations, Sino- 
Soviet relations deteriorated, and Mao believed that the “revisionists” were 
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destroying anything revolutionary about the Soviet project. In any case, by 1960, the 
damage had been done. No longer would the Soviet Union provide the Chinese state 
with advisors or material aid, and no longer would Chinese people study the “black 
earth of white birch forests [i.e. Soviet conditions and realities] over the red soil of 
bamboo forests”, as the 1976 film Jue Lie [“Breaking with Old Customs”] would put 
it.161 Charting a new path forward, Mao would initiate the Great Leap Forward and 
total communalization of agriculture in 1957 to leap beyond the binding confines of 
dialectical history. Volunteerism could triumph over technocratic plans and 
incrementalism, as model projects like the Dazhai commune seemed to prove. 
However, the Great Leap Forward and its production targets failed to come to 
fruition. Drought, mismanagement, zeal, party structures, and misguided pest 
eradication campaigns resulted in a disastrous famine that killed millions of rural 
Chinese, particularly in regions like Henan and Anhui where political mobilization 
was especially fervent.162 Steel produced by backyard smelters was essentially a 
waste, for the product was poor and kept farmers from other tasks. The many failures 
of the Great Leap Forward resulted in Mao being sidelined by more technocratic CCP 
elites like Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping. 
 
Just before the Great Leap took off, an environment of suspicion permeated 
Beijing. The Hundred Flowers Campaign of 1956, in which Mao solicited dissent and 
criticism of the CCP’s administration, had led to the Anti-Rightist Campaign of 1957, 
 
161 Sigrid Schmalzer, Red Revolution, Green Revolution (University of Chicago Press, 2016), 
37-38. 
162 The disasters resulting from the Great Leap Forward are discussed elsewhere, but are not 
the focus of my work. My main source here is Yang Jisheng’s Tombstone (NY: Farrar, 
Strauss, and Giroux, 2012). 
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in which critics and dissidents were punished as “poisonous weeds”. Though it is 
unclear exactly why Mao cracked down on solicited dissent, with his own 
justification resting on the need to weed a garden to get desirable results, this and the 
denunciation of the formerly-esteemed Peng Dehuai for speaking out against the 
Great Leap Forward created a climate of fear in Chinese political circles.163 However, 
the GLF greatly discredited Mao and his leadership. Following the Great Leap, the 
CCP sidelined Mao and began to rule more technocratically, rule that involved the 
stratification of society into a good, red quasi-aristocracy and a bad, black under- 
caste. This division relied largely upon notions of good and bad blood as based upon 
ancestral ties; if one was descended from a revolutionary martyr, then one’s blood 
was good.164 The converse is obvious. 
It was against this sort of stratified society that Mao had initially sought to 
struggle, if his earlier writings are any indication. Categorical suppression with no 
room for individual agency was, after all, the real dagger in the heart of Miss Zhao.165 
Accordingly, Mao launched the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (hereafter the 
Cultural Revolution or the CR) to disrupt the stratification of Chinese society and to 
promote the revolutionary character of New China. It was also a movement against 
the Party and so gave individuals agency to challenge what had been a domineering, 
inaccessible authority.166 The Cultural Revolution became a symbol of anti- 
 
 
 
163 Maurice Meisner, Mao Zedong, (Cambridge: Polity, 2006), 156. 
164 Yiching Wu, The Cultural Revolution at the Margins: Chinese Socialism in Crisis, 
(Harvard UP, 2014), 56. 
165 Mao Zedong, “Miss Chao’s Suicide”, 1919, Marxists.org, 
https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/works/1919/miss-chao.htm. 
166 Yiching Wu, 2. 
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authoritarianism to many oppressed groups around the world, and cemented a global 
image of a most revolutionary Mao and a most empowering Mao Zedong Thought, 
“the spiritual atom bomb.”167 However, the Cultural Revolution devolved into chaotic 
infighting between CCP factions, Red Guard factions, and other belligerents. 
Following Mao’s death, the Cultural Revolution and its aftermath were blamed on his 
wife Chiang Qing and the Gang of Four (consisting of Chiang, Zhang Chunqiao, Yao 
Wenyuan, and Wang Hongyan). Mao’s successor Hua Guofeng, who insisted upon 
maintaining “whatever” Mao would have wanted, was pushed aside by Deng 
Xiaoping and the reformists in 1978. 
The real details of the Reform and Opening Up are beyond our scope; what is 
most important here is the shift from Maoist ideological purity to Dengist 
pragmatism. “Whichever cat catches the mouse” is the better cat, as Deng put it. The 
Chinese economy grew rapidly following the normalization of relations with the 
United States, the monetization of the renminbi, the opening of the Chinese economy 
gradually through the creation of Special Economic Zones and the implementation of 
their lessons elsewhere, and a turn away from militarism. Though financial 
difficulties in the 1990s resulted from the breaking of “the iron rice-bowl” (the state- 
owned enterprise and the failsafe jobs it provided) under Zhu Rongji and from the 
IMF Crisis of 1997, the economy overall grew at a tremendous rate between the Deng 
years and today. We may note, however, that while the era of Deng, Jiang Zemin, and 
Hu Jintao saw rapid growth and an emphasis on China’s peaceful rise to prominence, 
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the Xi Jinping years have thus far seen slowing economic growth—referred to as the 
“New Normal” of a caught-up, developed economy—and a preponderance of saber- 
rattling in the South China Sea, East China Sea, and along the mountainous border 
with India. Though this thesis does not dwell on current events, we might note that 
the Xi years may yet bring about more unforeseen developments. It is with this basic 
context in mind that we must consider the following commemorations of Sun Yat-sen 
to better understand the images of Sun being created and for what purpose. 
iii: Glory to Sun, the Democratic Revolutionary!—Commemorating Sun Yat- 
sen’s 90th Birthday in the People’s Daily 
Every ten years on November 12th or 13th, starting from 1956 on, the Chinese 
Communist Party commemorates the birth of Sun Yat-sen with pageantry, speeches, 
and a People’s Daily recap of the event. Though each commemorative speech is 
different in its particulars and the general narrative changes over time, they all follow 
similar logic and espouse a similar narrative: Sun Yat-sen, a great forebear of the 
Communist revolutionaries, initiated China’s democratic revolution, the necessary 
precursor for the Chinese Communist Party’s claim to socialist revolution according 
with Marxist historical analysis. This consistent depiction of Sun as a great 
revolutionary was tied to the need to legitimate the CCP in Marxist terms, but he is 
also invoked to create a constant thread of revolutionary nationalism and as a way of 
comparing the Old and New China of CCP rhetoric. In this way, Sun’s life and image 
are manipulated to fit within the framework of a CCP narrative that combines 
nationalism, Marxism, and—after 1976—pragmatism in legitimating the regime. 
Commemorating his birth deepens his connection to the CCP and so furthers the 
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nationalist legitimacy of the Party; it also provides an opportunity for reflection on 
the past for the purposes of glorifying the present. 
1956 marked the late stages for Sino-Soviet cooperation, with both the 
Hungarian Uprising and the Hundred Flowers Movement fueling Chairman Mao 
Zedong’s suspicion of reformist mindsets and political opposition within the PRC. 
The year also marked the 90th anniversary of Sun Yat-sen’s birth. Unlike his 80th 
birthday in 1946, a time when the Communists and Nationalists were once again 
embroiled in desperate combat,168 the victorious CCP seized upon Sun’s 90th birthday 
for a major commemoration, as evinced by extensive coverage in the People’s Daily. 
Drawing upon a potent global spirit of anti-colonial nationalism, the fledgling state 
invited participants from around the world for a ceremony that included figures as 
high-ranking as GMD Revolutionary Committee chairwoman He Xiangning,169 
Premier Zhou Enlai, and Chairman Mao himself. Why was Sun suddenly so crucial to 
the CCP? Why hold such a large commemorative event on his 90th birthday? In 
answering this question, we should consider the political context. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
168 The 1946 papers from November 11-13th do not detail any similar commemoration events, 
highlighting that the CCP’s formal commemoration of Sun began after the party had assumed 
power. 
169 He Xiangning, a woman of diverse talents and pursuits, was a longtime member of Sun’s 
Tongmenghui, the Minister of Women’s Affairs in Sun’s United Front regime, the widow of 
the GMD general Liao Zhongkai, and an accomplished painter among other things. After 
Liao’s assassination in 1924—an event which led to the ouster of Hu Hanmin and direct 
competition between Wang Jingwei and Chiang Kai-shek for party leadership—He 
Xiangning drew back from politics, but would co-found the Revolutionary Committee of the 
GMD in 1948 and be a prominent figure in top PRC institutions. 
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Figure 1: Front page of the November 12, 1956 People’s Daily. 
 
A keystone in the 1956 commemoration was a speech delivered by Mao 
Zedong, a speech that was printed in the People’s Daily on the occasion and later 
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reprinted as a canonical text as regards CCP orthodoxy on Sun. Mao praises Sun in a 
calling for remembrance: 
Remember our great revolutionary forebear, Mr. Sun Yat-sen! 
 
Remember during the preparatory period of the great Chinese democratic 
revolution, with the clear standpoint of the Chinese revolutionary factions, his 
sharp struggle with the reformist factions! In this stage of struggle, he was the 
flag-bearer of the Chinese democratic revolution. 
Remember his rich contributions of leading the people to overthrow the 
imperial system and establishing a republican state during the period of the 
Xinhai Revolution. 
Remember his rich contribution of updating the Old Three People’s Principles 
into the New Three People’s Principles in the first period of GMD-CCP 
cooperation. 
He has left us many beneficial things in the realm of political thought…170 
 
Mao continued to explain the significance of Sun in contemporary China by stating 
that all Chinese, aside from “certain reactionaries” like the GMD followers of Chiang 
Kai-shek in Taiwan and capitalist-roaders still on the mainland, were carrying on his 
 
 
170 Mao Zedong, “Jinian Sun Zhongshan Xiansheng” (Remember Dr. Sun Yat-sen), People’s 
Daily (Renmin Ribao), November 12, 1956, 1. The original text is: “纪念伟大的革命先行者
孙中山先生！纪念他在中国民主革命准备时期，以鲜明的中国革命民主派立场，同中
国改良派作了尖锐的斗争。他在这一场斗争中是中国革命民主派的旗帜。纪念他在辛
亥革命时期，领导人民推翻帝制、建立共和国的丰功伟绩。纪念他在第一次国共合作
时期，把旧三民主义发展为新三民主义的丰功伟绩。他在政治思想方面留给我们许多
有益的东西。” 
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revolutionary work through the present stage of socialist revolution. 
 
Concluding, he remarked upon his personal experience with Sun, saying that: 
 
Dr. Sun was an honest man. I had heard him give many speeches and felt he 
had a certain grandeur of spirit. From how he paid attention to the specifics of 
China’s historical situation and the present social situation, and from how his 
research paid attention to the domestic situation of the Soviet Union and of 
other foreign nations, I know he was very open-minded. 171 
Notably, Mao praised Sun as honest, humble, and open-minded. To his credit, in 
Mao’s eyes, he endeavored to understand the specifics of China’s own historical 
trajectory and the societal questions resulting, emphasizing the importance of 
understanding China on its own terms. However, Mao also praised him for studying 
the Soviet Union and other foreign countries, taking it as a sign of his open- 
mindedness and curiosity. Notably, by mentioning the Soviet Union by name, Mao 
indicated that Sun found the Soviet Union particularly worthy of understanding and 
so reinforced Sun’s connection to the CCP through this receptivity to the standard- 
bearer of socialism. Of course, Sun never went to the Soviet Union, but Mao noted 
his interest in conjunction with his broader interest in the domestic issues of foreign 
nations as well, recognizing the immutable reality of Sun’s globetrotting existence. 
We might briefly note that by lumping together the Soviet Union and the nameless 
foreign nations, Mao himself made a statement by relegating the lessons of Soviet 
 
 
171 Ibid. The original text is: “孙先生是一个谦虚的人。我听过他多次讲演，感到他有一
种宏伟的气魄。从他注意研究中国历史情况和当前社会情况方面，又从他注意研究包
括苏联在内的外国情况方面，知道他是很虚心的。” 
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Communism to foreign studies, undermining the universal claims backing certain 
understandings of Communism and reinforcing his own understanding of state 
Communism. 
This personal connection between Mao and Sun was not close, but Mao did 
make a point to mention it in his terse remarks. Mao’s conclusion thus demonstrates 
that pointing to a legendary figure like Sun and his personal experience of this figure 
granted him a certain amount of credibility and authenticity. In this way, Mao 
augmented his own revolutionary authenticity with another facet, that of a faithful 
heir of Sun in that he had firsthand heard Sun’s speeches and worked with him in his 
later years; this connection created a historical lineage that extended beyond the CCP. 
Moreover, Mao’s claims that the CCP already completed Sun’s unfinished work of 
democratic revolution illustrated how the CCP ideologically discredited their 
Nationalist foes. 172 
Further delegitimating the GMD, Mao coopted Sun’s ideology itself by 
emphasizing the New Three People’s Principles. While the GMD did and continues 
to emphasize Sun’s articulation of the Principles of Nationalism (minzu zhuyi), the 
People’s Sovereignty/Democracy (minquan zhuyi), and the People’s Welfare 
(minsheng zhuyi), Mao emphasized the New Three People’s Principles as the correct, 
updated thought of Sun with regards to national salvation and organization. The New 
Three People’s Principles (New TPP/Old TPP henceforth) were first articulated in 
 
172 Given that the CCP claimed that establishing the PRC had successfully completed the 
democratic revolution and thus initiated the stage of socialist revolution, any attempt to 
institute capitalist development was historically reactionary and without basis. Only 
progressive ideals and policies that helped bring about communism were legitimate according 
to this dialectal vision of history, and so the GMD had no leg to stand on. 
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Mao’s speech “On New Democracy”, delivered on January 15th, 1940. Mao, at the 
time of the Second United Front and responding Wang Jingwei’s defection from the 
United Front, stated that the Old TPP and the New TPP was not his distinction, but 
rather Sun’s own distinction. The Old TPP simply were old and obsolete, while the 
New TPP reflected the correct understanding of the post-Xinhai, post-Yuan Shikai 
Chinese revolutionary movement. The New TPP were contained and codified in the 
1924 Manifesto of the First Party Congress of the GMD. They consisted of alliance 
with the Soviet Union, alliance with the Communist Party, and supporting the 
workers and peasantry.173 
Mao created binary choices to justify and cement the New TPP as the 
ideologically correct TPP. One can ally with the Soviets, or ally with the imperialists. 
One can work with the Communists, or one can work with the Japanese. One can 
work to support the workers and peasants, or one can give up on any pretense of 
revolutionary activity given that China is a peasant nation and New Democracy is 
“fundamentally a question of giving the peasants their rights.”174 In doing so, he 
created a framework in which the Communist Party was the faithful heir to Sun’s 
revolution, a key part of his plans for Chinese revolution, and a key part of his 
ideology. By Mao’s logic, opposing the Communist Party was tantamount to treason 
against Sun and his work. Thus, no opponent of the CCP could legitimately claim to 
represent Sun or his thought. In this way, Mao invoked Sun to legitimate the CCP 
regime and to delegitimate the Nationalists, his rivals in invoking Sun and his legacy 
 
173 Mao Zedong, “On New Democracy”. Mao Zedong and China’s Revolutions: A Brief 
History with Documents, ed. Timothy Cheek, (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 95. 
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for their own competing political ends. 
 
Mao and his 1956 speech memorializing Sun became the basis for the CCP’s 
later narratives of Sun. We might periodize CCP Sun commemorations into three 
eras: first, the 1956 Sun, reflecting the politics of the first-five year plan, was framed 
using the terms of post-Stalin, Soviet-esque Chinese communism; second, a more 
radical commemoration in 1966 framed Sun using the terms of Cultural Revolution- 
era Maoism; third, a version of Sun reformulated to fit the post-“Reform and 
Opening Up” CCP capitalist reform. 
We may contextualize the early PRC remembrance of Sun in terms of other 
1956 articles that illustrate what was in vogue in Chinese politics at the time. Sun 
Yat-sen was not a socialist, one article admits. However, Sun was upheld as a 
socialist sympathizer and fervent admirer of the USSR.175 This assertion of Sun’s 
explicit admiration for the Soviet Union came at a time when Soviet advisors 
remained a visible presence in the Chinese communist party-state and in the wake of 
significant Soviet aid programs that predated the proclamation of the People’s 
Republic on October 1st, 1949. Zhou Enlai similarly articulated Sun’s admiration for 
the Soviet Union as he built up the standard picture of Sun as a democratic 
revolutionary in league with the Communists working towards progressive ends 
under a united front. Zhou then directly connected Sun’s mission as a prelude to 
calling for the immediate invasion of Taiwan for the purposes of expelling the 
reactionary Chiang government, so as to reunify China. Even more telling, Zhou 
 
 
175 “Sun Zhongshan Xiansheng Yongsheng” [The Eternal Life of Dr. Sun Yat-sen], People’s 
Daily, November 12, 1956, 1. 
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connected Sun’s vision of anti-imperialist national revolution to anti-colonial 
nationalisms in Africa and Asia, to the concurrent Suez crisis in particular, reflecting 
the spirit of the Bandung Conference and the perceived relevance of Sun to the global 
decolonization movement.176 
Lin Boqu177 and He Xiangning filled out the remaining Chinese statements for 
the 1956 ceremony. Lin, a longtime member of the Nationalist Party, delivered a 
theoretical address that sought to explicate the connections between Sun and the 
Communist narrative of revolution. Lin stated that Sun was deeply influenced by the 
successes and failures of the Taiping Rebellion and by the Hundred Days’ Reform. 
From the Taipings, Sun learned of the disaffection of the masses and their great 
revolutionary potential; from the reformers, Sun learned of the extent of Qing 
corruption and stagnation, as well as how the reformers unwillingness to rely upon 
the masses and champion their causes—unwillingness stemming from fear, Lin 
suggests—doomed their initiatives from the start.178 This emphasis on the 
revolutionary potential of the masses, in particular the proletariat, represents an 
attempt to steep Sun in Communist ideology and provide a basis for CCP narratives 
of history by articulating them through the respected figure of Sun Yat-sen. Notably, 
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Lin states that prior uprisings had not been connected to the proletariat, China’s most 
progressive class in Marxist terms, and so failed because they did not represent 
historically progressive movements according to historical materialism. Rather, such 
movements like the Taiping or various Ming restorationist uprisings (carried out by 
peasants) and the Hundred Days’ Reform (carried out by elite landowners) were 
necessarily reactionary in that they sought only to restore old dynasties, found new 
dynasties, or modify existing dynasties. None of these three possibilities were 
historically progressive in a feudal society, as they all preserved the feudal relations 
of production. Sun’s revolution, therefore, was unique and successful in that it was 
historically progressive. Although Sun did not live to see it completed, the CCP 
claimed to have completed the democratic revolution with the founding of the PRC, 
and this legitimated the initiation of socialist development under the CCP. 
Lin further emphasized Sun’s poor understanding of socialism,179 his distrust 
of Western capitalism and pursuit of Chinese-style capitalism to avoid characteristic 
Western abuses of the poor. Lin also made a point of Sun’s avid anti-imperialism, 
which, Lin suggests, dated back to at least the activities of the Tongmenghui, but was 
heightened by the success of the October Revolution: “Sun Yat-sen, like all patriots, 
saw something in the October Revolution: a force that could truly oppose 
imperialism.”180 This crucial link establishes why Sun admired the Soviets, which— 
 
 
 
179 A common demerit attributed to Sun in Communist narratives is that Sun did not truly 
understand socialism and that what he did understand came from thinkers like Henry George, 
a somewhat influential thinker from the time who advocated for the Single Tax as a key 
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in ceremonial terms—had been a slogan only up until Lin’s address. By this, Lin also 
established the nationalist credentials of the Communist Party, being the party 
consistently supported by the anti-imperialist USSR, and thus underscored how 
opponents of the Communist Party were necessarily anti-nationalist, pro-imperialist 
traitors. The de-legitimation of the GMD was two-fold; they were portrayed as 
reactionaries for their opposition to socialism and portrayed as national traitors for 
their opposition to the CCP. 
In discussing the potential dangers of imperialism, Lin mentioned the 
Hungarian Uprising, which he framed as a reactionary uprising supported by foreign 
imperialists against the people’s government of Hungary. He also cited the Suez 
crisis, in which Britain, France, and the fledgling state of Israel invaded Egypt and 
occupied the Canal Zone in response to socialist Egyptian premier Gamal Abdel 
Nasser’s nationalization of the Suez Canal. Both incidents, to Lin, demonstrated the 
need for vigilance and cooperation in anticolonialism. 
 
He Xiangning, longtime Tongmenghui member and chairwoman of the GMD 
RevComm, rehashed the main points of the prior speeches while emphasizing four 
things the audience is to remember about Sun: Sun was a staunch anti-imperialist; 
anti-imperialism relies upon the masses; the people’s welfare (minsheng) is of 
paramount concern and was to be effected through land equalization and the 
establishment of a command economy. He concludes by decrying the GMD’s usage 
of the National History Museum181 to warp the legacy of Sun to suit reactionary 
 
181 It is not immediately clear what He is referring to here. I presume she objected the ROC 
government’s “moving” of the National History Museum (囯史館/Academia Historia) to 
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purposes, a betrayal undeserved by the revolutionary democrat Sun Yat-sen. 
 
The presence of a sizeable contingent of international guests, including a 
Soviet representative named Moskatov—identified with the Central Auditing 
Commission—conveyed the international significance of Sun Yat-sen as an anti- 
imperialist, revolutionary hero of the decolonization movement. Many of the guests’ 
remarks conveyed similar sentiments. Bashir Ahmad, Pakistani representative, lauded 
Sun’s humble roots, his revolutionary and anti-imperialist spirit, and the inspiring 
example of the PRC for Asian and African nations struggling to fight the colonial 
powers.182 The speeches at the event were accompanied by a sizeable selection of 
congratulatory telegrams from figures like Sukarno of Indonesia, Ho Chi Minh of 
North Vietnam, Nehru of India, and Sihanouk of Cambodia, seemingly orchestrated 
to demonstrate the international appeal of Sun and his anti-imperialist image. At the 
same time, it illustrated the PRC’s friendly relations with much of the Second World 
and the Global South in the immediate aftermath of foundation and the Bandung 
Conference. 
 
iv: Down with US Imperialism and the Reactionary Elements!— 
Commemorating Sun’s Centennial Birthday in 1966 
 
It is in the context of the dawning Cultural Revolution, China’s recent 
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development of nuclear weapons material and spiritual, and the escalating American 
involvement in Vietnam that we must frame Sun Yat-sen’s centennial birthday bash. 
Unlike in 1956, no significant international contingent was present at the 1966 
commemoration, despite the perhaps more obvious significance of Sun’s 100th 
birthday. This evinces the diplomatic isolation facing the PRC following the CCP’s 
falling out with the Soviet Communists but before CCP leadership reestablished some 
limited if significant connections with the United States and its allies. Rhetorically, 
the commemorations of Sun here vary in scope, but they all present Sun as man of 
humble origins, a revolutionary for his time, and a fierce anti-imperialist. This focus 
on anti-imperialism was perhaps at its height in the heady days of the mid-1960s, 
being sharper than in the 1956 addresses and far more prominent than in any post- 
reform addresses. 
 
Unlike 1956, Mao did not speak at the 1966 commemoration. In view of the 
events at hand, this is unsurprising. Mao was a largely silent public face during the 
Cultural Revolution, adding to the mystery of this historical event. The Sino-Soviet 
split also precluded the presence of any Soviet representative, again unlike 1956. 
Speaking instead were Dong Biwu, Song Qingling, He Xiangning, and Zhou Enlai. 
One international delegate, a Miyazaki Seimin of the Sino-Japanese Friendship 
Alliance, addressed the audience. Miyazaki’s presence was quite significant given the 
otherwise sparse representation of international guests. Even more significant was 
that Miyazaki Seimin was none other than the descendant of Miyazaki Torazō, Sun’s 
Japanese friend and ally from his early revolutionary days.183 However, unlike in 
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1956, there does not seem to have been an international component to this 
anniversary aside from Miyazaki, somewhat surprising considering a centennial 
seems more significant than a ninetieth anniversary (possible arguments otherwise, 
presumably that it marks one and a half traditional sexagenary cycles,184 seem weak 
at best). No other foreign guests spoke, nor were any telegrams presented.185 Perhaps 
this has to do with the fading of the Bandung spirit, perhaps this reflects China’s 
increasing global isolation following the Sino-Soviet split and before détente with the 
United States. It is not entirely clear. It must be noted that such isolation said much 
about the inward-turn of the Chinese ‘60s and the radical self-reliance of the early 
Cultural Revolution days. 
 
Dong Biwu’s opening statements helpfully clarified some of the refrains from 
1956 to better fit the climate of 1966. His narrative highlighted that Mao Zedong 
personally completed the democratic revolution by overthrowing the forces of 
imperialism, capitalism, and feudalism—it was after this that he, personally, initiated 
the socialist stage of revolution. These 1966 themes correspond to the glorification of 
Mao in the politics of the anti-Party Cultural Revolution and Mao’s lively personality 
cult. Indeed, the main thrust of Dong’s opening address was less a commemoration of 
how Sun benefited China or what he did in life, but rather how far China had come 
under Mao—Dong’s recognition of Sun appears almost as an afterthought. While 
Dong began by reciting a familiar phrase, that “Sun was our revolutionary forebear 
who opposed reformists [this time citing Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao 
 
 
184 The traditional Chinese lunar calendar operates in sixty-year cycles. 
185 This could simply be a problem of access, as I don’t have all the pages to this one. 
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specifically], lead the Xinhai Revolution, articulated the Old and New Three People’s 
Principles, and allied with the CCP and USSR,” his tone was more dismissive of Sun 
and more laudatory of Mao than any seen in the 1956 commemorations. However, 
while he did not heap praise upon Sun, Dong did emphasize the work of Sun as the 
foundation of the socialist revolution and of the Cultural Revolution.186 “Today, all 
the people of China—under the personal direction of the Great Leader Chairman 
Mao—are working to carry out a historically-unprecedented Great Proletarian 
Cultural Revolution. Although the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, whether in 
breadth or depth, cannot be imitated by any other revolutionary movement,” Dong 
declared, “we are historical materialists and must honor them, as their work formed 
our foundation. We are the heirs of Sun Yat-sen’s revolutionary work.”187 
As for current affairs, Vietnam now replaced the Suez Canal and the 
Hungarian Uprising as the current cause célèbre against the forces of imperialism, in 
particular the specter of the “U.S. imperialists” (Mei Di). The Suez Crisis 
demonstrated the continuing threat of recolonization as old empires and new states 
 
 
186 Dong Biwu, “Zai Sun Zhongshan Xiansheng Dansheng Yibaizhounian Jiniandahui shang, 
Dong Biwu Fuzhuxi de Kaimuci” [Vice-Chairman Dong Biwu’s Opening Remarks at the 
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1. The original text is: “他作为中国革命民主派的旗手，在民主革命准备时期，同当时以
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。” 
187 Ibid. The original text is: “今天，全中国人民正在我们伟大领袖毛主席的亲自领导下
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上创立了我们自己的事业的，我们是孙中山先生革命事业的继承者。” 
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attempted to resist nationalist movements and projects, such as Nasser’s 
nationalization of the vital Suez Canal. The Hungarian Uprising, in the 1956 
speeches, represented the threat of fifth-column movements within Communist states, 
the ever-present danger of reactionaries and counter-revolutionaries. Vietnam, 
representing the threat posed by the United States and its own brand of imperialism, 
had more in common with the Suez Crisis than the Hungarian Uprising, and so 
perhaps represents a fear of domino theory. That is to say, as the U.S. justified 
intervention in the Vietnamese war with domino theory, the PRC may have feared the 
failure of the Vietnamese Nationalists under Ho Chi Minh would provide the US with 
another staging ground for undermining the CCP and aiding a GMD invasion of the 
mainland.188 Indeed, the plight of Vietnam and the threat of American imperialism 
was a constant refrain in all of the 1966 speeches. 
 
Much as Dong invoked the 1956 ceremonies, Zhou Enlai’s speech began with 
quoting Mao’s speech ten years prior, reinforcing the presence and authority of Mao 
despite his absence. Before discussing Zhou’s speech, we might briefly consider 
Mao’s absence and the attendance list of this ceremony. Despite Mao’s prominent 
place—with his man Lin Biao alongside—on the front page of this issue of the 
People’s Daily, neither Mao nor Lin were listed as present. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
188 Domino theory was the idea of George Kennan, US State Dept. Sec’y, and claimed that 
one state falling to communism would lead to many others meeting the same fate, just as one 
domino knocks over many others. We may consider that the PRC leadership seemed to be 
working with its own understanding of domino theory, in which losing one socialist ally to 
Meidi could lead to a spiraling situation that would threaten Beijing, by so closely identifying 
with the North Vietnamese and North Koreans. 
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Figure 2: The November 13, 1966 People’s Daily. 
 
Mao’s absence stands in contrast to the prominent yet suspect list of attendees: 
Zhou Enlai, Song Qingling, He Xiangning, Dong Biwu, Chen Boda, Deng Xiaoping, 
Liu Shaoqi, Zhu De, and more.189 Many of those present had problematic ties to 
 
 
 
189 “Fachang Sun Zhongshan de gemingzhandoujingshen…” (Developing Sun Yat-sen’s 
Spirit of Revolutionary Struggle), People’s Daily, November 13, 1966. 
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“rightists”, whether that meant the GMD, the technocratic CCP, or the CCP old- 
guard, and would suffer as the Cultural Revolution grew chaotic; in the case of Liu 
Shaoqi, he would soon be persecuted unto death, dying in prison in 1969. Israel 
Epstein, in his biography of Song, suggested that this ceremony was itself a chance to 
humiliate less than politically correct figures: 
 
That day, too, marked the final public appearance, for all time, of Liu 
Shaoqi…As Chairman of the People’s Republic, he outranked all others 
present. Yet the official report listed him seventh, not only below Zhou Enlai, 
the Premier, and Dong Biwu, a vice-chairman, but also below Tao Zhu and 
Chen Boda, members of the Cultural Revolution Group, and Deng Xiaoping, 
soon to be his partner under attack. Still further down, in a glaring slur, was 
[PLA general and revolutionary hero] Zhu De…These humiliations were 
obviously deliberate. For Liu, they were a prelude to utter downfall, for Zhu 
De, a punishment for having failed to join in the chorus of the ultra-Left (Red 
Guard posters were already maligning the old revolutionary hero as an 
unreconstructed warlord!).190 
If this was the case, we might wonder who wanted to humiliate Liu Shaoqi and Zhu 
De and why would this ceremony be the way to do it. Obviously, Liu Shaoqi and Zhu 
De had opponents in the upper-ranks of the PRC, opponents who were perhaps 
capitalizing on the budding Cultural Revolution to undermine their rivals. Exploring 
this in depth, however, would take us too far afield. Let it suffice to say that 
 
 
190 Epstein ,303. 
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commemorating Sun was not only a chance to commemorate the success of the PRC, 
but was also a field of political maneuvering and conflict for PRC power-players. 
Given how fraught the political climate of the Cultural Revolution era was, it is not 
surprising that the speakers at this event largely took advantage of the opportunity to 
praise Mao and establish themselves as politically-correct. It is notable, however, that 
many of the speakers worked to update Sun’s reputation to fit the times. This speaks 
partly to self-interest (those with links to Sun could not afford to have these links be 
problematic) but also to the great malleability of Sun’s image and its continued 
usefulness. So long as Sun’s image could be shaped to fit the times, Sun remained a 
valuable figure. 
 
Returning to Zhou Enlai, his 1966 address held far more venom than his 
address of 1956. Zhou spent most of his time railing against the American Empire 
and its Nationalist “running dogs” in Taiwan, but several details stick out. First, when 
Zhou discussed the reactionary forces of Chiang Kai-shek, he specifies that Chiang 
was a “traitorous disciple” of Sun serving the global interests of American 
imperialism. It is evident that such commemorations of Sun remained useful for 
attacking the ideological and political legitimacy of the Guomindang.191 Second, and 
perhaps more of the time, Zhou specifies that Sun’s alliance with the Soviet Union 
was with Lenin’s Soviet Union; the USSR of “Khrushchev’s revisionism” was now a 
rival and Zhou needed to distinguish the friendly, helpful, USSR of Lenin and Stalin 
 
 
191 Zhou Enlai, “Zhou Enlai Zongli de Jianghua” [Premier Zhou Enlai’s Remarks], People’s 
Daily, November 13,1966, 2. The original text is: “今天，美帝国主义是中国人民和全世界
人民最凶恶的共同敌人。美帝国主义霸占我国领土台湾，敌视中国人民，利用孙中山
先生的叛徒蒋介石作为它的走狗。美帝国主义侵略越南，不断扩大侵越战争。” 
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with the technocratic, imperialist, less-than-revolutionary behemoth pressing against 
China’s northern borders in the 1960s.192 Zhou went so far as to claim that the Soviet 
Union was now the “accomplice” of the United States and that China was now the 
light of democratic socialism in an increasingly hostile world. More pertinently, by 
emphasizing Lenin’s Soviet Union as the source of Sun’s inspiration and by breaking 
this Soviet Union from the post-Stalin “revisionist” USSR, Mao’s admiration of 
Stalin and utilization of a Stalinist personality cult thus became a connection with 
Sun, and so further cemented the legitimacy of Mao and his anti-Party movement. 
Zhou concluded with a call for “following Sun Yat-sen’s spirit of anti-imperialist 
resistance” in “liberating” Taiwan, unifying China, and continued opposition to the 
forces of American imperialism in Taiwan, Vietnam, and Latin America.193 Zhou thus 
illustrated the global concerns of CR-era Sunist rhetoric and the primacy of Sun’s 
image as an anti-imperialist nationalist revolutionary to that effect. 
 
In the longest address of 1966, Sun’s widow Song Qingling (Soong Ching- 
ling) offered a biography of Sun and considered why his life was worth 
commemorating. This is the most personal of any commemoration of Sun in the PRC, 
 
 
192 Ibid. The original text is: “孙中山先生从列宁领导的十月革命中看到了被压迫民族和
被压迫人民争取解放的希望。可是，今天苏联领导集团完全背叛了伟大的列宁，背叛
了伟大的十月革命的道路。他们推行赫鲁晓夫修正主义路线，出卖世界人民的革命利
益，在资本主义世界维护帝国主义、殖民主义的统治，在社会主义世界实行资本主义
复辟。他们联合美帝国主义，反对社会主义的中国；他们热衷于美苏合作，主宰世 界
。他们已经堕落成为美帝国主义的帮凶。我们今天纪念孙中山先生，就一定要同全世
界革命人民一道，坚决反对背叛列宁、联合美帝国主义的苏共修正主义集团，把反对
现代修正主义的斗争进行到底。” 
193 Ibid. The original text is: “我们今天纪念孙中山先生，就要进一步发扬孙中山先生的
反帝斗争精神，为解放台湾、实现祖国领土的完全统一而奋斗，坚决支持越南人民的
抗美救国斗争，坚决支持亚洲、非洲、拉丁美洲和全世界人民的反帝革命斗争。” 
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as might be expected from his widow, but her speech remained couched in political 
language and categories. She, evidently, had to prove Sun to be a politically-viable 
hero in a quickly changing landscape, and worked hard to meet her goal. 
 
Her biography began with an image of Sun Yat-sen the country boy. Sun, 
born to poor peasants in Guangdong, was well-aware of the hardships of the common 
people, for he was of the common people and tasted bitterness firsthand. According to 
Song, “Sun was born to a poor peasant family and sometimes did not have enough to 
eat—he could only fill up on sweet potatoes to stave off hunger. When he was a child, 
the local storyteller would tell tales of the Heavenly Taiping Kingdom and other 
peasant rebellions, and he was enraptured…”194 His poor, rural upbringing was the 
foundation of his discontent, and he therefore understood the plight of the peasants 
for he was of the same cloth. Song states that his brother, Sun Mei, was a farm laborer 
in Hawaii, and Sun would come learn of the outside world through his time there. 
Song repeatedly reiterates Sun’s positives: Sun Yat-sen had a lifelong concern with 
the welfare of the people, with the welfare of Asians, with a disgust for warlordism 
and a love of humility. He died with little and accepted less in life (not even a leather 
 
 
 
 
 
194Song Qingling, “Sun Zhongshan—jiandingbuyi, baichiburao de gemingzhe” (Sun Yat- 
sen—Unyielding, Unbreaking Revolutionary), People’s Daily, November 13, 1966, 3. The 
original text is: “孙中山出生在一个贫农家庭，有时饭不够吃，只好以甘薯充饥。童年
时代，当地说书人常在晚上讲关于太平天国和其他农民起义事迹的故事，使他听得入
迷。他的家庭出身、他和下层被压迫人民的共同生活，以及他所听到的人民企图挣脱
压迫者的斗争故事，在他的思想上留下了不可磨灭的印象。以后的发展证明，这些童
年的经历对于他决心终生献身革命起了决定的影响。” 
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coat in winter, according to one anecdote she tells), despite his incessant fundraising 
for the revolutionary cause, for he was not one to skim off the top. While abroad, he 
came into contact with the national consciousness of the Han people as preserved by 
the overseas Chinese; such national consciousness had long been dormant in China 
due to Qing suppression, Song implied, but the overseas nurtured it and Sun learned 
from them that he was, too, a Han Chinese with a stake in the national mission.195 
Song took care to explain his frequent absences from the country, including at the 
time of Xinhai Revolution, as in service to the revolutionary cause, and emphasized 
that the Xinhai Revolution arose from his revolutionary organizing and agitation. 
Though she granted he was, as other revolutionary forebears were, flawed and had a 
poor understanding of socialism, she underscores that he was indeed the revolutionary 
forebear of the Chinese socialist revolution and that he and his compatriots were 
figuring out “the rules of revolution” as they went along. His public will, charging 
every Chinese to continue the revolution, spoke of his continued relevance to the 
oppressed masses of the world. 
However, perhaps most significant was how Song used Sun to talk about the 
Chinese revolution. Through her discussion of Sun and his times, Song laid bare her 
methods of excusing Sun’s inadequacies (as a 1960s PRC audience might have seen 
them) as well how commemorating Sun was largely a way to commemorate the 
progress of China since his time: 
He [Sun Yat-sen] was born before the era of imperial monopoly capitalism. 
 
 
 
 
195 Ibid. 
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When he was born, the domestic feudal monarchy had just been rocked by the 
Taiping Kingdom peasants’ revolution and our nation’s people had just come 
into contact with the capitalist states… 
When he passed on from our world, the power of imperialism thought itself 
paramount. The Great Powers of Europe carved up our nation’s land like a 
melon while neighboring Japanese militarism menaced the existence of our 
entire country. The nation had been split by warlords into several parts… 
Today, China has undergone such great historically-significant changes! 
Under the leadership of Chairman Mao and the Chinese Communist Party, the 
Chinese people have already moved the three great mountains of imperialist 
invasion, feudal governance, and bureaucratic capitalism. The Chinese people 
have not only triumphantly completed the New Democratic revolution, but 
have also obtained brilliant successes in socialist revolution and 
construction… 
Now, why are we now commemorating Sun Yat-sen? I think it’s so that we 
always cherish the memory of an unbreaking, unyielding revolutionary leader 
of the Chinese democratic revolution, China’s great revolutionary forebear.196 
 
 
196 Ibid. The original text is: “他生在帝国主义垄断资本开始统治世界之前。他出生的时
候，国内的封建王朝刚刚收到太平王国农民革命的震撼，我国任命还刚刚同资本主义
国家生接触。 
当他离开人间的时候，帝国主义力量正不可一世，欧洲列强处心积虐要瓜分我国领 土
，近邻日本的军国主义也不断威胁着我们整个国家的生存。国家被军阀们分割成几部
分。。。 
今天，中国发生了多么伟大的具有历史意义的变化！在中国共产党和毛主席领导下， 
中国人民已经搬掉了帝国主义侵略、封建统治和官僚资本垄断这三座大山。中国人民 
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Naturally, given the tensions of the moment and her own respect for Mao, Song lauds 
his personal leadership but also took a risk in lauding the accomplishments of the 
CCP as a body. She used her address to paint a dismal picture of China in his youth, 
his radicalization as a model with which to explain broader peasant radicalization, the 
struggles of the revolutionaries (including Sun and Mao) against steep odds, and the 
dazzling successes of the PRC, and in so doing helps us understand the mechanics of 
these commemorations perhaps more deeply than any other speaker. 
 
As for Miyazaki Seimin, he represented a Japanese-Chinese interest group 
called the Sino-Japanese Friendship Association (his title is presented as Rizhongyou 
xieli shizhang, or assistant director of Rizhongyou) and delivered a speech hailing Sun 
as a great Asian revolutionary and a moral compass. He invoked both his own family 
ties to Sun, his childhood memories of Sun, and the historical memory of Japanese 
Tang official Abe no Nakamaro throughout his speech. Doing so allowed Miyazaki to 
establish his own authority, as someone with close if indirect ties to Sun and as a 
Japanese friend of China, as well as to illustrate the ideals of Sino-Japanese 
cooperation and the intertwined cultural, historical, and national roots of China and 
Japan. Miyazaki stated, 
 
Japan and China are two neighbors separated by a sea. Therefore, it is plain as 
can be that two nations have an extremely long and rich history of interaction. 
 
 
 
不但胜利地完成了新民主主义革命，斌且在社会主义革命和建设中去得了光辉的成
就。。。 
那末，我们现在为什么还要来纪念孙中山呢？我想，这是为了使我们永远怀念中国民
主革命时期这位坚定不移、百折不饶的革命家，中国伟大的革命先行者。” 
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Everybody knows about Abe no Nakamaro, China’s Jianzhen Heshang, and 
others, those who—through their bravery and wisdom—made outstanding 
contributions to the futures of two nations. In this process of mutual exchange, 
how much influence Japanese culture had in China, I don’t really know. What 
we think really matters is that, over the long and friendly course of this 
exchange, Chinese culture had a deep and lasting influence on the lives of the 
Japanese nation and our forebears.197 
Miyazaki was keen to play up the cultural connections between China and Japan, 
reaching into the past to provide evidence of a friendship that more recent events had 
perhaps called into question. Given that he was a guest, his flattery of his Chinese 
hosts is not surprising and perhaps natural, seeing as the Japanese invasion had only 
concluded some twenty-one years earlier. 
 
Later in his address, Miyazaki noted Sun’s high expectations for the 
“capitalist Japan” of the Meiji era and lauded Sun’s 1924 speech in Kobe, lamenting 
that Japanese then did not heed his admonitions.198 The speech in Kobe is generally 
 
 
 
197 Miyazaki Seimin, “Rizhongyou xieli shizhang Gongqi Shimin de Jianghua” (Sino- 
Japanese Friendship Committee Manager Miyazaki Seimin’s Remarks), People’s Daily, 
November 13, 1966, 4. The original text is: “日本和中国，是一海相隔的邻邦。因此，两
个民族之间的来往历史有着极为长期而丰富的内容，是理所当然的事。大家都知道， 
日本的阿部仲麻吕和中国的鉴真和尚等人，曾以他们的勇气和智慧，为两个民族的友
好往来作出了卓越的贡献。在这个相互往来的过程中，日本的文化给予中国多大影 响
，我是不大了解的。我们认为重要的是，在这个悠久的友好往来的历史中，中国的文
化深深地渗透到日本民族即我们祖先的生活之中。” 
 
198 Ibid. 
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cited as Sun’s articulation of a Sunist Pan-Asianism, in which the Ways of the King 
and the Hegemon stand opposed. The Kingly Way (wangdao) is the Way of the 
sagely kings of old, the Way of benevolence, righteousness, wisdom, and propriety 
that takes Yao and Shun as its North Star; the Hegemonic Way (badao) is the Way of 
the hegemon-warlords of Chunqiu and chaos, the Way of violence, coercion, and 
intimidation that takes Xiang Yu, Cao Cao, and Alexander as models.199 In Sun’s 
binary, the Western powers adopted the Way of the Hegemons, relying upon 
gunboats, conglomerates, and law to dominate weaker nations, while the ideal path of 
the Eastern nations is the spiritually-whole path of virtue, good governance, and good 
living. Japan, with its colonization of Korea and Taiwan, its seizure of Shandong and 
the Carolines, its Meiji Restoration, had begun to walk the path of the hegemons, but 
it was not too late to return to the good and right wangdao. 
 
Miyazaki lamented that Japan continued along the badao. He concludes by 
stating that, if the recent war had any lessons, it taught that Japan needed a good 
relationship with China to enjoy any sort of peace or prosperity.200 Sun, a Chinese 
revolutionary who spent much time in Japan and had many Japanese allies (Yamada 
Yoshimasa201 and Miyazaki Torazō202 being two), was a fine symbol for the Sino- 
Japanese friendship that ought always be, and so was as worthy of Japanese 
admiration and commemoration as Chinese. Moreover, by advancing China along the 
 
 
199 Chao Hsun-ta, “Sun Yat-sen’s Pan-Asianism in Taiwan”, 87. 
200 Miyazaki Seimin. The original text is: “第二次世界大战后，日本人民通过这个惨痛的
教训，深刻地认识到日本不同中国友好，就不可能有和平和繁荣，从而，对孙文先生
向日本人民提出的劝告有了进一步的体会。” 
201 Wang Jingwei, “Implementing the Three People’s Principles and Pan-Asianism”, 2752. 
202 Bergère, 73. 
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path of democratic revolution, he aided the world revolution, and so was only more 
laudable. Miyazaki concluded by hoping that Japan and China could team together to 
stand against the “paper tiger” of American imperialism. 
 
He Xiangning, once again speaking in her capacity as head of the GMD 
Revolutionary Committee, rehashed the basic list of Sun’s achievements. Helpfully, 
she was quite clear in her list: peasant-born Sun led the Xinhai Revolution, overthrew 
the monarchic system, opposed constitutional monarchy and reformists, and 
discarded the old TPP (nationalism, democracy, and land equalization) in favor of the 
new TPP (alliance with the Leninist USSR, alliance with the CCP, alliance with the 
workers and the peasants).203 Sun gradually learned to rely on force of arms, unite 
with the masses, work on achieving democratic revolution, and focus on opposing 
foreign imperialism and domestic feudalism (ie the warlords). She credited him with 
some new achievements: he was the first Chinese to use the term “revolution”204 in 
the late days of the Qing Dynasty and articulated the Land to the Tiller policy as part 
of the Principle of the People’s Welfare, thereby supporting later Communist land- 
reform initiatives. 
 
Notably, He rhetorically equated Sun to Mao in discussing her own 
revolutionary trajectory. “I’m old,” she proclaimed, “but what I can take comfort in is 
this: during the stage of democratic revolution, I followed Sun Yat-sen, and now in 
 
203 He Xiangning, “Mingezhuxi He Xiangning de Jianghua” (RevComm Chairwoman He 
Xiangning’s Remarks), People’s Daily, November 13, 1966, 4. 
204 Her exact comment is as follows: “Dr. Sun was the first in the most recent hundred years 
of Chinese history to use the word ‘revolution’. He started using ‘revolution’ over seventy 
years ago.” The original text is: “孙先生是中国近百年史中，第一个提出“革命”的人。他
开始使用“革命”这两个字，是在七十多年前了。” 
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the stage of socialist revolution, I follow Mao.” Such an equation once again 
furthered the connections between the great revolutionary forebear being 
commemorated and the great revolutionary helmsman, and so furthered Mao’s 
personal legitimacy as well as safeguarded the reputation of Sun. After all, if Sun was 
the Mao of that era, then wouldn’t criticizing him be similar to criticizing Mao? 
Therefore, this comment can also be seen as an attempt to safeguard those connected 
with Sun, like longtime Tongmenghui member and ally of Sun He Xiangning, during 
a time of great political unrest. He was keen to emphasize her support for the Cultural 
Revolution, framing it as a lesson from Sun. Even though Sun was old by the time he 
allied with the CCP and the Soviet Union, his lifelong pursuit and recalibration of 
revolution illustrated that he never rested on his laurels, and so neither should she. 
Keeping up with the times and advancing revolution meant supporting the Cultural 
Revolution. 
 
Though new details emerged to accommodate new political realities, the 
general narrative of Sun produced in 1966 is similar to that of 1956. Sun, the 
democratic revolutionary forebear, did many things to advance revolution in China, 
and should be remembered for his great contributions that, in turn, led to the ongoing 
socialist revolution. The particulars—such as Mao’s greatness, the urgency of 
defeating American imperialism and its new ally Soviet revisionism, and the 
importance of constant revolution—largely reflect the political shifts of the Sino- 
Soviet split and the Cultural Revolution. 
 
v: The Father of Modern China!—Commemorating Sun’s 120th Birthday 
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By 1976, New China was changing once more. Chairman Mao Zedong, the 
Great Helmsman himself, passed away in September of that year; Zhou Enlai, the 
Premier of the People’s Republic, passed away that February. Song Qingling had 
largely retired from the public eye and He Xiangning had passed away some years 
earlier. Most urgently, a campaign against the Gang of Four (articles denouncing the 
Gang and its members take up the rest of the front page) and the chaos of “their” 
Cultural Revolution was at full-steam in the press. We may note as well that Chiang 
Kai-shek, the eternal face of the GMD “running dogs”, had passed away in 1975, and 
the United States had semi-normal diplomatic relations with the PRC as of the 
establishment of Liaison Offices in 1973, thus undermining the main constructed 
enemies of earlier Sun commemorations. Soviet revisionism still existed, however, 
but the Chinese technocrats were now vying for control. In any case, many living 
connections to Sun were now gone, and so commemorations would never again be so 
personal or varied. 
 
Presumably because of these changes, one finds few details related to Sun 
commemorations in the People’s Daily of 1976. The only article I found was one in 
which some B-list political figures observe a ceremony in Beijing. The article 
included few details on the ceremony itself and is similar in form to overview articles 
presented in 1956 and 1966 issues; however, unlike those years, there are no other 
articles that provide the printed speeches. They also seem to have lost a great deal of 
symbolic weight, judging by the sparse coverage and lackluster attendance. Though 
Song was alive at this point, she did not attend the Beijing ceremony, as other things 
were taking precedence in November of 1976. 
145  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: The November 12, 1976 issue. 
 
Skipping ahead, much had changed between 1966 and 1986. As stated above, 
the importance of Mao Zedong’s death cannot be overstated. Following his death, the 
ouster of the Gang of Four, and the fall of Hua Guofeng and his “whatever-ism”, 
Deng Xiaoping and the technocratic faction of the CCP took control of the state. 
Reform, once a dirty word, was now the slogan of the day. Deng’s “Reform and 
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Opening Up” (gaige kaifang) changed much about Chinese society, and would 
eventually lead to the collapse or radical transformation of many fixtures of Mao-era 
life, social, economic, and political. Various products of the reform movements 
included “market socialism”, the monetization of the renminbi, the dissolution of 
communes and reconfiguration of work-units, and the undermining of Mao’s 
revolutionary culture in favor of Dengist pragmatism and gradualism.205 It was a most 
unrevolutionary time to commemorate a revolutionary forebear, but 1986 saw a 
sizeable commemoration. As it was the 120th anniversary of Sun’s birth, this 
ceremony marked the conclusion of two sexagenary cycles. Articles were published 
on relevant topics on both November 12th and 13th. 
The November 12th articles are varied, covering the opening of new exhibits 
relating to Sun Yat-sen, announcing the release of a commemorative coin to mark the 
occasion, a poem by a Song Dan206 titled “Zhongshan Mausoleum”, and various 
commemorative articles. The coin, released by a joint Beijing-Hong Kong company, 
illustrates the key role of Hong Kong in opening up the Chinese economy by 
providing a middleman between the still-insular socialist economy and the global 
marketplace.207 A common theme of the commemorative articles is that Sun was a 
great nationalist and figure of modernization. The shifting portrayal illustrates the 
 
 
 
205 Barry Naughton, The Chinese Economy, second edition: Adaptation and Growth, 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press: 2018), 99-101. 
206 It is unclear who Song Dan was. Perhaps this Song Dan is the same as the Lieutenant 
General Song Dan who attended the Nineteenth National Congress, but I find no conclusive 
evidence to support that beyond his name and his having a plausible age, being born in 1951. 
207 “Zhonghua Renmin Yinhang Jinri Faxing Sun Zhongshan Xiansheng Jinian Yinbi” (The 
People’s Bank of China Issues Today the Sun Yat-sen Commemorative Silver Coin), 
People’s Daily, November 12, 1986, 2. 
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political shift in priorities from socialist revolution (either on universal “scientific” 
Soviet terms or on particular “red soil” Chinese terms) to “socialist development”. 
The transcript of Peng Zhen’s keynote address in the November 13th issue only 
further suggests this. 
 
On the fourth page of the November 12 issue, Deng Yingchao—widow of 
Zhou Enlai—and Huang Jianqiu, described Sun Yat-sen as a revolutionary nationalist 
whose primary goal was “catching up with the West” and creating “a strong and 
prosperous nation-state” (minfu bingqiang de guojia).208 They justified the Xinhai 
Revolution by stating that modernization was not possible in “semi-colonial, semi- 
feudal China”, and so the Qing monarchy had to be removed if China was to 
modernize. While prior addresses made little point of justifying the Xinhai 
Revolution, it is interesting that Deng and Huang felt the need to.209 
Huang and Deng did not invoke the term “hypo-colony” (cizhimindi) but 
rather “semi-colony” (banzhimindi) in commemorating Sun. This reflects that the 
 
208 Deng Yingchao and Huang Jianqiu, “Jinian Sun Zhongshan Xiansheng Danzhen 
Yibaiershizhounian” (Commemorating the 120th Anniversary of Sun Yat-sen’s Birth), 
People’s Daily, November 12, 1986, 4. 
209 Sun famously termed China “a hypo-colony”, a colony of many rather than a colony of 
one. Much less than being a semi-colony, which Lenin defined as a country on the verge of 
being colonized, or an outright colony, a nation dominated by another politically (and, Lenin 
would emphasize, economically), China was essentially “the slave of any country that had a 
treaty” due to the pernicious cycle of imperial bullying, concessions, and piling concessions 
due to “most-favored nation” clauses in many treaties. This meant that if France exacted new 
concessions from the Qing, then Britain could claim these for Britain, as a “most-favored 
nation” was to get the best possible treatment. Effectively, this meant that if one state 
pressured China further, many states would then be able to claim these concessions for 
themselves. Sun described this as being the slave of many rather than one, and this meant that 
not only was China a slave-nation, but a slave lacking even a master duty-bound to provide 
basic support. Truly, there was nothing more pitiful than a hypo-colony in Sun’s eyes, and 
any attempt to describe China as a “semi-colony” was a vain attempt to avoid the sordid 
reality of things. 
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authors, in their capacity as writers for the government mouthpiece People’s Daily, 
did not necessarily subscribe to Sunist understandings of Chinese history, and so 
illustrate that the CCP at large did not either. This is no different than from the earlier 
commemorations in the sense that neither subscribed to Sunist understandings of 
history, preferring instead dialectical history and Leninist categories. However, 
Huang and Deng feel the need to justify the 1911 revolution. This is a departure from 
1956 and 1966, in which revolution against the Qing monarchy was good and not 
needing much justification. The means by which they justify it are also odd in the 
context of ’56 and ’66: modernization was impossible under the Qing monarchy. In a 
sense, this is similar to saying that history could not progress without the overthrow 
of the feudal regime, but the term “modernization” with the explicit goal of “catching 
up to the West” suggest a new understanding of history based upon developmentalism 
along the lines of Western modernity. Chinese Communists had preferred terms like 
progress and struggle, but the Dengist shift to goals of modernization according to 
capitalist standards seems to suggest several possibilities. One is that the Party had 
abandoned claims to have already completed the democratic revolution if they now 
sought to meet the standards of bourgeois capitalism; a second possibility is that the 
characteristics of what constituted socialism officially—as deigned by the CCP—had 
shifted. 
 
Huang and Deng emphasized that the current goal was to establish a 
prosperous and culturally vibrant socialist state, indicating that official rhetoric of 
being in the stage of socialist revolution had not changed. They lauded Sun’s New 
Three People’s Principles, now seemingly recast as “treating the CCP and socialism 
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as friends, allying with the CCP, relying on the masses”, as well as Sun’s constant 
“revision” (xiuzheng) and progress to keep up with the times.210 They emphasized 
learning from other countries and Sun’s plans for national construction over his 
revolutionary activities. Finally, they concluded with an appeal for unification with 
Taiwan. While in 1956 and 1966 Taiwan was seen as the outpost of U.S. imperialism 
as supported by its running dogs Chiang Kai-shek and his Nationalists, traitorous to 
Sun and China, in 1986 and afterwards the CCP began striking a more conciliatory 
tone when it came to appeals for unification. Sun’s major dream was now framed as 
national unity; what a shame it is Taiwan had yet to return to China! Only when the 
nation was whole could national construction truly reach fruition, and so it was 
imperative that the GMD in Taiwan realize their shared interest with the CCP and 
come back into the fold. Only then would Sun’s dreams be realized. In this case, Sun 
was still used as a weapon against the Taipei GMD, but no longer to delegitimate; 
rather, the goal now was to pressure them into cooperating with Beijing. 
 
This focus on bringing the Taipei GMD back into the fold was echoed, 
unsurprisingly, in a GMD Revolutionary Committee lecture on the need for a Third 
United Front. The First United Front was initiated in 1924 by Sun Yat-sen to build the 
GMD into a Leninist revolutionary party for the purpose of pursuing national 
unification, while the Second United Front was initiated in 1936 by the CCP and 
Zhang Xueliang by pressuring Chiang Kai-shek into alliance at gunpoint for the 
purpose of focusing CCP and GMD efforts against the encroaching Japanese. Now, in 
1986, it was time for a Third United Front under the auspices of a new policy—One 
 
210 Deng and Huang, People’s Daily, 4. 
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Country, Two Systems—to build a strong and prosperous China according to the 
standards of the modern, capitalist nations while still advancing along the road of 
socialism.211 The policy of One Country, Two Systems was designed to dissuade 
ROC fears of outright Communist takeover, and was to be substantiated by the 
examples of Hong Kong and Macao following their reabsorption into the PRC as 
special administrative regions in the late 1990s. 
 
Other articles from this Reform-era commemoration come from various 
sources and cover various topics. One article, a travel article promoting Sun’s old 
home in Cuiheng, reinforced a narrative of progress and so lauded the 
accomplishments of the CCP while also illustrating the rising importance of 
advertising in the market-socialist economy. Another, covering Shanghai mayor Jiang 
Zemin’s speech for the Shanghai commemorations, emphasized Sun’s nationalism 
and his spiritual contributions to liberation, while one at the Sun Yat-sen University 
in Guangzhou connects tianxiaweigong to yixinweiguo de jingshen.212 Notably, this 
seems to be the first year examined in which Sun ceremonies were carried out 
nationwide and not solely in Beijing. A Xu Xianzhong continued to emphasize Sun’s 
opposition to the reformists, and so we can see that not all reform was created equal; 
 
 
 
211 “Min’ge Zhongyang Juxing Sun Zhongshan Xueshu Yanjiu Yantaohui” (RevComm Center 
Carries Out Sun Yat-sen Studies Research Conference), People’s Daily, November 12, 1986, 
4. 
212 “Jinian Sun Zhongshan Xiansheng Danzhen 120 Zhounian” (Commemorating the 120th 
Anniversary of Sun Yat-sen’s Birth), People’s Daily, November 12, 1986, 6. 
I leave this in romanization because translation of tianxiaweigong is itself reflective of the 
politics of Sun interpretation. One standard is “all under Heaven is for the common good”. 
This is connected to “the spirit of putting the heart and mind in service to the country”, and so 
further illustrates Sun’s nationalism. At least as far as the Columbus Park statue is concerned, 
“All are equal” has replaced “All under Heaven is a commonwealth” as of November, 2019. 
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to distinguish the Reform and Opening Up from the Hundred Days’ Reform, the Qing 
had to be made an obstacle to the primary good of modernization, whereas the Party 
was the tool for executing modernization.213 
Peng Zhen’s address, made on November 12 and printed in the November 13th 
issue, reinforced these statements, with some variations .214 
 
 
 
Figure 4: The November 13, 1986 issue. 
 
 
 
213 Zhuan Jiu, Wu Peizhen, Xu Jianzhong. “Zhanshi Weida de Gemingxianxingzhe suo 
Chuangjian de Fenggongweiye—Sun Zhongshan Xiansheng Danzhen Zhanlan zai Jing 
Kaimu” (Sun Yat-sen Birthday Memorial Exhibit Opens in Beijing), People’s Daily, 
November 12, 1986, 1. 
214 Peng Zhen was a longtime CCP member who had fallen afoul of Mao Zedong and was 
persecuted during the Cultural Revolution. He was later rehabilitated by Deng Xiaoping and 
the reformists; in 1986, he was the chairman of the standing committee of the National 
People’s Congress. 
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Sun was to be honored for his nationalism and his thought on national construction. 
He struggled all his life for the salvation of the Chinese nation and its poor, suffering 
masses, bestowing upon the them the “thought-weapon” (sixiang wuqi) of the Three 
People’s Principles.215 Sun’s openness to learning from others, his general openness 
(kaifangzhuyi), his cultural confidence all stood to inspire Chinese everywhere. Peng 
concluded by emphasizing the great achievements that came with past United Fronts, 
pitching One Country, Two Systems as a good deal for Taiwan, and appealing to 
Chinese at home and abroad (that is, overseas Chinese) to follow Sun’s thought and 
to unite for the strengthening of China. 
 
In summary, 1986 commemorations differ chiefly in their recasting of Sun. 
 
His revolutionary contributions to the realization of bourgeois democracy are no 
longer emphasized; rather, chief is his nationalism, his drive for establishing a 
modern China, and a vague sense of revolutionary commitment to the nation. 
vi: Commemorating Sun’s 150th Birthday—Live from Beijing! 
 
On November 11th, 2016, a live ceremony was hosted in Beijing’s 
Great Hall of the People to commemorate the 150th birthday of Sun Yat-sen. It is 
unclear if other ceremonies had been televised live before this. To mark the 
ceremony, Xi Jinping, the first Paramount Leader of the PRC since Deng Xiaoping, 
gave a long address to the assembly there. Notably, Xi was the third of three sitting 
Secretaries-General of the Chinese Communist Party to deliver keynote remarks on 
 
215 Peng Zhen, “Fachang Sun Zhongshan Gemingjingshen he Aiguozhuyijinshen gongtong 
Fendou Shixian Zuguotongyifanrongjingsheng” (Develop Sun Yat-sen’s Revolutionary Spirit 
and Patriotism, Struggle Together Towards Realizing the Unification of the Motherland and 
Its Prosperity), People’s Daily, November 13, 1986, 1. 
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such an occasion, the first being Mao Zedong himself in 1956 and the second being 
Jiang Zemin in 1996. In his remarks, Xi Jinping emphasized Sun Yat-sen’s great 
contribution to the Chinese nation, his high moral character, and his love of country. 
Xi began his talk stating: 
We are gathered here today to commemorate the 150th anniversary of Dr. Sun 
Yat-sen’s birth, cherishing his timeless contributions to the independence of 
the nation, the progress of society, and the happiness of the people, taking 
note of revolutionary spirit and his superior moral qualities, and encouraging 
all Chinese sons and daughters, at home and abroad, to join in the struggle to 
realize the great revival of the Chinese nation. 
Dr. Sun Yat-sen was a great hero of the people, a great patriot, a great 
forebear of the Chinese democratic revolution. He dedicated his life to the 
revolution, to saving the state and its people, and wrote an outstanding 
contribution to the annals of the Chinese nation.216 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
216 Xi Jinping, Shouquan fabu Xi Jinping: zai jinian Sun Zhongshan xiansheng danzhen 150 
zhounian dahui shang de jianghua, (Authorized Publication—Xi Jinping: Remarks 
Commemorating the 150th Birthday of Dr. Sun Yat-sen), November 11, 2016, Xinhua News 
Agency, http://www.xinhuanet.com//politics/2016-11/11/c_1119897047.htm. The original 
text is: “今天，我们在这里隆重集会，纪念孙中山先生诞辰 150 周年，缅怀他为民族独
立、社会进步、人民幸福建立的不朽功勋，弘扬他的革命精神和崇高品德，激励海内外
中华儿女为实现中华民族伟大复兴而团结奋斗。孙中山先生是伟大的民族英雄、伟大的
爱国主义者、中国民主革命的伟大先驱，一生以革命为己任，立志救国救民，为中华民
族作出了彪炳史册的贡献。” 
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Figure 5: Screenshot of the 2016 Ceremony.217 
 
Xi’s introduction clearly framed Sun as a superior person, a great nationalist, and a 
forebear of the democratic revolution. Somewhat unlike earlier CCP narratives, which 
emphasized Sun’s humility and acknowledged his many flaws, the Sun of Xi’s 
rhetoric is a lofty hero and patriot. According to Xi, Sun was responsible for founding 
the Revive China Society, the Tongmenghui, for articulating the Three People’s 
Principles, for leading the Xinhai Revolution, for opposing warlordism, for allying 
with the CCP, for updating the Old Three People’s Principles into the New Three 
People’s Principles, and for guiding the democratic revolution through the GMD and 
the Northern Expedition. 
The political use of Sun is perhaps more obvious in Xi’s speech than in any 
other CCP discussed here. He goes into great length discussing the lessons of Sun for 
 
 
217 CCTV4, “[Authorized Release] Jiemu kandian 20161111, CCTV Zhongwen guoji”, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0UiQnYOuiro. 
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the CCP, “Sun Yat-sen’s revolutionary heirs”: 
 
The members of the Chinese Communist Party are the most fervent 
supporters, the most loyal partners, the most faithful heirs of Sun Yat-sen’s 
revolutionary work. Before he passed away, CCP members resolutely 
supported Sun’s work. After he passed away, CCP members faithfully 
followed Sun’s will, uniting to lead the whole country’s people, of all races, in 
heroic struggle, continuing forward, offering great sacrifices to complete Sun 
Yat-sen’s unfinished work: using the New Three People’s Principles to take 
victory in the revolution, building a People’s Republic of China in which the 
people are the masters of the house, realizing national independence and the 
people’s liberation. On this basis, the CCP members unite to lead the Chinese 
people forward in struggle to complete the socialist revolution and to establish 
a socialist system. 
In the sixty-seven years since the establishment of New China—particularly in 
the last thirty years since the Reform and Opening Up—the Chinese people 
have experienced great leaps and dazzling success on the road of socialism 
under the leadership of the CCP. Today, we can tell Dr. Sun that, yes, we are 
closer than at any point in history to realizing the great revival of the Chinese 
nation, and have more confidence and capability to do so than at any other 
point.218 
 
 
218 Xi Jinping, Xinhua. The original text is: “中国共产党人是孙中山先生革命事业最坚定
的支持者、最忠诚的合作者、最忠实的继承者。在他生前，中国共产党人坚定支持孙
中山先生的事业。在他身后，中国共产党人忠实继承孙中山先生的遗志，团结带领全 
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Of course, as in all CCP commemorations, a key aspect of this revival is the 
reunification of Taiwan with mainland China; Xi reiterates that “both sides of the 
Strait” are flesh and blood and have a shared destiny. Moreover, reunification is the 
“sacred duty” of the Chinese, at home and overseas, and is framed as a key facet of 
Sun Yat-sen’s plan for national revival. Xi explicitly stated that the CCP were the 
loyal heirs of Sun and that they were indeed closer to realizing his mission, defined as 
the great revival of the Chinese nation, than at any point in history. By using the 
occasion to inform a dead Sun of this progress towards his revolutionary goals, Xi 
used the opportunity to celebrate the successes of the CCP and to reinforce its claims 
to revolutionary legitimacy. 
To further reinforce the CCP as Sun’s most dedicated students and heirs, Xi 
listed the key lessons for all Chinese, regardless of party membership or formal 
citizenship, to learn and live: his “fervent patriotism” and “devotion of self to the 
nation”; his “tianxia wei gong” spirit and “great compassion for the people”; his 
“relentless pursuit of truth” and his “keeping current with the times”; his 
“unshakeable, dauntless revolutionary spirit”. 
Concluding his remarks, Xi Jinping emphasized the importance of Sun Yat- 
 
 
国各族人民英勇奋斗、继续前进，付出巨大牺牲，完成了孙中山先生的未竟事业，取
得新民主主义革命胜利，建立了人民当家作主的中华人民共和国，实现了民族独立、
人民解放。在这个基础上，中国共产党人团结带领中国人民继续奋斗，完成了社会主
义革命，确立了社会主义制度。 
 
新中国成立 67 年特别是改革开放 30 多年来，在中国共产党领导下，中国人民在社会
主义道路上实现了一个又一个伟大飞跃，取得举世瞩目的伟大成就。今天，我们可以
告慰孙中山先生的是，我们比历史上任何时期都更接近中华民族伟大复兴的目标，比
历史上任何时期都更有信心、有能力实现这个目标。” 
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sen, his teachings, and his mission to Chinese in China and abroad: 
 
In over five millennia, the Chinese nation has, in the course of its own 
development, already produced outstanding contributions to the human race. 
In coming times, the Chinese people and the Chinese nation will inevitably 
produced yet greater contributions for the great work of peace and 
development! 
Comrades, friends! 
 
Dr. Sun Yat-sen said back then: “Using four-hundred million common people, 
the abundance of many thousands of miles of land, if we work to make it 
great, then we can have no match under Heaven,” “I only hope that you, 
gentlemen, will take this great task of reviving China upon your own 
shoulders.” In his final days, Sun Yat-sen exhorted, “The revolution is not yet 
finished, comrades—continue to work hard!” Realizing the modernization of 
China, the revival of the Chinese nation, the shared prosperity of the Chinese 
people—we still have a long way to go and many obstacles to overcome. 
I call upon all the sons and daughters of the Chinese nation and the esteemed 
Sun Yat-sen, including mainland compatriots, Hong Kong and Macao 
compatriots, Taiwan compatriots, and overseas compatriots, regardless of 
party beliefs, regardless of where you are, to unite more closely, to take hold 
of this historic opportunity, to take up this historic responsibility and to push 
forward in the great revolutionary work of Sun Yat-sen and our other 
revolutionary forebears! Strive onward with the great work for which all 
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dreamers and idealists have, since the dawn of the modern era, struggled so 
dearly! Strive onward with the great revolutionary work for which all modern 
Chinese have struggled so dearly!219 
Xi’s final charge illustrates the narrative in miniature. Regardless of Sun’s 
specific work, his work was—in a larger sense—the work of the Chinese national 
revival. He was not the only one to pursue this work; rather, this work has been the 
province of all Chinese, and thus is made a national mission for all Chinese, 
regardless of party-membership, citizenship, or place of residence. Sun Yat-sen, being 
a figure of vague beliefs, shifting party allegiances, and transnational connection, thus 
serves as a central figure in this work, an example of devotion to nation for all to 
follow. Plainly, this narrative of Sun simplifies much about his life, such as his own 
turn to warlordism, his somewhat questionable romantic life, his questionable claims 
to leadership of his own revolutionary organizations—to say nothing of the Xinhai 
Revolution. These inconveniences are buffed out to create a brilliant image of Sun, 
playing off Sun’s existing clout in the PRC and abroad, to define the CCP’s 
 
219 Ibid. The original text is: “5000 多年来，中华民族在自己的发展历程中已经为人类作
出了伟大的贡献。未来岁月里，中国人民和中华民族也必将为人类和平与发展的崇高
事业不断作出新的更大的贡献！同志们、朋友们！孙中山先生当年说：“以四百兆苍生  之
众，数万里土地之饶，因可发奋为雄，无敌于天下。”“惟愿诸君将振兴中国之责 
任，置之于自身之肩上。”孙中山先生在生命的最后时刻仍然嘱咐，革命尚未成功，同  志
仍须努力。实现中国现代化，实现中华民族伟大复兴，实现全体中国人民共同富  裕
，我们还有很长的路要走，还有很多困难和风险要去战胜。 
 
我呼吁，所有敬仰孙中山先生的中华儿女，包括大陆同胞、港澳同胞、台湾同胞、海
外侨胞，无论党派信仰，无论身在何处，更加紧密地团结起来，把握历史机遇，担当
历史责任，把孙中山先生等一切革命先辈为之奋斗的伟大事业继续推向前进！把近代
以来一切仁人志士为之奋斗的伟大事业继续推向前进！把近代以来中国人民和中华民
族为之奋斗的伟大事业继续推向前进！” 
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revolutionary values, to reiterate the need for unification with Taiwan, and to bring 
overseas Chinese and gangtai’ao.220 Chinese into the fold of the great Chinese 
national revival—the true work of Sun and his true descendants, the CCP. 
 
vii: Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, the standard CCP narrative of Sun as presented in 
commemorative articles presents the image of a democratic revolutionary pioneer 
who toppled the Qing and struggled for the sake of China, eventually meeting his 
helpful allies the Communists. Specifics vary by decade: in 1956, the Soviet Union is 
in, Bandung was recent, and Sun was an inspiration to anti-colonial movements 
worldwide; in 1966, the Soviet Union was out, Vietnam was underway, and Sun was 
the Mao of his era; in 1986, Maoism was out, reform was in, and Sun was a 
modernizing nationalist above all else. This narrative remains as of 2016, the most 
recent decennial celebration of Sun, though certain particulars have changed. The 
redefinition of Sun Yat-sen in these official state ceremonies serves to illustrate 
changing top-level priorities in the PRC in different decades. The ceremonies, 
additionally, served as opportunities for political maneuvering, with Sun’s allies 
redefining Sun to make him politically palatable for different times, and, in doing so, 
safeguarding their own positions. Alternatively, the ceremonies served as 
opportunities to humiliate political rivals, as the 1966 humiliation of Liu Shaoqi and 
Zhu De by unknown parties, presumably of the pro-Cultural Revolution flanks, 
 
 
 
220 Hong Kong (xianggang), Taiwan, and Macao (Aomen) are sometimes referred to in tandem as 
gangtai’ao, particularly in PRC airports. 
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illustrated. 
 
We might think back to the Indian Communist M. N. Roy’s narrative of Sun 
for comparison. To Roy, Sun was constantly a petit-bourgeois schemer bungling his 
way through insurrectionary efforts, finally redeeming himself somewhat through 
accepting Soviet aid and advice, allying with the Chinese Communist Party, and 
doing away with the more reactionary elements of his past revolutionary efforts. This 
distinction is presumably explained by the fact that Roy, an internationalist with a 
rigid understanding of history as social science, disliked Sun’s nationalistic revolution 
and Sun’s sloppy, inconsistent revolutionary efforts; the CCP, being a national 
Communist organization, likes Sun’s nationalism. Both found him useful. For Roy, 
Sun, his times, and his ilk explain, in part, the failure of the socialist revolution in 
China; for the CCP, Sun provided a link to the past that allows for useful, becoming 
contrast with the present as well as link that further legitimates the CCP as the home 
and hero of Chinese nationalism. Of course, the CCP is not a monolithic entity, and 
so we see that there are multiple variations on Sun the Communist forebear. 
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III 
 
SHADES OF BLUE, SHADES OF GREEN: SUN YAT-SEN & 
THE BEAUTIFUL ISLE 
 
“History is revised as I like it.” 
—Chthonic, “Rage of My Sword” (大械鬥) 
 
i: Introduction 
 
As the GMD’s political fortunes decline and as Taiwanese identity 
increasingly sheds connection to China, figures like Sun are being redefined to better 
fit new understandings of nationhood in Taiwan. The overall effect is to make Sun 
more relevant to a society increasingly distant from its nominal status as the Republic 
of China. To examine this redefinition, I will explore how representations of Sun Yat- 
sen have changed in Taiwan from the martial law period to today, or roughly from the 
1950s through the late 2010s. To do so, I will first establish a brief historical narrative 
of Taiwan and how the island arrived at its present situation. Next, I will explore how 
Sun was discussed in martial law Taiwan and how Taiwanese became implicated as 
particular figures in the greater project of Chinese nationalism. Third, I will explore a 
shift in post-liberalization Taiwan to a more native, or bentu, political environment 
and how this creates an awkward situation for the Guomindang and its associated 
symbols, like Sun Yat-sen; I focus on one text, a zhuan narrative of the Taiwanese 
nationalist Chiang Wei-shui that also features Sun to consider how Sun is apparently 
being redefined in a way that is politically palatable for the Pan-Green camp. 
ii: Taiwan, China, Japan, and China 
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Taiwan, an island off the coast of Fujian and longtime home of Austronesian 
peoples, has had a complicated relationship with the Chinese nation. Large-scale Han 
migration to the island began around the time of the Ming-Qing transition, with most 
migrants hailing from the Fujianese cities of Zhangzhou and Quanzhou. Various 
Western powers, including the Dutch, the Spanish, the Portuguese, and the British 
controlled forts on the island at some point, with the Dutch Fort Zeelandia in Tainan 
and the Spanish Fort Domingo in Tamsui the most famous. Following the Qing 
conquest of the pirate king and Ming loyalist Koxinga (Zheng Chenggong), the island 
would formally be made a prefecture of Fujian Province, a status it would hold until 
the end of the 19th century. As part of Qing modernization reforms designed to 
strengthen the court’s claim to the island in light of pressure from Japanese 
expansionism and Western imperialism, Taiwan was reorganized as a province in 
1885. Modernization projects, such as the establishment of Taipei as the new capital 
and the building of a railroad from Keelung to Hsinchu, evinced the ambition and 
failures of the Qing reform movements. While the capital move went smoothly, the 
63-mile-long railroad—the first planned leg of a railroad connecting all the 
Taiwanese West Coast—proved rickety and could not be used.221 
Following the First Sino-Japanese War and the Treaty of Shimonoseki, which 
formalized its conclusion, the isle of Taiwan was ceded to Japan “in perpetuity”, 
along with the Pescadores (Penghu Islands) and the Liaodong Peninsula.222 This 
 
221 Andrew Fraser, First Fruits of Empire: Japan’s Colonial Administration in Taiwan, 1895- 
1934 (Papers on Far Eastern History, vol. 38. 9-1-1988) 98. 
222 Other treaty provisions, such as the recognition of an independent Korean Empire, the 
payment of indemnities to Japan, and the granting of most-favored nation status to Japan, 
were perhaps more immediately important. Indeed, the cession of Liaodong to Japan 
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cession of Taiwan to Japan—though it did not endure—proved critical to the island’s 
development. Though Taiwan had been a peripheral area of the Qing Empire, it 
became a model colony for the Japanese Empire. Governors-general like Kodama 
Gentarō and Gotō Shinpei oversaw extensive modernization programs. These 
programs ranged from the building of the aforementioned railroad, the development 
of Taipei into a modern colonial capital, the introduction of new cash crops, and the 
foundation of tropical medicine institutions.223 Gotō would be particularly important 
for biological views of race, fitness, governance, and national health in the 
development of multiple administrative systems for Taiwan and in the field of public 
hygiene in the Japanese empire more generally.224 
Taiwan would not be as critical a colony as Korea. Thereafter, the rhetorical 
“dagger pointing at the heart of Japan”225 became a center of industry for Japan 
following its 1910 annexation. Taiwan, nonetheless, would be crucial geopolitically 
as a southern foothold in the Pacific, agriculturally for tropical and subtropical crops, 
and politically as a poster child for the munificence and benevolence of Japanese 
imperialism. To be recognized as a great power, Japan needed lucrative and useful 
colonies, and so Taiwan was indeed integral to the forging of a new imperial Japanese 
 
provoked the Triple Intervention, in which Russian, French, and German delegates all pressed 
Japan to return the peninsula to Chinese jurisdiction, and Russian forces would later claim 
authority over it. 
Russo-Japanese tensions over control of the Liaodong Peninsula would later lead to the 
Russo-Japanese War, a bloody Japanese victory that resolved so few of the underlying 
political questions that Japanese in Tokyo would riot over the disappointing Treaty of 
Portsmouth in what came to be known as the Hibiya Riots. 
223 Fraser, 98. 
224 Yukiko Hayase, The Career of Goto Shinpei, 41. 
225 Peter Duus, The Abacus and the Sword: The Japanese Penetration of Korea (University of 
California Press, 1998). A phrase attributed to German advisor to the Meiji government Jacob 
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image. Old-growth Taiwanese cedar trees would come to form the grand torii gates 
of the Meiji Shrine in central Tokyo, a material affirmation of the imperial grandeur 
of the Meiji Emperor and the growing Japanese empire.226 
During Japanese administration, Han Taiwanese and Aboriginal Taiwanese 
were held apart from Japanese Taiwanese. The predominant population group of the 
“civilized zones”, Han were effectively second-class citizens; aboriginals, in the 
“savage zones”, were classified as part of “scientific” administration and subjected to 
great restrictions on the freedom of movement.227 Partly as a result of this second- 
class status and partly as a result of a rising anti-imperialist movement inspired by 
Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points and nationalists in China, Korea, and elsewhere, 
Taiwanese nationalists like Lin Xiantang and Chiang Wei-shui actively opposed the 
ruling Japanese administrators. The Taiwanese independence movement of the 1920s, 
largely a bourgeois democratic movement (to borrow Marxist terms), would not 
succeed in establishing Taiwan as an independent nation. Rather, as Japanese 
imperialism intensified, in the terms of Louise Young, the Han Taiwanese and 
Aboriginal Taiwanese needed to be integrated into the national polity (kokutai) as 
coequal “subjects of the Emperor” (sekishii, lit. “infants”).228 This dōka undo (lit. 
“assimilation movement”) was not unique to Taiwan; indeed, it was prominent in 
Korea as well. However, given Taiwan’s ethnic composition, assimilation was 
particularly important: 
 
226 Observed during a visit to the Meiji Shrine in Shibuya, Tokyo in August, 2019. 
227 Paul Barclays, Outcasts of Empire: Japan’s Rule on Taiwan’s Savage Border 1874-1945 
(University of California Press, 2018), 212. 
228 Hui-yu Caroline Ts’ai, Taiwan in Japan's Empire-building: An Institutional Approach to 
Colonial Engineering (London: Routledge, 2011) 170. 
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The movement to convert Taiwanese into ‘loyal subjects of the emperor of 
Japan’ began at this point. This movement quickly involved Taiwanese of all 
ranks in ‘patriotic service’, and labor service became one way to show 
devotion to the nation. The fact that the war was waged against China—the 
origins of most Taiwanese or at least of their ancestors—complicated Japan’s 
labor operations: logically Taiwanese had to be completely converted into 
Japanese before they could be deployed to the front.229 
In an effort to make good Japanese subjects out of the Taiwanese and Koreans, the 
two peoples of Japan’s largest and most integral directly-administered colonies, 
colonial students were educated in Japanese. Colonial subjects in both Korea and 
Taiwan were made to take Japanese names and speak Japanese in official and public 
circumstances. The imperial religion of modern Shintoism was also introduced 
through the construction and veneration of shrines in the colonies. During the Second 
Sino-Japanese War and the later Pacific Theater of the Second World War, 
Taiwanese would serve as soldiers, interpreters, and support-labor for the Imperial 
cause, many at least nominally as volunteers.230 
Following Japan’s defeat, Taiwan’s status was uncertain. Though it was a 
colony of Japan, it had been taken long before Japan’s “hot” 1930s and, unlike Korea, 
Taiwan had no prior history as an independent nation. In any case, Japan had not 
formally relinquished claims of sovereignty over the island in surrender. The 
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Republic of China unilaterally declared the Retrocession of Taiwan in 1945, 
reclaiming it as a province of China and introducing it, for the first time, as a province 
of the Republic of China.231 What amounted essentially to the annexation of Taiwan 
by the irredentist ROC was supported implicitly by its wartime ally the United States, 
which was then occupying Japan and exerting a heavy influence on Japanese affairs. 
Many Taiwanese chafed under the new GMD regime. ROC officials, police, 
and soldiers appeared less trustworthy and less competent than the old Japanese 
administrators, and some Taiwanese continued to actively identify with their lost 
connection to Japanese empire. Others experienced no nostalgia for Japanese rule but 
had advocated an independent Taiwanese state and so could not be satisfied as one 
small province of the gargantuan ROC. Most simply suffered as the Republican 
administrators brought the chaos and corruption of mainland China, battered by the 
disastrous Japanese invasion and further destabilized by the resumption of GMD-CCP 
civil war, to the formerly insulated island. Under the administration of Chen Yi, grain 
was exported from Taiwan to the mainland to support Nationalist troops and 
population centers, driving up prices in Taiwan. Meanwhile, the GMD took over 
Japanese state monopolies and used them to bolster the regime’s coffers while also 
pursuing a “de-Japanification” campaign.232 
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These monopolies were peripherally related to a defining moment in post-war 
Taiwanese history. In 1947, a dispute between a black-market cigarette vendor and 
Taipei police enforcing the state tobacco monopoly became violent, with the police 
firing into an angry crowd, killing one. This led to an island-wide outcry. The 
provincial governor Chen Yi met the resultant protests with ruthless military 
suppression. The 2-28 Incident, named for the initial protest’s date of February 28th, 
1947, came to clearly mark the coercive power of the new regime, its willingness to 
use force against dissent, and the relative powerlessness of the civilian population.233 
Many of the slain or disappeared were Taiwanese nationalists (including Taidu 
nationalists and Zhonghua nationalists), elites with wealth from the Japanese era, and 
other politically-active or prominent groups.234 The crackdown reinforced GMD 
control and served to severely weaken local resistance. 
The general trajectory of Taiwanese history during the martial law period is 
marked by the cessation of American aid to the GMD, the GMD loss of the mainland, 
the end of Operation National Glory, the Chinese Cultural Renaissance, the 
“Economic Miracle”, and the end of the martial law period in the late 1980s. The 
Guomindang declared martial law in 1948 as a result of the increasingly dire position 
of the Nanjing government on the Chinese mainland. This order was extended to 
Taiwan Province in spring of 1949 as the war situation grew yet bleaker. Following 
 
 
 
papers, an article by Wu Chin-lien in the Taiwan Xinsheng Bao on the strong current of 
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233 Some five to ten thousand people were killed or disappeared during the crackdown. Chen 
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the Nationalists’ retreat from the mainland in late 1949, Mainlanders (largely known 
in Taiwan as waishengren, or “people from other provinces”) began to occupy 
privileged positions throughout Taiwanese society. The ROC apparatus emphasized 
state-owned enterprise at this time, with the result that most of Taiwan’s larger firms 
were owned by the state, and these were largely operated by Mainlanders.235 Native 
Taiwanese (benturen, or Han Taiwanese who had lived in Taiwan before the 
Nationalists’ retreat) largely worked outside the government-controlled sectors of the 
economy or as lower-level employees within it. Legislative representation cast the 
ROC as it had looked during the election of 1948; representatives from the lost 
provinces held their seats, as no elections could be held in the lost territories to 
replace them. This rendered Taiwan a disproportionately tiny voice in a legislature 
with little authority beyond Taiwan Province and the coastal marches of Fujian. This 
limitation based on provincial population also limited the number of Taiwanese who 
could join the civil service.236 
After the North Korean invasion of South Korea in 1950, American aid 
resumed and would prove instrumental in GMD development programs. The GMD 
gradually moved away from its SOE-centric development model over the course of 
the 1950s and implemented land reform reminiscent of reforms enacted in Japan 
under the American occupation forces. This land reform, designed and implemented 
under the charge of Chen Cheng, was ideologically linked to Sun Yat-sen’s “land to 
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the tiller” program under the Principle of the People’s Welfare.237 The reforms 
included new regulations on rent and landlord-tenant relations and subsequently 
ensured fairer treatment of tenants. New farm sizes were too small to support surplus 
agricultural labor,238 a feature that accelerated urbanization .239 Fearing that the Great 
Leap Forward on the mainland might succeed and noting dwindling American aid for 
Taiwan, the GMD lifted restrictions on foreign investment starting in 1959. This 
opened the Taiwanese economy to growing numbers of aspiring Japanese and 
American investors.240 
Operation National Glory, the National Army’s mission to retake the 
mainland for the ROC, illustrated that Chiang Kai-shek and his government had a 
concrete, if unsuccessful, plan to recover the Mainland through military force. By and 
large, however, the ROC government devoted most of its energies to the practical 
task of developing Taiwan as a model province. Taiwan was promoted as a cultural 
and societal model, not just an economic model. To this effect, the Chinese Cultural 
Renaissance, launched in 1966, attempted to cultivate a connection to Chinese 
cultural tradition. This meant that the classics were taught in school, that Confucian 
virtues were promoted again as in the New Life Movement of the 1930s, that Peking 
opera was on the stage, and that Zhongyuan (Central Plains) culture was promulgated 
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on the Beautiful Isle. New buildings like the National Palace Museum and the 
Yuanshan Hotel in Taipei were designed to reaffirm the Sinitic identity of Taiwan. 
Grand, palatial, they invoked the grandeur of an imagined imperial past in the muggy 
concrete cityscape of fast-growing Taipei, a city that didn’t exist in any meaningful 
sense of the term before the Manchu Qing Dynasty. The Chinese Cultural 
Renaissance helpfully illustrates what establishing Taiwan as the “revival base of the 
nation” looked like to GMD planners; it meant preserving and reifying a traditional 
China, standing in opulent opposition to the New China then undergoing the chaos 
and cultural destruction of the Cultural Revolution. 
Following the death of Chiang Kai-shek in 1975, his eldest son Ching-kuo 
served as the President of the ROC. Chiang Ching-kuo oversaw Taiwan at a period of 
tremendous economic and infrastructural growth and launched programs like the chui 
Taiqing (“promoting Taiwanese youth”) initiative to “Taiwan-ize” the GMD and the 
state apparatus of the ROC.241 He famously declared that “I am also a Taiwanese,” 
and nominated the benturen Lee Teng-hui to serve as his Vice-President, naming him 
as his successor. Lee was confirmed as VP by the Legislative Yuan in 1984, and 
succeeded Chiang Ching-kuo upon his death in 1988. A Hakka from Taipei, a former 
Japanese soldier, a former Communist sympathizer, and an agricultural economist, 
Lee would lift martial law orders in 1988. His tenure was marked by further 
Taiwanization and democratization, including the direct election of presidents, in 
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response to the Wild Lily Protests of 1990.242 He would be the first democratically 
elected President of the ROC and would famously frame Taiwan as the ROC-Taiwan. 
While not radical by the standards of Taiwanese independence activists, Lee’s 
characterization of the regime suggested that there was something particular about the 
ROC as it existed on Taiwan, and emphasized the largely Taiwanese nature of the 
surviving ROC. If the Republic of China was to be democratic in such a situation, it 
must necessarily represent and be composed of its majority of Taiwanese 
constituents. 
Following Lee’s presidency, Taiwan has seen a back and forth between the 
post-authoritarian GMD (known in Taiwan often by the older appellation “KMT”) 
and the Democratic Progressive Party, an opposition party born from the Dangwai 
Movement of the 1980s.243 The two parties are the central institutions in Taiwan’s 
two main political camps today. The Pan-Blue camp, in which the chief party is the 
GMD, is more socially conservative. The Blue camp values Chinese national identity, 
and—since the Shanghai Accords of 1992—closer cooperation with the PRC. The 
 
 
 
242 The Wild Lily Protests of 1990 was a student protest movement that pushed for the 
democratic election of presidents, vice-presidents, and legislative representatives. The 
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Pan-Green camp, led by the DPP, is more socially progressive, values Taiwanese 
national identity, and is wary of Beijing. Both parties are arguably Taiwanified by 
this point in time, with the waishengren having been in Taiwan for several 
generations, but the disagreement over the relationship between Chinese and 
Taiwanese identity remains a contentious issue between the two camps. Moreover, 
bentu and waisheng identities remain salient. Under DPP presidents Chen Shui-bian 
and Tsai Ing-wen, the ROC-Taiwan government worked to further indigenize Taiwan 
and undo much of the GMD’s Sinification work. For his part, GMD president Ma 
Ying-jeou worked to reestablish some of Taiwan’s connections with China, both 
culturally and economically. This Blue-Green split is key to understanding the image 
of Sun Yat-sen in post-Retrocession Taiwan, as will be explicated below. 
iii: Sun, Chiang, and Changing Taiwanese Politics 
 
During the era of GMD dictatorship and Taiwanese Sinification, official 
histories explicitly and deeply tied Taiwan to China. For example, in the Pictorial 
History of the Republic of China, an English-language history for foreign readers 
published on the occasion of Chiang Ching-kuo’s election as president in 1978, Han 
settlement is redefined as dating back to the Qin and Han Dynasties. The pirate-lord 
and Ming-loyalist Koxinga, furthermore, is made to a be a great nationalist hero “able 
to expel the Dutch and reconstruct Taiwan as his bastion for resistance against the 
Manchus and restoration of the Ming Dynasty,” paralleling the GMD’s own mission 
following 1949.244 However, while the Manchus and the Communists are equated as 
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bandit invaders that must be resisted and overcome, Qing control over Taiwan was 
framed as a formative moment in the development of Taiwan so as the strengthen 
historical ties between Taiwan and mainland China. To this effect, the late Qing 
officials Shen Baozhen (a high-ranking official in Taiwan Prefecture) and Liu 
Mingchuan (the first governor of Taiwan Province) are described as laying “the 
cornerstone for Taiwan’s modernization.”245 Liu’s railroad project, described earlier, 
is reproduced here to highlight this Chinese modernization project. Further 
connecting Taiwan to China, stone tools are produced and described as illustrating the 
shared culture of the ancient Taiwanese and Chinese. Ancient maps featuring the isle 
of Yizhou (yi here being the same yi for the “eastern barbarians” of Chinese antiquity) 
and the geologically recent break of Taiwan from the Asian landmass, meanwhile, 
also serve to suggest an ancient and visceral connection to mainland China.246 
Beyond this affirmation of ancient, modern, and fundamentally organic 
connections with China, Japanese rule is presented as brief, cruel, oppressive, and 
barbaric. Japanese brutality is illustrated through photos of Japanese soldiers 
bayonetting and flogging Taiwanese prisoners, by a remembrance of the Wushe 
Incident and the associated Japanese massacre of aboriginal Taiwanese,247 and by 
photos of Japanese “narcotics manufacture”—the latter notes that Japanese “soldiers 
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of fortune” made good money pushing drugs on the Chinese mainland.248 However, 
the Taiwanese are shown at every corner resisting this rule in favor of Chinese 
nationalism. Quotes and figures produced include Mainland GMD politician Dai 
Jitao’s charge “Blood is thicker than water,” featured in the Taiwan Minbao. Chinese 
nationalists from Taiwan like Qiu Niantai, a soldier who fought against the Japanese 
in Taiwan before retreating to Guangdong, is celebrated for later serving as a 
“Chinese volunteer” against the Japanese seizure of Manchuria.249 Also featured is 
Lai Lai, a man from Miaoli who launched attacks against police stations in Taiwan 
after seeing the success of the Xinhai Revolution during a 1912 visit to Shanghai.250 
Qiu and Lai had quite different fates, with Qiu becoming a high-ranking GMD 
member later in life and Lai being swiftly executed by the Japanese, but both figures 
are celebrated here to support the narrative of Taiwanese as patriotic Chinese. The 
chapter concludes with a section titled “President Chiang Kai-shek and the 
Retrocession of Taiwan”, in which the Retrocession is framed as a Sunist mission that 
was personally fulfilled by Chiang: 
In modern times, the lot of Taiwan has been decided by the two Sino-Japanese 
Wars: the first one, in 1894, lost Taiwan to imperialist Japan under which 
Taiwan was ruled 51 years; the second was also known as China’s War of 
Resistance that started in 1937, lasted eight years, and finally through the 
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sagacious leadership of President Ciang, ended in imperialist Japan’s 
unconditional surrender. Taiwan was retroceded to China, and the Taiwanese 
again became Chinese. None can ever admire sufficiently the way President 
Chiang accomplished what Dr. Sun Yat-sen had set out to do long, long 
ago.251 
That Chiang had successfully fulfilled Sun’s goals was a key point of Chiang’s 
carefully constructed political image in Taiwan, in which he figured as a successor, 
student, and equal. We may even consider that Chiang’s success in doing what Sun 
could not achieve in his own time may even serve to qualify Chiang as Sun’s superior 
in this framing, though to explicitly suggest so would perhaps be politically unwise. 
Indeed, if we consider that Sun veneration was a key point of the GMD’s image 
cultivation, undermining Sun would serve to undermine the party itself. We might 
consider Mao’s anti-CCP turn in the 1960s in further thinking about individual 
personality cults and how they related to pre-existing symbols and structures. 
Therefore, Chiang’s successes were framed as Sunist successes, and not as something 
new, although Chiang’s personal role in achieving these old goals was emphasized to 
glorify his name. 
The above description of retrocession illustrates how official histories 
published in the martial law period portrayed Chiang in relation to Sun, and Sun in 
relation to Taiwan. To fully grasp this lineage, we must look at an earlier section in 
the chapter, aptly named “Dr. Sun Yat-sen’s Leadership of the Revolution and Its 
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Relationship to Taiwan.” This section frames the first Canton Uprising as directly 
linked to the Treaty of Shimonoseki: “the cession of Taiwan and the Penghu 
islands…provoked a surging tide of nationalism among the people of Taiwan,” and 
“Dr. Sun engineered the first Canton Uprising only five days after the fall of the 
island province.”252 The book indeed suggests that the second branch of the Revive 
China Society was founded in Taiwan that year, linking “the national revolution to 
the recovery of Taiwan in an [sic] motivation and nexus.”253 The overview concludes 
with the statement that 
Though Taiwan had become estranged since 1895, the people of Taiwan never 
abated in their reverence for Dr. Sun…It is no accident that today Taiwan is 
the bastion for China’s eventual recovery and rejuvenation, to which all 
Chinese, on the mainland and overseas as well as in Taiwan, look for hope for 
the future.254 
This narrative accompanies photographs and captions that illustrate Sun’s 
connections to Taiwan, such as Sun’s use of the island as a base for the Huizhou 
Uprising of 1900, and the contrasting failure of Japanese authorities in Taiwan to 
provide promised support. Other photos include hotels where Sun stayed, a portrait of 
his long-time Taiwan-based friend and ally Chen Shaobai—the founder of the RCS 
Taiwan branch—and a portrait of Lin Wei-ko, a wealthy Taipei resident and donor 
who supported the 1911 Canton Uprising. All serve to underscore Sun’s connections 
 
 
 
252 Ibid., 145. 
253 Ibid. 
254 Ibid. 
177  
to the island.255 
 
While Sun’s time in Taiwan was eminently important to the book’s narrative, 
more important still was the participation of Taiwanese in Chinese revolutionary 
organs. Chiang Wei-shui, the subject of the next section, appears in this book as just 
such a Chinese nationalist revolutionary from Taiwan. In a two-page spread, Chiang’s 
life is narrated accordingly: 
Chiang Wei-shui (1891-1931) was a native of Ilan and a graduate of the 
Medical College in Taipei. He was heartened by the success of the revolution 
that established the Republic, but sorely aggrieved by Yuan Shih-kai’s 
imperial ambitions in 1916, somuch so that he went so far as attempting to 
assassinate Yuan with germs. He failed, but upon return from Peking he ran a 
clinic and took part in the 1920 formation of the New People Society, from 
which time he began to engross himself with wrestling civil rights from the 
Japanese. With Lin Hsien-tang he co-founded the Taiwan Cultural 
Association in 1921, and he was so active that he attracted the attention of the 
Japanese authorities, who imprisoned him for a time in 1923. On his release, 
he founded the Taiwan Min-pao and was imprisoned again for the paper’s 
anti-Japanese views. In 1927, he was one of the founders of the Taiwan Min- 
chung Tang and persisted in an uncompromising attitude until death overtook 
him in August, 1931, and the party he founded also died. All through his life 
he was in spirit a follower of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, and a nationalist who never 
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wavered in his resolution to see Taiwan restored to the fatherland.256 
 
Chiang was presented as a whole-hearted Chinese nationalist from Taiwan, a Chinese 
whose local identity and reality as a Taiwanese under Japanese rule complemented 
his larger sense of Chinese nationalism. To further this point, the author notes that 
Chiang’s bookshelf held Sun’s works, thus portraying him as a filial disciple and 
admirer. 
Such a simplified picture of Taiwanese as Chinese, no more or less Chinese 
than a Cantonese or a Henanese, functioned to support the legitimacy of the GMD 
party-state in Taiwan. Similar messages were accordingly promulgated in public 
ceremonies. In November 1966, as his sworn enemies in Beijing conducted a parallel 
ceremony that claimed Sun’s legacy, Chiang Kai-shek gave a speech commemorating 
the opening of Chung-shan Hall and the centennial birthday of Sun Yat-sen. 
 
 
Figure 6: Chung-shan Hall (the Zhongshan Building), Taipei.257 
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This speech is significant in that it illustrates an official narrative of Sun during the 
martial law years, but also in that it marks the formal beginning of the Chinese 
Cultural Renaissance Movement.258” 
In his speech, Chiang bemoaned threats to China’s ancient cultural traditions, 
asserting an unbroken daotong (a philosophic or ideological bloodline) line stretching 
from the great sages through the present day. The mantle of upholding Chinese 
culture at a time when “red disaster [Communism] floods the world, the nation is in 
dire straits and facing unprecedent calamity…” and “Our superior five-thousand year- 
old traditional culture is threatened to point of risking extinction” was plainly an 
urgent task to Chiang.259 Beyond a mere reference to Communist rule, the disaster he 
beheld now included the talk of “cultural revolution” and “smashing the old world” 
and its outmoded culture. Chiang defined the basis of this culture in terms of “ethics, 
democracy, and science.”260 His salvation lay with the rightful heirs of Sun and the 
mantle of daotong, the GMD and the ROC. The solution was a three-pronged plan for 
cultural revival, endorsing ethics, democracy, and science as the keys to renewing 
Chinese culture: 
The Three People’s Principles issued by our Father of the Nation take the 
continuation of our Chinese race’s bloodline as their responsibility, and 
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furthermore aim to preserve and renew our five-thousand-year-old national 
culture. We will exhaust our efforts in this endeavor, aiming to embrace the 
highest cultural values unto this purpose. It is as the Father of the Nation said: 
“When there is morality there may be a country, when there is morality there 
may be a perfected world.” The national morality mentioned here is like a 
holding a ceremonial wine vessel, in that “first, everyone must take self- 
cultivation as the root.” He also said, “My Principle of Democracy takes the 
people’s sovereignty as its first resolution.” From this, we see the issuance of 
the idea that the people are the roots of the nation. He also said, “In all things 
we must rely upon scientific principle. Only then may we resolve these issues, 
only then may we reach our goals satisfactorily.” Here, “the Way of 
Construction is in the People’s Livelihood,” and in all that the People’s 
Livelihood must consist of in daily life. For example, the necessities, such as 
the six categories of food, clothing, domicile, profession, education, and 
pleasure—this is the origin of the Father of the Nation’s six-faceted plan for 
scientific national construction, the root of national prosperity and 
longevity!261 
This solution further involved a series of concrete tasks: building “grand 
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things” to remind Chinese and visitors alike of the grandeur of Chinese culture, 
associating Sun and his mission with this grand culture, and reminding the Chinese 
people of unfinished work and their suffering compatriots across the waters: 
Today foreigners come to Taiwan to travel, more and more by the day, trying 
to see the richness of Chinese material culture, but they can’t even get a 
glimpse of the grandeur of traditional Chinese architecture. What a shame! 
Last year, on the occasion of the Father of the Nation’s birthday, the 
government resolved to build a hall on Yangming Mountain and name it “the 
Zhongshan Building”, styled as a “Chinese Cultural Hall”, so as to remember 
the Father of the Nation’s virtuous work in building the Republic with his own 
hands and manifest the glory of Chinese culture for all to see.262 
This year the hall is completed, and we now use it to mark the one- 
hundredth birthday of the Father of the Nation. But this one hall, just one of 
our few buildings built in a traditional manner, simply cannot fully represent 
the full face of Chinese culture! All of our countrymen, when coming to view 
this hall, will see its name and reflect upon its meaning. They will remember 
the unfinished work of the Father of the Nation and will thus join forces to 
work towards its realization! This hall also manifests the ideology of the 
 
 
262 Ibid. The original text is: “今者國際人士之來臺觀光者，與日俱增，嘗以其僅見中華文
物之豐富，而未能一睹我中華文化傳統建築之宏規，引為莫大之缺憾！去歲 國父百年
誕辰，政府請於陽明山啟樓建堂，且乞以樓顏之曰「中山樓」，以堂顏之曰「中華文化
堂」，意在紀念 國父手創民國之德澤，亦以發揚中華文化之矞皇。議其堂廡之制，則
鹹以為自節用愛人而言，即土階石室，猶以為大；但自表彰中華文化之博大悠久而言，
雖重簷藻梲，猶以為小；中正謹如眾議，許崇其堂廡，經營興作，蓋誠不可以棲棲者，
以儉於 國父；亦不可以吝此區區者，使無以見我中華文化之久而且大也。” 
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Three People’s Priniples, that which our nation follows, as a condensation of 
our culture, bringing together practice and the arousal of virtue!263 
But alas! Looking west across the waters, all I see are lesions. The 
ferries sunken, the green mountains bare—could these be the Central Plains? 
Their tears are bitter and blood dry, their lives and deaths passing 
unannounced—could it be that our countrymen, our flesh and blood are here? 
It’s enough to make this one, Zhongzheng, forget his age and the weight of his 
responsibilities, despite his trials and tribulations. We must remember the 
dangers we face, and work every day to become stronger! Do not let the joys 
of visiting this fine, splendiferous building commemorating our Father of the 
Nation cause you to forget your sorrows and worries! What you must know is 
that this is a symbol of the revival base for rebuilding our national culture, that 
when we resolve to extirpate the red calamity and retake the mainland: only 
the glorious White Sun264 will shine over the marches of the Mainland; the 
benefits of ethics, democracy, science, and the Three People’s Principles will 
extend to all our brothers and sisters on the mainland, just as on today’s base 
of freedom Taiwan; we will from then on have no regrets about leaking roofs, 
no regrets regarding the Father of the Nation’s will that puts the people first; 
 
 
 
263 Ibid. The original text is: “經歲而堂成，今以 國父一百晉一誕辰，敬啟管鑰。惟此一
堂廡，僅略具我傳統建築範疇之一二，自不足以言代表中華文化之全貌！凡我國人， 
來瞻於此堂此樓之下，顧其名而思其義，應念 國父之遺志未竟，願相與一心戮力以竟
之！又當思三民主義，乃為我民族之所託命，亦為我文化之所凝聚，願相與實踐而振德
之！” 
264 A reference to the national flag of the ROC, commonly called the “Blue Sky, White Sun, 
and Red Earth” (qingtian bairi mandihong) flag. 
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we will have furthermore seized this opportunity to revive the highest virtues 
of the new Chinese nation for all the land!265 
Chiang explicitly invoked Sun for political legitimation, as discussed previously, but 
this legitimation took on new aspects as the ROC and PRC changed. The Cultural 
Revolution on the mainland posed a great threat to traditional Chinese culture, and 
Chiang—who had long held that traditional Chinese culture was the root of China’s 
greatness and the antidote to its contemporary problems—used this commemorative 
address as a point of contradistinction. In contrast to the rhetorical weight placed 
upon the mainland, Taiwan appears small and, in various ways, incidental in the 
speech. It is mostly useful as a model for what “free China” looks like, in opposition 
to the China overrun with Communists. But Taiwan also emerges as a place of want. 
As a peripheral space in the late dynasties and a foreign space in the early dynasties, 
Taiwan lacked the grand architecture then under threat in Henan and Shaanxi, lacked 
the strong association with the traditional Central Plains culture of the Shang and 
Zhou Dynasties to which Chiang appealed. In this way, it becomes clear that 
remembering Sun offers an opportunity for Chiang to remember the GMD’s image of 
traditional China, an image highly preoccupied with “the wellspring of traditional 
 
 
 
 
265 Ibid. The original text is: “嗟呼！隔水西望，滿目瘡痍，渡頭落日，青山一髮者，莫
非中原！淚枯血乾，死生無告者，莫非吾同胞與骨肉焉！是以中正雖歷經艱難險阻， 
與侮辱橫逆之來，猶予日孳孳，而忘其身之老，責之重也！尤冀我國人操危慮患，莊
敬日強！毋徒以遊目此璀璨瑰瑋紀念 國父之建築，而樂以忘憂！須知此為復興基地重
建民族文化之標幟，當益堅其消滅赤禍，重光大陸之信念，惟有我青天白日之光輝， 
普被於大陸之疆土；倫理、民主、科學三民主義之福祉，均霑於大陸全體之同胞，一
如今日自由基地之臺灣者然；而後始無愧於屋漏，無愧於 國父與先民之遺規，且以此
為復興我中華文化明德新民之契機，則庶幾乎！” 
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China,”266 the Central Plains. Building a commemorative hall named for Sun in a 
Zhongyuan-esque style in 1966 was a means of knitting together the GMD, Sun, 
Taiwan, and traditional China. 
Sun’s connection to Taiwan was further reinforced through the Chiang cult 
itself. As Chiang was the face of the GMD government and of the ROC more 
broadly, Sun served as the lofty paternal figure standing behind Chiang and the 
Chinese nation, tasking it with fulfilling the great work of the Chinese Revolution, of 
realizing the Republic and its Principles. The two were so closely linked in official 
narratives that to praise one essentially meant praising the other. Thus, 
commemorating Sun was itself an occasion to celebrate Chiang, much as CCP 
commemorations of Sun were also occasions to celebrate socialist progress (and, in 
1966, Mao Zedong). It is no coincidence that the two grandest monuments in Taipei 
are the Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Halls.267 Nor is it a coincidence 
that it is chiefly on Taiwan that Chiang’s formal name, Chiang Chung-cheng or Jiang 
Zhongzheng is widely used. The chung/zhong character suggest a direct and brotherly 
linkage to Sun Zhongshan. 
This may also be seen in eulogies and panegyrics to Chiang following his 
 
 
 
266 The Central Plains, as mentioned, are often regarded as the origin of Chinese culture, as 
the Shang and mythical Xia hail from the Yellow River valley. Chiang’s preoccupation with 
the Central Plains, a region that the GMD—an organization based in South China and 
initially composed largely of southerners—had little direct connection, illustrates how Chiang 
sought to connect the contemporary Republic with the traditional China of bygone days. 
Cultivating such a connection was integral to the GMD narrative of Chinese Taiwan and to 
justifying efforts to Sinify Taiwan and to retake the mainland. 
267 Notably, upon Chiang’s passing, the SYS Memorial Hall was the site of his lying-in- 
repose. 
Ai Wen, “Let Us Turn Our Grief into Strength”, Homage to Our Leader: Essays and Poems 
in Memory of the Late President Chiang Kai-shek (Taipei: China Forum Inc., 1975), 125. 
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death in 1975. While this chapter does not dig deeply into Chiang commemorations, a 
brief survey may illustrate the basic trend. Writers published works featuring florid 
and fawning descriptions to commemorate the life of Chiang and portray him as a 
brilliant leader in his own right. For example, Chiang Mu, in “I Saw, I Heard, I 
Thought, I Mused”, waxed: 
O our dear and respected leader, you are a born saint and sage whose 
greatness has made us impressed to a greater degree with the need of our 
revolutionary task, and we believe that the splendor of the Three Principles of 
the People will always be the splendor of the twentieth century and of the 
whole universe. It is you who have [sic] provided us with the basis on which 
we can build our unshakable hope as a nation, a nation blessed with the 
history of 5000 years. It is also you who have made inviolable the dignity of 
the Chinese race.268 
Writing on the victory over Japan, Kui-ren in “Eternal Grief—President 
Chiang as I Knew Him” writes: 
Then came sweet victory. In majestic splendor flew high the Flag of the White 
Sun and Blue Sky. The Three People’s Principles and China’s Destiny 
became objects of avid study among the students. We were no longer slaves to 
a foreign race; we were no longer a vanquished people without a country to 
call our own. Enthusiastically we stood erect under the National Flag or in the 
 
 
268 Chiang Mu, Homage, 102. Unfortunately, no characters are provided for reference, and so 
I have been unable to confirm details about Chiang Mu. I believe Chiang Mu is 姜穆 (1929- 
2003), a Miao author who went to Taiwan with the GMD. 
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hall where were hung portraits of the Father of the Republic and of you, dear 
President. We were given the chance to know the dignity of man, and to be 
proud being born Chinese.269 
Chu Hsi-ning, in “The Great Man Is Always with Us”, imagines the SYS 
Mausoleum in Nanjing with a matching CKS Mausoleum next to it: 
The two mausoleums [sic] would provide the opportunity for endless 
generations of the Chinese and of the people from other parts of the world to 
see and worship the two national heroes and leaders, the two giant stars in the 
firmament of the twentieth century, the two great seers whose vision is 
colored by the Three Principles of the People, and the two oriflammes in 
which mankind takes pride.270 
Finally, for our purposes, Chang Chao-ch’i mourns Chiang in verse, writing 
“Ah! Giant of our nation—mankind’s eternal model/Anti-Communist 
prophet/Inheritor of our Founding Father’s revolution/You! Never, never will 
you/Disappear from/Our weeping.”271 
While he is equated with Sun, some distinguishing features of Chiang are his 
Christian faith, his long tenure as leader—in some capacity—of the ROC, his military 
background, and his ultimate strength in failure. Though Chiang is described as 
 
 
269 Kui-jen, Homage, 15. I believe Kui-ren is 歸人, the penname of Huang Shoucheng 黃守
誠 （1928-2012）, an award-winning author who achieved renown in the 1960s and 1970s. 
270 Chu, Homage, 200. I believe Chu Hsi-ning is 朱西寧(1927-1998), an author who had 
served as an officer in the National Army during the Civil War. 
271 Chang, Homage, 253. I believe Chang Chao-ch’i is 張肇祺 (1925-1998), another author 
who came with the GMD to Taiwan. His penname was Ping Sha 平沙, as in “level sands”. 
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facing great adversity, these authors make his dignity and perseverance in the face of 
said adversity a mark of his superior character, thus providing a role model for the 
citizens of the beleaguered Republic. While the quoted selections highlight the 
nominal equality of Chiang and Sun, it may be observed that many of the addresses 
make no note of Sun at all and instead praise Chiang as a distinctive god-like man272 
of superior virtue, knowledge, and action. Ultimately, while Chiang was equated with 
Sun, it may have been that, for many, Chiang’s heroic image was superior to that of 
Sun, but perhaps this is simply an effect of his more approximate death and the fact 
these were after all eulogies for the recently deceased Chiang. Written at a time when 
the ROC was being displaced from the international stage, in mourning for Chiang 
and glorifying him, these writers were perhaps mourning for and glorifying the 
Republic itself. 
In any case, the explicit connection of Chiang and Sun and of Taiwan to the 
ROC, was also reinforced through smaller, if no less important steps. The presidents 
of the ROC, from Chiang through Chen Shui-bian, all paid homage to a portrait of 
Sun before delivering their monthly addresses at the Presidential Manor in Taipei. 
Sun’s portraits still grace official functions in Taiwan. The national anthem remains 
the Sanmin Zhuyi hymn, and the flag remains the Blue Sky, White Sun, and Red 
Earth. Moreover, Minsheng and Xinhai Roads, Zhongshan and Zhongzheng Districts, 
GMD statues and GMD branch-offices pervasively mark the ROC-controlled 
territories. Sun’s image adorns the $100NTD bill, just as Chiang’s image adorns the 
 
 
 
 
272 There are not a few messianic allusions. 
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$200NTD bill, and both grace coins as well.273 
 
Since liberalization, Sun’s legacy, for so long bound to the fortunes of the 
GMD and Chiang, has suffered for it on Taiwan. The idea of indigenization, or 
bentuhua, has created distance between Taiwan and any greater sense of Chinese 
nationalism, leaving aside the political baggage of ROC nationalism in post- 
dictatorship Taiwan. Picking up this baggage again, we might consider that qu 
Jianghua, or “de-Chiangification” has been a widespread cultural and political 
phenomenon in Taiwan. In a fashion that mirrors the removal of many Mao statues on 
the mainland, many of Chiang’s statues have been torn out of the ground and thus 
scrapped or left to rust out of view. The DPP even attempted to rename the CKS 
Memorial Hall in Taipei in fall of 2008, opting instead for the “Taiwan Democracy 
Memorial Hall”.274 This was not widely accepted, however, and the GMD reinstated 
its former name shortly after the party’s strong performance in the 2008 elections. 
Nonetheless, the square before it still holds the newer name of “Liberty Square”. 
 
While memorials and “gratitude halls” in the form of shrines still dot Taiwan, 
such as the CKS Memorial Hall in Taipei or the CKS Gratitude Hall on Qilin Island 
in Kaohsiung, Chiang is associated with the worst of the GMD’s White Terror by 
what historian Jeremy Taylor calls a newly “homogenizing” Green history 
constructed, at least in part, in service to a DPP nation-building program.275 The 
 
 
273 Ceremonial coins featuring lesser figures like Chiang Wei-shui have also been minted 
since the presidency of Lee Teng-hui. 
274 Jeremy Taylor, “QuJianghua: Disposing of and Re-Appraising the Remnants of Chiang 
Kai-Shek's Reign on Taiwan”, Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 45, No. 1 (Jan., 2010), 
pp. 181-196, 181. 
275 Ibid., 185. 
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stains of the White Terror and the increasingly hallowed 2-28 Incident—a newer 
namesake for parks and memorial, a frequent talking point for the Green-minded 
about Blue crimes, and the subject of everything from films like Hou Hsiao-hsien’s 
City of Sadness to anime-inspired dating simulators like The Rainy Port Keelung— 
mar Chiang’s reputation. As the old 1950s-1960s call for retaking the mainland and 
toppling the CCP seems increasingly out of touch, Chiang seems ever more distant 
from contemporary Taiwan and ever more pigeonholed into the role of an autocratic 
“butcher” from the past. Indeed, the CKS Memorial Hall itself offers an exhibit on 
Taiwan’s journey from autocracy to democracy, only a short journey on the stairs 
from the great statue hall atop the memorial or the historical exhibition at ground 
level.276 Fewer and fewer Taiwanese identify themselves as Chinese. Even 
waishengren who still identify in that fashion are more and more removed from any 
family roots or historical connections in Zhejiang or Shandong. Of course, the relative 
normalization of Sino-Taiwanese relations since 1992 has seen the formation of new 
connections. Thus, the broader identity shift is hardly a simple narrative of withering 
roots. 
On the whole, nevertheless, Chiang, the Nanjing government, and Operation 
National Glory appear in contemporary Taiwan as ever more distant and foreign 
entities. We might note that in 2006, Chen Shui-bian declined to deliver a speech 
 
 
276 Observed during a visit to the CKS Memorial Hall in June of 2019. This is perhaps not to 
be taken out of context, as there were many exhibits in the Memorial Hall, including a 
painting gallery, a special photography exhibit, a traveling exhibit on Garfield the cat, and a 
statue garden featuring Taiwanese wildlife in various colors, including a fish adorned with 
the White Sun, Blue Sky, and Red Earth. Nevertheless, given the contested history of the Hall 
and the DPP’s recent electoral successes, the inclusion of such an exhibit suggests that the 
fight over the Hall and the legacy of Chiang will continue into the future. 
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commemorating Sun’s 140th birthday, purportedly due to fears of Daobian (Depose 
Bian, as in Chen Shui-bian, presumably making use of one of bian’s more bodily 
meanings to insult Chen), protestors marring the event. The Double-Tenth national 
day ceremonies were indeed marred by protests, some violence, and the heckling of 
Chen before foreign dignitaries, and so this is perhaps an open and shut case.277 It 
nonetheless suggests that Chen, an ardent Green, did not regard commemorating 
Sun’s birthday as an essential duty when faced with political challenges. Given 
Chen’s efforts to undermine the GMD image of Chiang and the vestiges of Chiang’s 
prior personality cult by means of name-changes, rededications of space, and his 
promotion of a national identity with little space for ROC symbols, it would seem 
Chen also found it convenient to avoid honoring Sun. Thus, the incident offered an 
opportunity to chastise his immediate opponents by ignoring their cherished icon on a 
significant anniversary. 
iv: Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Wei-shui, the Anti-Japanese Martyr 
 
We now turn to a specific work to illustrate how Sun Yat-sen is, indirectly, 
being discussed in contemporary Taiwan, a far different political environment than 
that of the Sinification years. Now, bentu politics and identity are strong in Taiwan, 
with Sun and his revolution being at most tangentially related to Taiwan under 
Japanese rule—a period bentu identitarians remember increasingly fondly, with Lee 
 
 
 
 
 
277 Lin Nansen, “Taibei shuangshi qingdian zai hunluanzhong jieshu” (Taipei Double-Tenth 
Celebration Ends in Chaos), BBC, October 10, 2006, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/chinese/trad/hi/newsid_6030000/newsid_6036300/6036387.stm. 
191  
Teng-hui serving as a prime example.278 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Lee Teng-hui strikes a pose.279 
 
As narratives of Taiwanese history increasingly formulate Taiwan as removed from 
China (a formulation in which emphasizing the influence of Japanese rule is useful), 
the official public-school curriculum has been a ground for contestation. In what was 
a highly controversial move, DPP Education Minister Du Zhengsheng in November 
 
278 Though Lee was a member of the GMD, following his retirement he has been an active 
promoter for the Greens, helping the DPP’s Chen Shui-bian and Tsai Ing-wen with their 
presidential campaign. He is not an independence advocate, however, in line with his earlier 
ROC-Taiwan doctrines that maintain the de facto existence of an independent ROC state on 
the island of Taiwan and its environs. 
279 Photo courtesy of the Lee Teng-hui School, found below. 
Jewel Huang, “Grandmaster Lee’ takes on the younger generation,” Taipei Times, November 
17, 2004, https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2004/11/17/2003211409. 
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2004 released a draft history curriculum that consigned Sun Yat-sen to the dustbin of 
“Chinese history”, a category now separate from “Taiwanese history” as per the 
educational program of then-President Chen Shui-bian.280 Newly rectified 
“Taiwanese history” textbooks avoided mention of Sun, illustrating the attempt to 
wrest Taiwanese history apart from Chinese (especially ROC) history. A further point 
of distancing was that Sun was originally consigned to “ancient Chinese history” by 
the DPP-controlled Ministry of Education, as he died before the Second World War. 
So controversial was this attempt to excise Sun from Taiwanese history that an 
elderly veteran, Li Qiyu, committed suicide before a statue of Sun Yat-sen in the city 
of Kaohsiung on Sun’s 138th birthday (November 12th, 2004) in protest. Although 
Green media organs like the Liberty Times281 did not link Li’s suicide to the row over 
Sun and Taiwanese history books, Blue outlets and Chinese outlets in Hong Kong 
like the Apple Daily282 and on the mainland like the People’s Daily283 made much of 
the link, framing Li as something of a martyr and lamenting the thought that 
 
 
 
280 Yang Mengyu, “Taiwan ‘wuba’ Sun Zhongshan liru Zhongguo gudaishi” (Taiwan 
‘Mistakenly’ Makes Sun Yat-sen Ancient Chinese History), November 11, 2004, BBC, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/chinese/simp/hi/newsid_3990000/newsid_3996300/3996399.stm?fbclid 
=IwAR06ixPR4nuNEoHyP7Ryvv7-soAfgT2WwhVoLmguhuXVXDvddJ0dIWXEdZY. 
281 Yang Jingjing and Meng Qingci, “76 sui rongmin zhonglieciqian wenjing” (76 Year-old 
Vet Cuts Own Throat at Martyr’s Shrine), November 13, 2004, Liberty Times (Ziyou 
Shibao), http://old.ltn.com.tw/2004/new/nov/13/today- 
so8.htm?fbclid=IwAR0fqpF5rvl4iUi5WaJmjWbNmWJEbJwt6wWn1U- 
vCQ5NxHc9uyJ16HHe7LU 
282 Apple Daily (Pingguo Ribao), “Guofu shouru tailaobing jifen gehou” (Father of the 
Nation Disgraced—Taiwan Veteran Slits Own Throat in Rage), November 13, 2004, 
https://hk.news.appledaily.com/international/daily/article/20041113/4438556?fbclid=IwAR1 
oHRftSEOb7_PwoQDb0FBr0UUAsLgE18COhyvMrM-pi7PRZZiHQoZK4FQ. 
283 Shi Xi, “Tailaobing gehou kangyi dangju cheng Sun Zhongshan wei ‘waiguoren’” 
(Taiwan Vet Cuts Own Throat—Protests Authorities Dubbing Sun Yat-sen “Foreigner”), 
Huaxia Jingweiwang, November 14, 2004, 
http://tw.people.com.cn/BIG5/14812/14875/2986327.html. 
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Taiwanese saw their pater patria as a “foreigner”. 
 
The move, part of Chen’s Taiwanization campaign that included the 
designation of the square before the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial and across from the 
National Library as Liberty Square (ziyou guangchang), illustrates the fraught status 
of Sun Yat-sen in contemporary Taiwan, being a space with two competing national 
narratives. One demands reverence for Sun as the Father of the Nation, that nation 
being the Republic of China, and another demands he be regarded as a foreigner, if 
perhaps a commendable revolutionary. This latter narrative, a Taiwan-centric 
narrative, has gained steam politically over the past generation, as evinced by the 
frequent proselytizing of the Taiwanese independence advocates by Ximending, by 
Tsai Ing-wen’s hearty victory in the 2019 election over the GMD candidate Han Kuo- 
yu, and by the success of Pan-Green media. Polls, such as those conducted by the 
Election Study Center at National Chengchi University in New Taipei confirm that a 
growing number of Taiwan residents identify primarily as Taiwanese.284 However, 
the same polls confirm that a large if declining number of Taiwanese consider 
themselves Chinese, either solely or in addition to Taiwanese. Solely-Chinese 
identifying responders are a small minority these days, but Chinese-Taiwanese 
identifying responders still constituted a third of responders in 2019. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
284 Figure 4 from Hui-ling Chen, “Taiwanese / Chinese Identity(1992/06~2019/12)”, Election 
Study Center at National Chengchi University, February 14, 2020, 
https://esc.nccu.edu.tw/course/news.php?Sn=166# 
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Figure 8: Graph from NCCU on Taiwanese/Chinese identity in Taiwan. 
 
Given that strong identification with one’s home province is long-standing feature of 
Chinese culture and society, this is not necessarily surprising. Indeed, identification 
with the province of Taiwan as part of the Chinese nation would support Pan-Blue 
narratives. However, we might consider that there is a growing sense among 
Taiwanese that Taiwan is a culturally Chinese nation, a member of a greater Chinese 
cultural-linguistic sphere like Malaysia or Singapore, and not that Taiwan is 
politically part of a larger Chinese nation. If the wording of this poll obscures finer 
details, it nonetheless illustrates two key facts for our purposes: one, many Taiwanese 
identify as solely Taiwanese; two, many Taiwanese still identify, in some sense and 
to some extent, as Chinese. The number of Taiwanese identifying as solely Taiwanese 
195  
has risen from a minority in the mid-90s to a plurality in the mid-2000s to a solid 
majority by the late 2010s. This means that, for a majority of Taiwanese, symbols of 
explicit Chinese identity hold little allure. 
Some institutions in Taiwan have nevertheless attempted to reinforce the 
connection between the Republic of China, the Chinese nation, and the island of 
Taiwan, a task made difficult for previously discussed historical reasons. In 2009, the 
Sun Yat-sen Memorial Hall published a zhuan narrative titled “The New Founder of 
Taiwan History—Chiang Wei-Shui” (Taiwan xianjian xielie—jingwei fenming 
changliu: Chiang Wei-shui xiaozhuan). Edited by Jiang Yanmei and Luo Ailing, the 
book is a hagiography of Chiang Wei-shui (1890-1931), a doctor-cum-activist who 
organized Han Taiwanese against Japanese colonial rule before succumbing to illness 
at an early age. At stages, he tried to assassinate both Yuan Shikai and the Taishō 
Emperor, pushed against the state opium monopoly in Taiwan, and later turned to 
labor organization in addition to his Taiwanese nationalist organizing. The book is 
replete with relevant photographs, illustrations, quotations, and a timeline. Before 
presenting the narrative itself, we might note the cover and back cover of the book. 
At front, an illustrated Chiang sits comfortably yet formally at a desk. He 
wears a student uniform and has taken off his cap. Behind the scene, a French map, 
labeled “Tai-Ouan ou Isle Formose” (Taiwan or the Isle of Formosa), is visible. This 
map is reproduced again on the back cover in greater detail. Visible now are the cities 
marked: Taiouan (Tainan, once referred to as Taiwan itself), Tantieu (Presumably 
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Takao or Dagou, the old name for Kaohsiung)285, and so forth. 
 
 
 
Figure 9: The front and back covers of the book in question. 
 
Harbors are marked with anchors near Tainan and the Penghu Islands 
(Pescadores/Pecheurs). This map was likely intended to be of use for French sailors in 
the general area. 
What is significant about this map on the book cover, for our purposes, is how 
it is framed and manipulated. The isle of Taiwan appears as just that: a solitary island 
dominating the scene. Bits and pieces of Fujian (presumably today’s PRC-controlled 
Pingtan County, here labelled “Pitcou-tchay”) are visible in the northwest corner, but 
 
 
285 The name of southern Taiwan’s largest city is itself emblematic of the island’s 
complicated history. The area was once called Takau by aboriginal inhabitants. Han migrants 
from Fujian and Guangdong spelled the city phonetically as 打狗, but later Japanese colonial 
authorities found the name inelegant and chose new characters to represent the phonetic 
name, 高雄 Takao. After Retrocession, the Japanese name was kept but the pronunciation in 
Mandarin did not align with Takao/Takau, and so the city is now Kaohsiung/Gaoxiong. 
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Taiwan dominates as a largely self-contained entity, the center of its own realm. 
Furthermore, the French text and styling of the map serve to present Taiwan, 
intentionally, in the light of foreign recognition. We may speculate that this choice 
serves to distance Taiwan from both China and Japan; thus, neither historical legacy 
of territorial expansion is evoked to suggest the natural belonging of the island to a 
larger political or geographic entity. The book deploys this foreign map in three 
locations. The first is the cover, with the aforementioned illustration of Chiang sitting. 
The back cover shows the Sun Yat-sen Memorial Hall superimposed over central 
Taiwan. Here the map appears in a central position in the image. The map appears in 
a third reproduction on the portrait page (as most political biographies in China begin 
with at least one portrait). For this portrait page, a mature Chiang—dressed in a 
Western suit and black cravat—is framed like a bust. His heroic image stands above a 
famous quote of his: “Countrymen must unite, unity is strength” (tongbao xu tuanjie, 
tuanjie zhen youli). 
There are two prefaces to this book. Each is provided with an accompanying 
English translation for the foreign reader. The first preface outlines the nature of the 
associated exhibit and presents a basic overview of Chiang Wei-shui. Quoting the 
rough English translation (with light editing for ease of reading), the purpose of the 
exhibition is as follows: “In order to let the people see how Taiwanese martyrs—with 
unselfish minds and dauntless spirits—defended the nation (situsimin, lit. “this land 
and this people”) and their courageous accomplishments to this end, our memorial 
hall has been holding a series of collections of the late heroes of Taiwan.” Chiang 
Wei-shui is named alongside Lee Yu-pang and Tung-Min Shieh as great historical 
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figures and “Taiwan Martyr[s]”.286 The preface continues, tying Chiang, the 
Taiwanese nationalist movement of the 1920s, and the Taiwan People’s Party and 
Sun, the Chinese Revolution, and the Guomindang: 
In 1911, Dr. Sun Yat-sen successfully led the Chinese Revolution. Chiang 
Wei-shui was inspired by Dr. Sun’s leadership and his revolutionary cause. In 
1913, Chiang Wei-shui studied at Taiwan Medical College and launched 
fundraising initiatives among the people. The first objective of the Taiwanese 
students’ revolutionary activities was to give financial support to the “Second 
Revolution”, the Anti-Yuan Campaign, and to protect the Provisional 
Constitution. The Taiwan People’s Party was established in 1927, and Chiang 
Wei-shui designed the first flag, which was blue on top, red on the bottom and 
white in the middle, and the second one, which had three stars on the up-left 
corner in blue and three-fourths of the flag in red. Both were inspired by Dr. 
Sun’s revolutionary spirit. Mr. Chiang Wei-shui submitted the outline 
according to Dr. Sun’s clause of the Principle of People’s Livelihood: each 
tiller of the soil will possess his own fields… 
Dr. Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Wei-shui were both medical doctors and 
received professional education and training. They saved the nation with 
loving kindness. Living in times of national crisis and under unequal rule in 
politics, they elevated nationalism and revolutionary spirit. Also, they built a 
body of concrete ideology and it had a great impact, inspiring the people’s 
 
 
286 Given that Chiang died of an illness presumably unrelated to his political activities, it is 
curious that he is designated a martyr. 
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thought. They both established parties and associations but passed away at the 
highest point of their lives. Dr. Sun accommodated to the world trend and 
arduously initiated the way to democracy, providing an utmost inspiration for 
Chiang Wei-shui…287 
Other commonalities are pointed out, such as the public activism of both men, their 
propensity for writing and lecturing, and social organizing. Cheng Nai-wen concludes 
by stating that Chiang is “Taiwan’s Sun Yat-sen”, noting several tributes to his name 
and thus inaugurating the exhibition. 
The second preface, titled “The New Founder of Taiwan History—Chiang 
Wei-shui”, offers another address from the exhibit’s inauguration. Here, the grandson 
of the man and CEO of the Chiang Wei-shui Cultural Foundation Chiang Chao-ken 
portrays Chiang Wei-shui as a modern-minded humanist who sought the political, 
cultural, and material development of an independent Taiwanese nation. He too 
elucidates similarities between Chiang and Sun, but notes that the two are not exactly 
similar figures: 
Researcher Huang Huang-hsiung, who was the first one that studied the 
philosophy of Chiang Wei-shui, enthroned my grandfather as Taiwan’s Sun 
Yat-sen. He believed that Chiang Wei-shui’s status was as important as Dr. 
Sun in history. Both Dr. Sun and Chiang were doctors and founded 
associations and political parties. They not only cured the sick people but also 
aimed to save the country. Influenced by Dr. Sun’s thoughts, Chiang Wei-shui 
 
 
287 Jiang Yanmei and Luo Ailing, Chiang Wei-shui, 6-7. See footnote eighty-two. 
288 Ibid., 13-14. 
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founded the Taiwan Culture Association, headed by a premier. He followed 
the same ideals that were promulgated by Dr. Sun’s Tung Meng Hui. Both 
experienced revolutionary awakening. Chiang Wei-shui also commemorated 
the second Memorial Day for Dr. Sun and delivered a speech in the Gangding 
lectures. 
There are still some differences between Dr. Sun Yat-sen and Chiang 
Wei-shui. For instance, Dr. Sun advocated revolution but Chiang preferred 
non-violent movements. Dr. Sun emphasized science, while Chiang took 
culture more seriously. Dr. Sun traveled around the world in order to get 
financial support from the overseas Chinese to overthrow the Ching 
government. Chiang Wei-shui, on the other hand, helped found the association 
that aimed to promote cultural and political improvements in Taiwan. When 
Dr. Sun passed away, Taiwanese called him the guide of the weak peoples. 
My grandfather was called the savior of the Taiwanese after his passing away. 
Moreover, all Taiwanese held memorials for him…288 
From both Chiang and Cheng’s opening addresses, both of which were 
designed to contextualize and frame the 2008 exhibition on Chiang Wei-shui at the 
SYS Memorial Hall in Taipei, we may see a clear attempt to link Chiang to Sun and 
so recast Sun to fit into a more local Taiwanese national history. In Cheng’s telling, 
this is a hierarchical teacher-student relationship, in which Chiang intentionally 
modelled his revolutionary organizations and actions after Sun’s. Indeed, Chiang 
289 Ibid., 7. 
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“read thoroughly all the Sun’s publications, he actively established newspapers, 
delivered speeches, and organized societies in order to introduce new knowledge in 
the world to promote the people to an advanced level.”289 In this framework, Chiang 
engaged in a didactic mission of political education so as to awaken the national 
consciousness of the Taiwanese against the Japanese, taking inspiration and 
knowledge from Sun’s own revolutionary experiences. This thus serves to tie together 
Taiwanese nationalism and Chinese nationalism while still appealing to a bentu 
sensibility. Sun Yat-sen, the guide of weak peoples, thus becomes an influential 
figure in Taiwanese nationalism due to his influence upon the nationalist activist 
Chiang Wei-shui. These narrative connections to Sun suggest that he retains some 
sort of political or cultural capital even as Chiang Kai-shek and the GMD are 
displaced from an increasingly bentu Taiwanese history. 
While Sun’s revolutionary organs—the Tongmenghui, the Revolutionary 
Party, the Nationalist Party, etc.—are invoked here, both speeches sidestep the 
standard Blue narrative we might expect to hear: Sun Yat-sen, leader of the Chinese 
revolution, was an inspiration to fellow Chinese in the Japanese colony of Taiwan 
like Chiang Wei-shui. Given the effort expended to tie Sun and Chiang Kai-shek 
together following the 1930s, we might expect a mention of Chiang Kai-shek in 
Sinified Taiwan, as we see in the eulogies for Chiang presented earlier in this paper. 
However, there is no such mention of the Retrocession, no mention of Chiang; the 
focus is simply on Chiang Wei-shui and Sun. This suggest an active effort on the part 
of the speakers and curators to recast the image of Sun Yat-sen to better fit into the 
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environment of bentu Taiwan, an image that avoids the baggage of the White Terror, 
GMD dictatorship, and the 228 Incident. 
Chiang’s mention of Huang Huang-hsiung is noteworthy as well. Huang’s 
book, Chiang Wei-shui: Taiwan de Sun Zhongshan (Chiang Wei-shui: Taiwan’s Sun 
Yat-sen) may be identified as a major source for this narrative. An academic history, 
Huang’s narrative expounds on Chiang’s life in far greater detail and includes an 
entire section on how Chiang was inspired by Sun, arguing that Sun Yat-sen was 
widely respected in Taiwan for his revolutionary work, his persistence, his support for 
colonized peoples in their own struggles, and his worldly vision. Huang argues that 
no one in Taiwan studied Sun and his work more diligently or faithfully than Chiang 
Wei-shui.290 He produces a telling quote of Chiang: “My ideal People’s Party needs 
to create ‘a party that can serve as a machine for the Taiwanese liberation movement.’ 
Just as the Chinese Guomindang is the machine for the Chinese liberation 
movement.”291 Of interest for us in this investigation, Huang states that during the 
martial law period, mention of Chiang was largely a taboo topic due to official 
censorship of any strain of pro-independence history. For this reason, most Taiwanese 
remained ignorant of Chiang Wei-shui. Huang notes that contemporary GMD 
discussions of Sun’s relationship with Taiwan rarely engage with the Taiwanese 
nationalist movement in any depth, but appears sympathetic to the GMD and to a 
broader sense of Chinese national identity.292 Indeed, his focus is at once local and 
 
290 Huang Huang-hsiung, Chiang Wei-shui: Taiwan de Sun Zhongshan (Taipei: China Times, 
2015), 313/2977 on the Kindle iPhone app but no actual page number. 
This is a reissue; the first edition was published in 2006. 
291 Ibid., 317-318. 
292 Ibid., 294/2977. 
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highly Sinocentric: Chiang Wei-shui is portrayed as a local hero and as a real salt-of- 
the-earth guy, but with a firm sense of Chinese identity on some level, if not 
necessarily political. Regardless of Huang’s personal politics, he writes that by 
studying Sun’s relationship with this movement, we may see a far more significant 
influence of Sun on broader Taiwanese society than the mere details of where he 
happened to stay or whom he happened to see during his few visits to the island. 
Huang’s study of Chiang emphasizes that Chiang had a Taiwanese 
consciousness and believed that the Chinese liberation movement and the Taiwanese 
liberation movement were not the same. However, the Memorial Hall zhuan itself 
reinforces Chiang’s Han identity, and thus his identification with a broader Chinese 
nation. The first section on Chiang’s early life emphasizes that, “In 1891, Chiang 
Wei-shui, zi name Xuegu and ancestral home in Zhangzhou, Fujian, was born in 
Yilan.” His father, after learning of the Chinese loss of Taiwan to Japan in the Treaty 
of Shimonoseki, resolved that his son would not receive a “colonial education”.293 
Therefore, he studied under the traditional teacher Zhang Jingguang until he was 18, 
when he transferred to public school and graduated in two years. Zhang is credited 
with instilling a deep sense of “national consciousness” into his pupil. Following this, 
he “walked the fishing road” (a country road along the coast, presumably) to Taipei to 
sit for the entrance exam to the Governor-General Medicine School, scoring first. 
“Then he started to receive a modern medical education, to make friends with like- 
minded souls. He received the baptism of new education and thus awakened his 
 
 
 
293 Jiang and Luo, Chiang Wei-shui, 16-17. 
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national consciousness, catching a ‘political fever….’”294 Chiang’s early life is 
framed so as to emphasize his identification with a certain minzu yishi, a national 
consciousness that is not explicitly named as Taiwanese nationalism or as Chinese 
consciousness. However, Chiang’s Han identity is reinforced through his traditional 
names, the naming of his ancestral home of Zhangzhou, and his education under a 
traditional Chinese teacher as opposed to Japanese colonial education. His native 
Taiwanese locality also appears prominently in the narrative, which depicts Chiang as 
a humble boy from Yilan who walked to Taipei by foot, earnestly seeking greater 
opportunity. 
As the zhuan continues, interspersed with quotes and pictures, Chiang suffers 
under the “intense oppression” of the Japanese colonial government until 1911： 
Under these severe laws and controls, which bound the thought and personal 
freedom of all Taiwanese, a thought movement, a yearning to break from 
bondage, surged forth ceaselessly. In 1911, the success of the Chinese 
revolution led by Sun Yat-sen made these outstanding medical students all 
undergo magnificent awakenings of national consciousness. Of these, Chiang 
Wei-shui’s practical competence was the fiercest.295 
Using his practical competence, Chiang organized his compatriots and donated funds 
to help the Guomindang fight the Second Revolution against Yuan Shikai. Beyond 
 
294 Ibid., 17. 
295 Ibid., 19. The original text is: “在這些嚴刑峻法的控制下，捆綁了台灣人民的思想及人
身自由，因此極欲掙脫束縛的思潮也翻騰不已，1911 年孫中山所領導的中國革命成功
，使得這群優秀的醫學校學生們激發出民族意識，其中又以蔣渭水的具體實踐能量最爲
强烈。” 
205  
this, Chiang was supposedly even involved in plans to assassinate Yuan and the 
Emperor Taishō of Japan with bacterial weapons. Chiang Chao-ken’s subsequent 
emphasis on his grandfather’s peaceful methods and local focus is striking, given that 
the zhuan itself goes to length to illustrate the young Chiang’s more radical 
involvement in the long Chinese Revolution and his seemingly strong identification 
with Chinese causes and culture—or, in the case of the anti-Taishō plot, his violent 
anti-Japanese activities. 
However, Chiang and Ai intersperse the exhibition narrative with quotes that 
show Chiang to be a Taiwanese patriot first. One such quotation, which immediately 
follows the brief noting of Chiang’s revolutionary plots to kill Yuan and the Taishō 
Emperor, Chiang declares that “Countrymen! Taiwan is our Taiwan, Taiwanese 
society is our society. We can not put aside responsibility here. Taiwan’s excellence 
is our excellence, Taiwanese society’s upward benefits are also our benefits.”296 
As the narrative continues, Chiang is further tied to Sun. Reflecting on his 
dissatisfaction with his personal life despite his apparent success as a doctor and a 
businessman, Chiang finds inspiration in Sun’s writings: 
I’m acquainted with many and met not a few people, but what Dr. Sun Yat- 
sen once said, “If I met only one who knew me, then I’d have no regrets,” 
really, he hit the mark! After five years of working, ordinary friends for 
private matters—so-called “booze buddies”—are not lacking, but comrades in 
 
 
296 Ibid., 21. The original text is: “同胞呵！台灣是我們的台灣，台灣的社會是我們的社
會，是不是袖手旁觀放棄責任的。台灣的裏還是我們的厲害，台灣社會向上的福利， 
也就是我們的福利。” 
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the public sphere are entirely so. This means I have no choice but to wait, to 
hide my intent and bide my time. After I’ve been in business for ten years, I 
believe I’ll find the life I led in the first five and the life I led in the second 
five will be drastically different. In other words, the me of the first five years 
may have led a life without any significance, but the me of the second five 
years will have led a significant life indeed.297 
Aside from his personal admiration for Sun, Chiang is also framed here as being an 
active student of Sun’s formal political work. If his early attempts at fundraising and 
assassination may be considered his first entry, Chiang’s return to sustained political 
activity from the private sector is presaged by mention of the publication of Sun’s 
texts. Indeed, the authors state that Chiang devoured and digested the Sun Wen 
xueshuo (Speeches of Sun Yat-sen) and Minquan chubu (First Steps of Democracy) 
completely.298 Following this, the reader is presented with a narrative of Chiang’s 
organization of the Taiwanese volunteer movement against the GGT and against the 
institutions of colonialism in Taiwan. This organization involved meetings, lectures, 
and mass action like hiring a private plane to drop flyers over Tokyo. In the latter 
move, Chiang and his comrades were protesting the lack of Diet-representation for or 
even Diet-control over Taiwan—the Governor-General of Taiwan, an appointed 
position, was authorized to act with an unconstitutional level of autonomy (termed 
 
 
297 Ibid., 23. The original text is: “相識滿天下，知心能幾人，孫中山先生說：“得一知己
可以無憾“實在不錯呀！開業五年間，私情上普通朋友，所謂酒肉朋友，卻是不少，而  公
務上的同志則全無，使我不得不隱忍待時，韜晦過日，我的開業已過十年間，前的五
年間的我的生活，和後的五年間的我的生活，大有差別。換句話説，前五年的我， 是
做了無意義的生活，后五年的我，是做了有意義的生活。” 
298 Ibid., 25. 
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ritsurei) due to the shrewd politicking of Itō Hirobumi back in the late Meiji era.299 
 
Solidifying narrative connections between the two figures, Chiang is credited 
with working to raise the cultural, political, and spiritual levels of the Taiwanese 
through the Taiwan Culture Association and through such publications as the Taiwan 
Minbao. The name of the newspaper makes explicit reference to the Minbao 
published by Sun’s Tongmenghui in Tokyo before the Xinhai Revolution. After 
factional strife resulted in the disintegration of the TCA, Chiang is credited with 
reorganizing some of its members into new groups like the Taiwan People’s Party, 
the Taiwan Tongmenghui, and others so as to pursue a more active pressure campaign 
on the GGT. 300 By this point, of course, Chiang’s political trajectory was quite 
different than Sun’s. Chiang and his organizations pressured the GGT for institutional 
reforms, such as bringing in League of Nations inspectors to force Japanese 
authorities to revise their opium laws.301 Sun, as described in the introduction, had 
abandoned reform efforts after the failure of the Qing in the Sino-French War of 
1884. To clarify, this means that Chiang saw the possibility and desirability of greater 
Taiwanese autonomy within the Japanese imperial framework, while Sun saw no 
possibility for Chinese national revival within the Qing imperial framework. 
Chiang’s domestic relationships seem to also evoke those of Sun in this 
narrative. Chiang, like Sun, entered a traditional arranged marriage at a young age, 
 
299 Fraser, 96. 
300 Jiang and Luo, Chiang Wei-shui, 35. 
301 Opium was legal in Japanese Taiwan, but was controlled by a government monopoly that 
restricted purchases to registered addicts. Purchasable amounts were to decrease over time, 
with the goal of weaning addicts off opium while profiting off opium sales. Chiang and his 
compatriots were opposed to the GGT’s issuance of the special permits that legalized opium 
sales under this system. 
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although Chiang’s match was arranged much earlier than Sun’s marriage with Lu 
Muzhen—Chiang Wei-shui was only 4 years old when he and Shi You were 
paired.302 Like Lu Muzhen in Jiang Xingde’s zhuan, Shi You is a fine wife and 
mother, “an honest, hard-working woman who supported him behind the scenes after 
their marriage so that he had no worries for home. She bore him four children: 
Songhui, Songming, Shiqian, Shiying.”303 Nonetheless, Chiang, was to meet a 
revolutionary partner down the line, much as Sun’s elopement with Song Qingling 
was described in Jiang’s zhuan. Through the youth group of the Taiwan Cultural 
Association, Chiang met Chen Tian, the only woman in the youth group. “Sweet as 
her name”, Chen and Chiang were meant to be: 
Chen Tian lived up to her name, bright and clever, sweet and beautiful, 
accommodating and considerate; she was not only Chiang Wei-shui’s 
revolutionary partner, but was also his soulmate, often accompanying him and 
helping to carry out social movements and lecture tours. In September of 
1927, Chen Tian spoke at the Mongka lectures…and frequently delivered him 
letters, clothing, books, and other odd things sent from his comrades after 
Chiang was imprisoned following the Zhijing Incident… 
When Chiang died, Chen was only 32 years old. Watching her dearly 
beloved fall ill and pass away, Chen was thrust deep into despair for a time. 
She went up to the Ciyun Monastery on the banks of the Tamsui River and 
devoted herself to clean eating and pious living. After this, her only company 
 
 
302 Ibid., 42. 
303 Ibid. 
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would be plain lanterns, wooden fish, and Sanskrit songs.304 
 
While differences between the two figures abound, the narrative of the exhibition 
suggests their commonalities and deep linkage. 
By the end of Chiang’s life, the Japanese authorities had outlawed the Taiwan 
People’s Party and injured Chiang in a crackdown. He continued to deliver speeches 
and worked to agitate the workers, peasants, and urban proletariat politically but did 
not again organize a formal political organization. He died of typhoid at age 41 in 
August of 1932. His former comrades organized a funeral for him, modelled on Sun 
Yat-sen’s 1929 funeral procession as befitting “Taiwan’s Sun Yat-sen”.305 However, 
ground burials were illegal under Japanese administration, and so the procession, 
comprised of supporters from all aspects of his political activities and private citizens, 
ended at the Banqiao Crematorium. No grand memorial was built for his ashes. 
The book ends with a reflection on Chiang’s legacy. Noting with approval 
Taiwan’s peaceful transition to democracy, the editors state that Chiang’s great gifts 
to the Taiwanese were his “Taiwanese spirit”, his advancement of bentuhua, and his 
 
 
 
 
304 Ibid., 43. 
Note: The “Tian” in Chen Tian’s name is the character 甜 , meaning sweet. The original text 
is:    “陳甜人如其名，靈慧甜美，處事圓融、設想周到，不但是蔣渭水的革命夥伴，也是心
靈伴侶，經常陪伴著蔣渭水從事社會運動及講演活動，在當時他也可以獨自上臺演説宣
傳理念。1927 年 9 月，陳甜在參加艋舺的講演會後亦遭檢肅。蔣渭水因治警事件被關在
牢裏的時候，陳甜常寫信給他，也經常給他寄些衣物、書籍、甚至業績寫其他同志的東
西，這些都是蔣渭水在獄中最大的精神安慰。蔣渭水去世時陳甜才 32 嵗，深愛的人乍
然病逝，是他頓時萬念俱灰，她到淡水河邊的慈雲寺修行吃齊，從此伴隨她的只是青燈
、木魚和梵歌。” 
305 This appellation is often used by the historian Huang Huang-hsiung, and is perhaps a 
response to DPP usages of Guomindang de Sun Zhongshan (the GMD’s Sun Yat-sen). 
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project of cultural revivalism.306 We may wonder if it is appropriate to credit Chiang 
with holding a bentu sensibility, given the term’s association with post-CKS Taiwan, 
but a detailed assessment of Chiang’s cultural works and beliefs is outside the scope 
of this study. We may simply note that a memorial park in Taipei, a highway linking 
Taipei and Yilan, and other memorials in the name of Chiang are listed before the 
book concludes with a caption: “Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Wei-shui, forever in our 
hearts” (yongyuan liucun zai women xinzhong de Sun Zhongshan yu Jiang 
Weishui).307 
Key to the narrative of Chiang Wei-shui as “the new founder of Taiwan 
history” is his social activism, political organizing, and modern nationalist 
consciousness. In illustrating Chiang as such a man while also casting him as a 
disciple of Sun,308 Sun Yat-sen himself is recast as a modern anti-imperialist 
nationalist and activist. This aspect of Sun’s legacy is emphasized beyond all else. 
While this is a prominent theme in Sun’s legacy, highlighted notably in post-reform 
CCP narratives of Sun, this image of Sun sidesteps his identity as guofu. Moreover, 
this image avoids recognizing Sun’s links to the historical baggage of Taiwan’s 
unique history by minimizing his connection to the GMD, presumably to keep Sun 
attractive in light of GMD violence and the growing strength of bentu identity in 
Taiwan. Indeed, by emphasizing Chiang’s connections to Sun through rough parallels 
in life experience and Chiang’s identity as a distant student, Sun Yat-sen is brought 
 
 
 
306 Ibid., 56. 
307 Ibid., 58. 
308 Chiang himself clearly cast himself as a student of Sun, and so the editors are not pulling 
any tricks in this comparison. 
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into the pantheon of bentu Taiwanese nationalism, if somewhat indirectly. That such 
maneuvering is possible suggests the weakening position of Sun as guofu in an 
increasingly de-Sinified Taiwan, together with the weakening of such political idols 
as Chiang Kai-shek. While Chiang’s connections and rough equality to Sun were key 
to his own political image, as seen earlier, Chiang’s image has been undermined by 
Green memories of the White Terror and of the GMD as a foreign dictatorship 
imposed upon Taiwan by force of arms. To shore up Sun’s position in such a climate 
means that reliance upon Chiang and the continued existence of the ROC on Taiwan 
is not enough; Sun was thus removed from the state and the nation and recast in an 
earlier mold, the mold of the worldly, learned, and passionate doctor-cum- 
revolutionary fighting for nationalism, democracy, and the people’s welfare through 
Chiang Wei-shui. This effort is seemingly motivated more by a desire to save Sun 
from the dangers of a changing historical climate, itself presumably more motivated 
by the great political and cultural capital of Sun Yat-sen, the world-famous 
revolutionary and idealist, than by the reality of Sun’s ties with Chiang. While Chiang 
was plainly influenced by Sun, they never met or corresponded. Moreover, Chiang is 
not notable enough of a figure to fully subsume Sun at this time, and so the impetus to 
place Sun within Chiang’s narrative reflects the importance and imperiled position of 
Sun’s own place in Taiwanese society. 
We might also consider that Chiang’s life is perhaps not so neat as the 
exhibition narrative would suggest. Through the Jiang-Luo book, we see signs of 
Chiang’s increasingly leftward lurch in his mobilization of workers, his focus on the 
urban proletariat, and his attempts at labor organizing, a lurch that historian Chao 
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Hsun-ta argues differentiates him from the “reformism” of the Three People’s 
Principles and Sun Yat-sen.309 Chao states that Chiang shifted to favor class conflict, 
while Sun insisted that the classes of a “weak nation” must band together 
harmoniously to oppose oppressor nations as a single national force, a shift that 
illustrates Chiang was more radical than Sun. We might also consider that Chiang 
himself saw Taiwan as a unique entity, Taiwanese being “Japanese citizens of the 
Chinese nation” with a unique positionality conducive for understanding both sides 
and bringing about peace in Asia.310 This substantiates Chiang as a far different 
thinker than Sun, unless we are to buy into Wang Jingwei’s account of the Asian Sun. 
Even if we did, we might note that by situating the Taiwanese as a mediator at the 
crossroads of East Asia, Chiang carved out a unique place for Taiwan in the world, 
one that recognized both its Chinese and Japanese identities (but still largely ignored 
any notion of a bentu Taiwanese identity). This Pan-Asianist lurch is not present in 
either the Pictorial History narrative of Chiang, the Chinese patriot from Taiwan, or 
the Greenish narrative of Chiang, the Taiwanese patriot who studied and admired the 
revolutionary nationalist Sun Yat-sen. However, this is not Huang Huang-hsiung’s 
interpretation of Chiang, but this rather emerges unmistakably from Chiang’s own 
article in a commemorative fifth-anniversary edition of the Taiwan Minbao. 
Seeing this, we might think of Sun’s own leftward lurch at the end of his life, 
 
 
 
309 Chao Hsun-ta, “Chiang Wei Shui’s Left-leaning Approach (1930-1931) : On the Influence 
of ‘The Third Stage of Capitalism’ by the Communism International to Chiang,” (Chiang 
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310 Huang Huang-hsiung, “From “Discovering Chiang Wei-shui” to “Protecting Chiang Wei- 
shui” (Cong ‘faxian Chiang Wei-shui’ dao ‘shouhu Chiang Wei-shui’), 
Hanxueyanjiutongxun, 36：1（ 141）2-2017, 7-8. 
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his own ambiguous Pan-Asianist sentiments, and the controversy that the two 
engendered and still engender. Much as Chiang Wei-shui was suppressed by the 
Japanese and the GMD for his dissenting views on Taiwan’s destiny, many aspects of 
Sun’s life are suppressed in the images displayed in this paper. Chiang Kai-shek 
erased Sun’s ties to the Communists, the Communists downplayed Sun’s own erratic 
politics and schmoozing with imperialists. Now, we see here that the Greenish Sun is 
suspiciously washed of his bluer hues, and that both the exhibition narrative and the 
earlier mentioned Pictorial History ignore Chiang Wei-shui’s own socialist activities, 
preference for working gradually within the Japanese imperial system (yet violent 
opposition to Japanese rule), and his own unique conception of Taiwan as the land 
between two great empires. These aspects of Sun’s and Chiang’s lives are suppressed 
because the complexities they pose undermine convenient narratives that serve to 
legitimate existing power structures. In considering any portrait, we ought to consider 
why it was painted and how the painter recasts reality. 
v: Conclusion 
 
Although Taiwan remains the Republic of China in name, much about its 
political circumstances have been transformed in the last seventy years. This has 
meant that, to keep Sun Yat-sen relevant, bodies and individuals with the desire to do 
so like the SYS Memorial Hall have shifted from relying upon reinforcing Sun’s 
status as the Father of the Nation, given the GMD and the ROC’s declining relevance 
to Taiwanese identity, to recasting Sun as a scrappy revolutionary leader who inspired 
the Taiwanese nationalist movement of the 1920s. The shift at once distances 
contemporary Taiwanese nationalism, which is relatively kind to the Japanese 
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colonial period, from the Taiwanese nationalist movement of the colonial period. 
Furthermore, by recasting Sun as a great revolutionary indirectly responsible for 
Taiwanese revolutionary activity and by dropping the reliance upon such mantles as 
the Father of the Nation, the authors of the book insulate Sun from the volatile 
fortunes of the GMD, the political baggage of years of association with the Chiang 
Kai-shek personality cult and the martial law abuses of the GMD, and the uncertain 
future of the ROC mantle. The aim seems to be that even if Taiwan was tomorrow 
declared independent and the Blue Sky, White Sun, Red Earth hung only in museums, 
Sun would have a significant place in the history of this new Taiwan, if not as its 
pater patriae. 
This desire to preserve and protect Sun’s legacy in Taiwan presumably stems 
from Sun’s immense political and cultural capital, but also from people’s own 
Chinese identity. Having been hailed as the Father of the Nation, as an anti- 
imperialist revolutionary, as the guide of the weak and the Father of Chinese 
Democracy, Sun weighs heavily upon the historical landscape of Chinese cultural 
zones. Plainly, the SYS Memorial Hall has a vested interested in defending the legacy 
of Sun, but even private citizens like Li Qiyu have martyred themselves (in his case, 
quite literally) to protect Sun’s legacy and ties to Taiwanese society. We might 
speculate that when Mr. Li set out for Kaohsiung with a knife in hand, he was not 
simply defending the honor of a man he never met. Rather, he was defending the very 
symbol of his own Chinese identity, the esteemed father of his professed nation, from 
the onslaught of a Taiwanese bentu cultural revolution that esteems Japanese 
colonialism and Taiwanese parochialism, and, more significantly, that would deny 
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him his own heritage as a son of the Yellow Emperor and a soldier of the Chinese 
revival. Of course, this is only speculation, and dead men tell no tales. Nonetheless, 
we will continue considering the place of heritage, threats to cultural continuity, and 
divergent histories further in the next chapter, which will consider the place of Sun 
Yat-sen among Chinese communities in two overseas locales: Hawaii and Malaysia. 
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IV 
 
SANDALWOOD & BETEL NUTS: SUN YAT-SEN IN HAWAII & PENANG 
 
Amidst a changing world and the advancement of sciences, people recognize 
even more the legitimate values of Confucianism when seeking a solution to 
modern social problems. 
—Dedication of a Confucius statue on Trinity Street in Hartford, CT 
 
i: Introduction 
 
We have spent much time considering the figure of Sun Yat-sen and his usage 
by state actors in China, and by less directly-associated bodies in the liminal space of 
Taiwan. We now shift to non-state narratives of Sun from non-Chinese spaces to 
explore new perspectives on Sun. In the following chapter I will briefly explore the 
local histories of Hawaii and Penang to probe how Sun is defined among two distinct 
overseas Chinese communities. Such spaces, beyond the control of the Chinese state 
and yet subject to Chinese state politics, offer a distinctive context for understanding 
the factors at play in the representation of Sun Yat-sen. Sun is defined to fit neatly 
with local political values; therefore, how Sun is remembered says something about 
how local Chinese relate to the larger local society. 
My sketches of each location are provisional. I had the opportunity to visit 
Honolulu and do some preliminary research on the ground there, and so am better 
acquainted with Sun’s Hawaiian afterlife. In Hawaii, the book Sun Yat-sen in 
Hawaii—written by Yansheng Ma Lum and Raymond Mun Kong Lum—evinces an 
attempt to frame Sun as a son of Hawaiian soil, a kamaaina.311 The commemorative 
 
311 A kamaaina is a local Hawaiian, but not necessarily an ethnic Hawaiian, for which the 
term would be kanaka. 
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book tells the story of Sun’s time in Hawaii and provides details on his revolutionary 
associates there, largely Revive China Society and Tongmenghui members. 
Throughout their book, Lum and Lum simultaneously raise the stature of the 
Hawaiians in Chinese history and the Chinese in Hawaiian history. They present the 
people of Hawaii as fully behind Sun and his mission, thus magnifying the aura of his 
aspiration for a democratic Chinese republic. Sun’s Chinese republic also evinces a 
Hawaiian Chinese attempt to illustrate Chinese modernity and democratic modernity, 
thus dignifying the identity of the Chinese in the United States in the terms of the 
local political environment. Differing particulars in Sun statuary, however, betray a 
more complex field of actors involved in remembering, presenting, and defining Sun, 
such as the Sun Yat-sen Hawaii Foundation, the Sun Yat-sen Foundation for Peace 
and Education, and city governments in the US, the PRC, and the ROC. In discussing 
Sun’s Hawaiian afterlife specifically, the introductions to the Lum and Lum book 
serve well to illustrate this point. I also refer to demographic trends in Hawaii, though 
only cursorily, to better situate Sun remembrance in the context of greater Hawaiian 
society, a society quite different from Chinese and Taiwanese societies. 
For the purpose of comparison, I also bring in the Malaysian state of Penang 
as another example of how Sun’s heroic image is shaped in overseas communities. In 
discussing Penang, Khoo Salma Nasution’s book Sun Yat Sen in Penang may serve to 
illustrate one aspect of his Malaysian fate. Khoo illustrates Sun’s relatively transient 
connection to the city but also the distinctive place of the Chinese in Penang and in 
broader Malaysian society when placed in conversation with Lum and Lum’s Sun 
Yat-sen in Hawaii. She emphasizes division among Chinese in the Straits and framing 
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Sun’s time there as a time of adversity with the intense support of a few. In this 
fashion, Khoo plays up the revolutionary nature of Sun’s struggle, the charity and 
foresight of his Penang supporters, and the often-difficult lives of emigrant Chinese in 
the Straits. Khoo also touches upon the role of place in commemoration with explicit 
discussion of 120 Armenian Street, the former headquarters of the Nanyang 
Tongmenghui, and the place of Sun Yat-sen in differing political agenda by the 
book’s end. 
We should not only think of local histories when considering the “place” of 
overseas Chinese in Hawaii and Malaysia. Because their positions were globally 
inflected, we should also consider how Chinese governments and organizations, from 
the Qing, the Tongmenghui, and Baohuanghui to the ROC, PRC, and Taiwanese 
independence crowd used and use the overseas Chinese in their own agendas. Beyond 
this, we must also consider how the Chinese populations in these locales have adapted 
to their environs, what Sun Yat-sen means in these extranational spaces, and why he 
is remembered. In Hawaii, Sun remembrance appears to serve to reinforce a local 
Hawaiian identity. Hawaii appears as a nation with a unique history, distinct from the 
rest of the United States, and Sun remembrance there reflects the contestation of 
loyalty by the ROC and PRC governments as well as the shifting place of Hawaii in 
the world and, later, Chinese in American society. In Penang, where the Chinese 
population has been subsumed into Malaysia unlike the Chinese of independent 
Singapore, remembering Sun offers an opportunity to remember the glory days of 
freeport Penang, a jewel of the Straits and the pivotal, if underappreciated, role it 
played in both Chinese and world history. By remembering Sun’s time there, Khoo 
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raises the stature of the Nanyang among Chinese spaces and the place of Penang in 
broader Chinese history. We also see in both Honolulu and Penang that Sun’s 
political afterlives are not only subject to Chinese in China and abroad, but also to the 
broader non-Chinese world with which these communities necessarily interact. 
I will use overseas Chinese to mean ethnic Chinese living outside of China, 
and use both terms more or less interchangeably. I am aware that some authors, such 
as Leo Suryadinata find the usage of “overseas Chinese” problematic for it 
presupposes that ethnic Chinese are a homogenous entity loyal to a Chinese state— 
today the PRC—and so invokes “yellow peril” politics to stoke prejudice against 
ethnic Chinese in other nations.312 However, this chapter, in part, touches upon 
Chinese state attempts to connect with ethnic Chinese abroad through the figure of 
Sun Yat-sen, and so I find using “overseas Chinese” appropriate in this context. 
ii: A Brief History of Hawaii and the Hawaiian Chinese 
 
The Hawaiian Islands, forming a volcanic archipelago in the Mid-Pacific, 
were first settled by Polynesian sailors in the first millennium of the common era. The 
islands would remain isolated until growing maritime trade networks led to their 
integration within trans-Pacific trade routes and maritime industries. The islands 
became known to the Western world following the arrival of explorer James Cook in 
1778 off the shore of Oahu.313 He and his crew returned the following year to further 
 
 
312 Leo Suryadinata, “Ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia”, Ethnic Chinese as Southeast Asians, 
ed. Leo Suryadinata (NY: St. Martin’s Press, 1997), 3-5. 
313 The following history comes largely from a textbook used in the Territory of Hawaii in the 
late 1920s. Though dated, I believe it is a useful resource for understanding the basic history 
of Hawaii till that point and the official narrative surrounding the Territory’s annexation. 
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chart the islands, but Cook would be killed by his former hosts in the domain of 
Kalaniopuu following a scuffle. Kalaniopuu, one of several powerful chiefs in the 
islands, ruled the isle of Hawaii. His domain was split following his death. His 
nephew, Kamehameha I, waged war to unify the island of Hawaii. Following his 
success in 1792, he invaded eastern Maui. Kamehameha I would eventually extend 
the control of his domain over the islands of Maui, Oahu, and Molokai and declare 
himself King of Hawaii. Kauai and its dependent Niihau swore fealty as autonomous 
islands within the Kingdom of Hawaii in 1810.314 
During the five-king Kamehameha dynasty, foreign interests in the Hawaiian 
Islands increased as the islands grew in economic and strategic importance. First, the 
islands were a useful waystation in the trans-Pacific fur trade. They emerged soon 
after as a valuable source of sandalwood.315 Following the mid-19th century collapse 
of the sandalwood trade, Hawaii relied upon its position as a waystation. Trans- 
Pacific fur trader and whalers—having significantly depleted Atlantic whale stocks— 
frequently called upon on the islands. The city of Honolulu on Oahu in particular 
emerged as a valuable resupply base with a good harbor. American, British, French, 
Russian, and Japanese interests in the islands were significant by the late 19th century. 
Aside from this, rising sugar, coffee, potato, and rice industries on the islands were 
fueled by American expansion to the Pacific coast of North America. Population 
booms in California and Oregon fed demand for Hawaiian sugar and potatoes, which 
 
 
 
Ralph S. Kuykendall, A History of Hawaii: Prepared under the Direction of the Historical 
Commission of the Territory of Hawaii (NY: MacMillan, 1928). 
314 Ibid., 93. 
315 Ibid., 116. 
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became important exports after the whaling frenzy of the 1840s subsided by the 
1860s. Pineapples and bananas became important cash crops for largely foreign-born 
plantation owners by the end of the nineteenth century. American interests in the 
islands, firmly entrenched since the days of the sandalwood trade, led to the islands’ 
annexation in 1898.316 
In 1893, the monarchy of Hawaii, having passed out of the hands of the 
Kamehamas and into those of the Kalakaua dynasty, was overthrown by Sanford B. 
Dole and his league of American-friendly republicans.317 After annexation as a 
territory in 1898, Hawaii grew significantly. Hawaiian plantations grew in size and 
scale, the most notable being the Dole Plantations of Sanford B. Dole, the first 
President of the Republic and the first Territorial Governor of Hawaii. The University 
of Hawaii-Manoa was founded in 1908 as part of the development of the islands into 
a modern colony and the Pearl River Lagoon was developed into Pearl Harbor, a 
critically important naval base for the US Pacific Fleet. Japanese attacks on Pearl 
Harbor were an integral part of the broader escalation of the Pacific War on 
December 7th, 1941, as Hawaii was the key staging ground of the US Pacific Fleet. 
Hawaii was admitted as a state in March of 1959, several months after the admission 
 
 
 
 
316 Ibid., 125-126. 
317 The republicans were largely wealthy business owners who sought the annexation of 
Hawaii into the United States. This was not the first time the islands had flirted with 
annexation. In 1854, Kamehameha III purportedly also submitted a request for the immediate 
annexation of the Kingdom of Hawaii by the USA as a full-fledged state following pressure 
from businessmen on the islands and threats from American filibusters.317 However, Dole and 
his crew administered Hawaii as a republic for five years before the islands were admitted to 
the United States as the Territory of Hawaii, not as a state. The deposition of Queen 
Liliuokalani and the native monarchy is still a matter of historical grievance among some 
Hawaiians. 
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of Alaska. 
 
Given Hawaii’s history as an isolated archipelago of Polynesian kingdoms and 
chiefdoms, Hawaii’s population was unsurprisingly different from that of the 
continental United States. The native population of Hawaiians had shrunk in the late 
18th century due to exposure to unfamiliar diseases resulting from contact with 
Europeans. Nonetheless, native Hawaiians still comprise a significant portion of the 
population.318 Aside from native Hawaiians, there are other Polynesian peoples, such 
as South Seas islanders brought to Hawaii to supplement the dwindling population of 
native Hawaiians during the reign of Kamehama IV.319 Today, there are also many 
Micronesians from the US protectorates of Palau, Micronesia, and Tonga. 
Aside from Polynesians and Micronesians, Hawaii has a significant 
population of Chinese. Many Chinese came to labor on Hawaiian plantations during 
the mid-nineteenth century, though many had come as independent farmers and 
traders before the rise of commercial sugar plantations.320 Though Chinese 
businessmen and farmers had pioneered sugar farming on the islands, it was primarily 
American businessman who benefited from the rapid settlement of California and the 
Great Mahele land reforms in Hawaii.321 Just as on the American mainland, the influx 
 
318 The exact bloodline that constitutes Native Hawaiian identity is limited to “full-blooded” 
from “half-blooded.” Though not the focus of this paper, J. Kehaulani Kauanui’s Hawaiian 
Blood addresses the blood-count definition of Hawaiian identity as codified in the Hawaiian 
Homes Commission Act of 1921. 
319 Kuykendall, 217. 
320 Clarence Glick, Sojourners and Settlers: Chinese Migrants in Hawaii, (University of 
Hawaii Press, 1980), 23. 
Glick estimates that two-thirds to three-fourths of some 46,000 pre-annexation Chinese 
immigrants came to work on sugar or rice plantations, but notes many did not stay in this line 
of work for long. 
321 Ibid. 
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of Chinese into Hawaii led to the growth of anti-Chinese sentiment, particularly 
among white Hawaiians and visitors.322 Following the annexation of Hawaii in 1898, 
the provisions of the Immigration Act of 1882 and the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 
were also valid and enforceable in the Territory, hampering the movement of 
indentured labor and Chinese more generally to the islands. Sun Yat-sen himself had 
to procure a fake Hawaiian birth certificate to enter Hawaii following annexation.323 
Clarence Glick notes that fewer Chinese were coming entered to work on the 
plantations. More migrants moved into business for themselves and thus constituted 
competition for the Anglo-American business elite of Hawaii. However, the growing 
plantations still required cheap labor and so Japanese and Filipino (the Philippines 
having been taken from Spain and made into a US colony following the 1898 
Spanish-American War) migration came to replace Chinese migration. These groups 
together largely displaced native Hawaiian labor as the chief sources of labor on the 
islands. Portuguese and Germans were also solicited to work on these plantations. 
While many white (a vague and changing term) immigrants had come to the islands 
for missionary or commercial purposes in the era of the Hawaiian Kingdom, many 
more came after the coup of 1893 and the annexation of 1898. The establishment of 
the Naval Station at Pearl Harbor, the Territorial Government in Honolulu, and the 
University in Honolulu drew many white and black American mainlanders to Oahu in 
particular. 
While my focus in this section is on how Sun Yat-sen is presented and 
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remembered among the overseas Chinese in Hawaii amidst its shifting demography, 
properly presenting this requires more context for the Chinese presence in Hawaii and 
trends among the population there. As stated above, Chinese first came to Hawaii as 
lascars, sailors, and passengers aboard Western ships in the late eighteenth century, 
but mass migration from China to Hawaii did not occur till the mid-nineteenth 
century. As mentioned above, Chinese migrants to Hawaii came for differing reasons, 
but regardless of their profession, they came largely as single men. Some of these 
men would return to China, others would settle down in Hawaii, but many went back 
and forth. As Hawaii’s Chinese population was largely male, Hawaiian Chinese 
generally married native Hawaiian women or went home to find a Chinese bride.324 
Their wives and children sometimes followed their husbands to the Islands; others 
stayed in the ancestral village. Those who brought wives and family to Hawaii or 
married there tended to invest there and establish deeper roots than those sojourners, 
who kept family at home and invested back in China.325 
Most Hawaiian Chinese of the Kingdom era hailed from Guangdong, and 
Xiangshan County in particular. This was largely because ships from Canton to 
Honolulu stopped at Macao first, a stone’s throw from Xiangshan.326 Xiangshan was 
not a rich place, and many apparently felt the need or ambition to try their luck 
overseas. One such Xiangshannese was Sun Mei, the elder brother of Sun Yat-sen. 
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This shared identity as Cantonese and Xiangshanese meant that many in Hawaii 
supported Sun and his Guangdong government following the failed Second 
Revolution. Even so, many other Hawaiian Chinese supported Yuan and dismissed 
the GMD as troublemakers.327 
Returning to the migrant experience, the story of Sun Mei and Sun Yat-sen 
itself reflects several facts about migration between China and Hawaii. First, it 
underscores economic motivations behind migration. Had Sun Mei been comfortable 
at home, he most likely would have had little reason to move. Second, it underscores 
the importance of family and social networks in migration. Sun Yat-sen followed his 
brother Sun Mei to Honolulu to work at his store, subsequently following him to his 
ranch on Maui. Sun Mei also helped to import Chinese laborers from Xiangshan to 
Hawaii to work on plantations and ranches. Those who knew and trusted Sun Mei 
might evidently turn to him in securing work or recommend his services to those they 
knew. 
In the early generations, Chinese who went to Hawaii generally worked lowly 
jobs on plantations. At this early juncture, distinctions between Punti (bendi, or 
Cantonese natives) and Hakka (kejia, or “guest households” who came to Guangdong 
in the eleventh century) were observed and reinforced in Hawaiian Chinese 
associations and networks. Later, many Hawaiian Chinese worked as merchants, and 
by the mid-twentieth century, many Hawaiian Chinese became professionals or 
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businesspeople.328 However, over the course of the period Hawaiian Chinese had 
grown increasingly cut off from China following the enforcement of Chinese 
exclusion starting in 1898, culminating in a near-total breaking of ties after the 
establishment of the PRC in 1949. Hawaiian Chinese had organized themselves into 
native place associations or huiguan, largely representing their home districts in 
Xiangshan or other counties in Guangdong. Many sent remittances back home. Some 
even returned home to conduct business, take up office, or carry out charitable 
initiatives like the building of roads or temples.329 Following the establishment of the 
PRC, Americans could not travel to the Chinese mainland and Chinese could not 
travel to the United States or its territories, thus breaking the link between Xiangshan, 
Guangdong, and Hawaii. Following the isolation from their families back in 
Guangdong and general intermarriage of Hawaiian Punti, Hawaiian Hakka, and 
newcomer Chinese Americans, these distinctions grew less clear.330 
Today’s Hawaiian Chinese compose a fluid mixture of peoples. Some hail 
from long-time Hawaiian backgrounds, others are newcomers from mainland China, 
Taiwan, or Nanyang territories like Malaysia or Singapore. Still others are Chinese 
Americans from various parts of the United States. Complicating local identities is 
the increasingly prominent identification of Taiwanese Americans, or Americans of 
Taiwanese descent who do not strictly identify as Chinese. The nominal existence of 
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one China, with the de facto existence of two regimes claiming—to varying extents— 
to be that China, and the rise of a distinctive Taiwanese nationalism produce a 
contentious force field of political ties. At least three non-American governments 
claim to represent some measure of the Huayi, Huaren, or Huaqiao of Hawaii and the 
Western world.331 
There is also the matter of contested Hawaiian and American identities. 
 
Hawaii’s past as an independent kingdom, the perceived illegitimacy of its annexation 
in 1898, and the general physical and cultural distance between Hawaii and the 
mainland US complicated the place of Hawaiians within the United States and, 
therefore, the place of Hawaiian Chinese within the United States as well. According 
to Clarence Glick, many Hawaiian Chinese do not solely identify as Chinese, but 
rather identify strongly as local Hawaiians as well.332 This is especially true of mixed- 
race Hawaiian Chinese, to the extent that some do not even identify as Chinese. The 
complex interplay in Hawaiian Chinese identity and Sun’s historic ties to the islands 
mean that local incarnations of Sun Yat-sen are unique. They combine tropes of other 
American images of Sun with local particulars that serve to elevate the place of 
Hawaii on the world stage and, thus, the place of the Hawaiian Chinese. 
iii: Sun Yat-sen in Hawaii 
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Before turning to Lum and Lum’s commemorative book, it may prove 
beneficial to first explore the landscape of Hawaiian Sun commemoration. Key to our 
brief overview are the Dr. Sun Yat-sen Hawaii Foundation, the foundation 
responsible for notable Sun statuary around Hawaii and for Sun Yat-sen in Hawaii, 
and the Sun Yat-sen Foundation for Peace and Education. Both foundations are tied 
to branches of the Sun family, with the latter foundation having been the personal 
project of the late Lily Sun Sui-fong, daughter of Sun Fo. Also integral are municipal 
governments of Honolulu, Kaohsiung, and Zhongshan. We see in the erection and 
dedication of Sun statues competing groups working to court the public opinion of 
Hawaiian Chinese, redefining Sun and his legacy to best fit their own political 
sensibilities and objectives. 
For instance, a 1965 statue of Sun that greets visitors to Honolulu’s Daniel K. 
Inouye International Airport (HNL) explicitly lauds the projected democratic nature 
of Sun’s revolution. Erected by the Dr. Sun Yat-sen Hawaii Foundation, the Airport 
Statue sits in the Chinese Garden near the ticketing window and baggage claim of 
Terminal 2. The statue sits beside a pleasant Chinese-style pavilion and a small pond 
in a generally-Chinese style garden. I say generally Chinese in that it does not appear 
to reflect any specifically regional garden tradition, such as the white walls and 
artificial mountains of a Jiangnan garden. Notably, sitting in a “generally Chinese- 
style garden” allows for Sun to stand for the Chinese nation as a whole and not be 
limited by regional distinctions and associations, distinctions that had divided 
Chinese Americans in Hawaii and elsewhere. 
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Figure 10: The SYS statue at HNL.333 
 
The statue bears English and Chinese dedications. The front view simply reads tian 
xia wei gong, the ubiquitous Sun Yat-sen memorial quote seen also in Manhattan’s 
Columbus Park and on a pailou outside Taipei’s National Palace Museum. The 
English text, dedicated on the occasion of Sun’s 100th birthday,334 marks Sun as the 
“founder of the Republic of China”, the “author of the Three People’s Principles”: 
He devoted his entire life to the cause of the Chinese Revolution. Author of 
the “Three People’s Principles”, he founded the Republic of China. An 
advocate of freedom, equality, and humanitarianism, he always exerted his 
utmost efforts to aid the weak and support the faltering with a view towards 
the realizing of universal justice as well as cosmopolitanism. He was revered 
by his people and admired by the world. On the centennial anniversary of his 
 
 
333 Photos by the author, January 5, 2020. 
334 Curiously, the Committee was using Chinese reckoning, by which one is one-year old at 
birth, but we might note that this is at odds with the 1966 centennial celebrations in both the 
ROC-Taiwan and the PRC. 
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birth, we respectfully erect this statue in everlasting tribute. Presented to the 
State of Hawaii by the Hawaii Dr. Sun Yat-sen Centennial Memorial 
Committee, November 12, 1965.335 
Sun Yat-sen, sitting prominently in the airport’s Chinese garden, is thus presented as 
a universally beloved Chinese hero of freedom, equality, and humanitarianism to the 
traveling masses passing through the corridors of the Inouye International Airport. 
Celebrating Sun as cosmopolitan and compassionate, an angel of mercy and justice, 
the dedication is fit for a modern-day saint and finds a place for Sun outside of the 
national pantheon of China. Instead of sitting alongside the Hongwu Emperor, Chiang 
Kai-shek (or Mao Zedong) as a great Chinese nationalist leader, Sun is recast such 
that he may walk alongside Abraham Lincoln,336 Mahatma Gandhi, or Martin Luther 
King Jr. While he is still celebrated for his revolutionary work, Sun is made a moral 
exemplar in terms of freedom, equality, and humanitarianism, terms familiar to an 
American audience. After all, it is difficult to celebrate Sun as a nationalist in a space 
that does not take Chinese nationalism as an evident good and in which Chinese 
nationalism has little cache. Recasting him as an icon of more familiar virtues allows 
non-Chinese American travelers, milling through the garden while waiting for their 
flights, bags, or parties to quickly interpret (presumably approvingly) the statue and 
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231  
the figure it represents. 
 
In contrast, the Chinese dedication does not locate Sun beyond Chinese 
nationalism, but rather honors him as the guofu of the Republic of China. The 
dedication is even dated according to the Chinese calendar: November 12, the fifty- 
fourth year of the Republic, a striking difference from less nationally marked English 
dedication. Although these stylistic distinctions do not deeply affect the main body of 
text, they do speak to the ways that one statue deploys different messages for 
different audiences. The English dedication presents a relatively universalized Sun, 
while the Chinese dedication adopts the language of ROC Chinese nationalism, 
presumptively deemed relevant to Chinese-literate visitors. The two dedications 
remind us of overlapping national identities and their gaps. Plainly, Sun Yat-sen 
cannot be the Father of the Nation in the United States, which has its own pantheon of 
Founding Fathers. Nonetheless, a strong sense of Chinese national identity among the 
members of the Hawaii Dr. Sun Yat-sen Centennial Committee necessitated honoring 
Sun’s importance for the Chinese nation he stood to represent. The linguistically 
camouflaged honoring of Sun as guofu also perhaps suggests that the Hawaiian 
Chinese who erected the statue felt some disconnection from mainstream American 
society and its symbolic representations. At the same time, the group avoided airing 
these feelings to a broader English-speaking audience, possibly to preserve 
simultaneous claims to their U.S. citizenship. 
A later statue, of ROC provenance, presents a different image of Sun to a 
different audience. Situated off of the Nuuanu Creek and only feet from the original 
headquarters of Sun’s Revive China Society, the Nuuanu statue was donated by the 
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city government of Kaohsiung in the 1984 to commemorate the 90th anniversary of 
the RCS’s founding in Honolulu.337 The plinth, a 2007 addition to the 1984 statue, 
was donated by Lily Sun’s Dr. Sun Yat-sen Foundation for Peace and Education.338 
 
 
Figure 11: The Nuuanu statue and its plinth. The White Sun and Blue Sky, part of the 
original installation, can be seen below.339 
 
 
337 By the other bank of the creek is a statue dedicated to Filipino revolutionary icon Jose 
Rizal. 
338 Dr. Sun Yat-sen Hawaii Foundation, “How many Dr. Sun Yat-sen statues are there in 
Hawaii?”, January 25, 2019, http://sunyatsenhawaii.org/2019/01/25/how-many-dr-sun-yat- 
sen-statues-are-there-in-hawaii/. 
339 Photos the author’s, January 8, 2020. Though I have not looked expressly for these plinths, 
a Sun statue with an identical plinth stands in the International District of Seattle. The statue, 
observed during a March 2019 trip, was outside the Chung Wa Benevolent Association (7th 
Avenue and Wheeler Street). Photos of identical bases beneath Sun statues at the Honolulu 
Taiwan Economic and Cultural Office and at Sun Mei’s former ranch in Kula, Maui, may be 
seen at the address below. Identical and odd translation of tianxia weigong as “All under 
Heaven Are Equal” (seen elsewhere as “All under Heaven for the common good” and “All 
under Heaven is a Commonwealth”) can also be found on a new base below the Columbus 
Park, Manhattan statue. 
Dr. Sun Yat-sen Hawaii Foundation, “How many?” 
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A scholarly Sun, in a jacket and changpao robes, stands considering a book in the 
shade of a tree. He now stands atop a shiny black base that elevates him above 
passerby; it is unclear if the statue was atop a plinth before 2007 or if he stood 
directly on the emblazoned sidewalk. The distinctive octagonal plinth, engraved with 
golden characters reading “peace”, “filial piety”, and “justice” among other things, is 
of a model seen in other locations. Although an exhaustive analysis of the who’s, 
how’s, and why’s of Sun statuary in the United States is beyond the scope of this 
thesis, we will briefly note that Sun, standing on a pedestal emblazoned with 
Confucian virtues and objectives such as righteousness, loyalty, harmony, grasping 
the nature of things, and the extension of knowledge, thus stands as an icon of 
Confucian morality and political modernity through his connection to democracy, 
political equality, and the establishment of a Chinese republic. Unlike the plinth of 
the airport statute, which marks Sun as the saint of freedom, equality, and 
humanitarianism in an almost French trifecta, the Lily Sun plinth identifies Sun as a 
sort of modern Confucian sage, in keeping with the scholarly stance of the Kaohsiung 
statue. 
2007 was a busy year for Sun statuary aficionados in Honolulu. In November 
12 of that year—the 141th anniversary of Sun’s birth—Honolulu’s Gateway Park was 
also rededicated as the Dr. Sun Yat-sen Memorial Park by the government of 
Honolulu, then under the administration of Mayor Mufi Hanneman. The rededication, 
which involved the dedication of a new Sun statute by the Dr. Sun Yat-sen Hawaii 
Foundation, served two distinct yet interrelated purposes. First, it was part of a 
community revitalization effort. Rededicating Gateway Park to honor Sun was one of 
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ten points of a community-city negotiated plan to revitalize the Honolulu Chinatown 
in 2006. Plainly, Sun Yat-sen has continued relevance to the Honolulu Chinese 
community if the community decided that the dedication of a park in his name should 
constitute one point of a neighborhood revitalization program. This suggests that a 
Sun park and statue both helped to reinforce the Chinese identity of Chinatown while 
also celebrating the virtues of democracy conducive to an American political 
environment. 
However, there was also a diplomatic motivation underlying the rededication. 
The rededication of Gateway Park also served to commemorate ten years of a sister- 
city relationship between Honolulu and Zhongshan340 in Guangdong. The 
international dimension to the rededication is reinforced by Mayor Hanneman: “There 
was great support to mark the 10th anniversary of our sister-city relationship by 
honoring Dr. Sun Yat-sen, who is universally known as the Father of Modern China. I 
firmly believe that there is no more beautiful or appropriate setting in our city to 
honor him than this park.”341 The mayor’s comments illustrate the explicitly 
diplomatic nature of the rededication and the interplay between local and 
international forces in the naming of a small city park, but also explicate Sun as the 
“Father of Modern China”. We have recently seen Sun as guofu, the benevolent, wise, 
and fantastic father of the ROC popularized as part of a GMD propaganda war in the 
 
 
 
340 As noted previously, Zhongshan City was formerly Xiangshan County, and in 1925 was 
renamed by the ROC government in honor of Sun. Deng Xiaoping’s PRC government re- 
designated Zhongshan County Zhongshan City in 1983. 
341 “CITY TO DEDICATE STATUE AND RENAME PARK TO HONOR DR. SUN YAT- 
SEN”, City and County of Honolulu, 11-7-2007, https://www.honolulu.gov/csd-news- 
2007/3585-city-to-dedicate-statue-and-rename-park-to-honor-dr-sun-yat-sen.html 
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1940s. However, this appellation is somewhat different than the Father of Modern 
China mentioned in the Hawaii of 2007. What is this China? This modern China is 
the modern People’s Republic of China of reformist rhetoric, as seen in the second 
chapter. This Sun is not a traditionalist superman like Chiang’s guofu or a bourgeois, 
anti-imperialist revolutionary leader like the Sun of early PRC commemorations. 
Rather, this Sun is defined primarily by his modernism and nationalism. Naturally, 
Deng and other post-Deng CCP leaders invoked this Sun, the Father of Modern 
China, largely to emphasize the role of the CCP in bringing about modern China, thus 
helping to legitimate CCP party-state dictatorship. 
Of course, the Mayor of Honolulu has no reason to bring that into his 
comments. However, he did use this epithet, perhaps as a diplomatic gesture of 
goodwill towards his counterparts in Zhongshan. But Hanneman did not wax about 
the merits of post-Reform China or its leadership, as he was the mayor of an 
American city; excessive praise for a foreign government would not play well at 
home, particularly given the sometimes tense relationship between Beijing and 
Washington and still-existent ROC sympathies among portions of his own Chinese 
American constituents. To sidestep all of these issues while still pleasing Zhongshan, 
he simply invoked Sun as the Father of Modern China without defining what exactly 
this meant. 
While the Gateway Park rededication served to please Chinese Americans in 
Honolulu and Chinese officials in Zhongshan, the statue in the park is itself worthy of 
discussion. 
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Figure 12: Dr. Sun Yat-sen Memorial Park and a close-up of the statue.342 
 
Unlike all other Sun statues discussed here, this statue portrays Sun Yat-sen in Hawaii 
as he was: a young boy. It is perhaps anachronistic to call it a statue of Sun Yat-sen, 
as Sun Deming did not adopt the name Sun Yat-sen until he was already a man. By 
portraying Sun as a boy, the Dr. Sun Yat-sen Hawaii Foundation emphasized what 
was unique about Sun’s ties to Hawaii; it is thus different from all other Sun statues 
and would make sense nowhere but in Hawaii or, perhaps, Cuiheng. It further serves 
to emphasize that the young, impressionable Sun—books in hand—learned many of 
his most formative lessons in Hawaii, and so claims a special place for Hawaii in the 
life and legacy of Sun. 
While statues are valuable for shaping the historical landscape of a geographic 
 
 
342 The left photo comes from a January 8, 2020 visit to the park, but it was unfortunately 
under construction. The right photo comes the Dr. Sun Yat-sen Hawaii Foundation’s article, 
“How many Sun statues…?”, cited above. 
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space, they are limited in reach. If you do not live near it or regularly pass by it, you 
would have to make a special trip to see it. The erectors of the airport statue 
presumably recognized the limitations of a stature’s reach and so chose a prominent 
place for it at a busy transit site, maximizing the number of people who would see it. 
The Nuuanu and Gateway statues are not located in the transitional space of an 
airport, at once in Honolulu and yet removed from the city itself. Rather, they are 
placed near significant sites in Honolulu’s busy Chinatown and so see significant foot 
and automotive traffic from tourists, locals, and commuters. We might speculate that 
the airport statue was placed to influence visitors’ understanding of Sun, but the 
Honolulu airport is the largest airport in Hawaii and the sole transit link to the 
mainland and foreign nations, and so it would be shortsighted to presume only 
tourists see the statue. As for the Chinatown statues, we might note that they see more 
local traffic, and are more immediately present in the fabric of the city than the airport 
statue. Their reaches are limited, nonetheless, by the nature of the medium. 
Unlike statues, however, books are eminently mobile and dense, and so 
narratives may be promulgated across any physical distance and expounded upon in 
great detail. It is with this in mind that we turn to Lum and Lum’s book Sun Yat-sen 
in Hawaii and His Supporters. This book, published by the Dr. Sun Yat-sen Hawaii 
Foundation, presents itself as an authoritative local history of Sun’s time in Hawaii 
and his connections to the local Chinese to a broad, borderless English-literature 
audience. Accordingly, its value rests largely on its claim to local authority and how it 
uses the authority to reshape the image of Sun. The book thus tells as much about the 
Chinese in Hawaii as it does the details of his connection to Hawaii then and now. 
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In exploring these questions, we might recall that Sun’s time in Hawaii was 
described by his biographers variously as a formative encounter with Western 
modernity, with Christianity, and with Chinese backwardness. To James Cantlie, 
Sun’s time in Hawaii was when Sun learned of the glory of Western civilization and 
in so doing learned the true extent of Qing China’s poverty and backwardness. M. N. 
Roy held a similar characterization, but argued that Sun’s cultural chauvinism was the 
only thing saving him from becoming an outright advocate for Western imperialism. 
Jiang Xingde, instead, echoed Sun’s approval of Hawaiian modernity, but 
emphasized Sun’s growth from a boy to a man there, as well as his contact with 
Christianity and his consciousness of being a Chinese in a non-Chinese space. Marie- 
Claire Bergère, in a more academic fashion, highlighted his contact with modernity 
and Christianity in Honolulu, and noted his frustration with Xiangshan’s superstitious 
parochialism upon his unwilling return at the age of seventeen. She, like Jiang, also 
made note of Sun’s boredom working for Sun Mei, thus foreshadowing the young 
boy’s unusual path. 
Sun Yat-sen in Hawaii has three sections. The first section explores Sun’s six 
visits to Hawaii; the second focuses on Sun’s local fundraising initiatives. The final 
section provides brief biographies of prominent Chinese men in Hawaii associated 
with Sun’s Hawaiian Revive China Society and Tongmenghui chapters. Finally, the 
book has an appendix featuring photographs of relevant historical materials. 
The book’s foreword, written by Leigh-wai Doo of the Dr. Sun Yat-sen 
Hawaii Foundation, clearly situates Sun as influenced by his formative years in 
Hawaii as a boy and thus emphasizes the place of Hawaii in Sun’s life: 
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The people in the Kingdom of Hawaii and later Territory of Hawaii, U.S.A., 
were principal contributors to Dr. Sun’s early year education, moral values, 
and support of the Democratic Revolution of 1911, and the subsequent 
unification efforts of Dr. Sun in China. As Dr. Lin Jia You, director of the Dr. 
Sun Yat-sen Institute of Zhong Shan University in Guangzhou, China, has 
said, “Without his experience in Hawaii, there would not be the great career of 
Dr. Sun Yat-sen.” It was in Hawaii that Dr. Sun Yat-sen developed the 
concepts and the moral character that were the foundations of his career. As a 
boy of thirteen, Sun Tai Chu learned English with such a proficiency that four 
years later he received an award from King Kalakaua of Hawaii. His concepts 
of government evolved from his schooling, which exposed him to the British 
and American systems of democracy. His character evolved, in those 
formative years of thirteen to seventeen years old, from the Anglican Iolani 
School and the Protestant Punahou School. 
Manpower and funds came from Dr. Sun Yat-sen’s brethren who had 
emigrated to Hawaii from Zhongshan County in China, where they spoke the 
same dialect and had common relatives and friends. It was with this group of 
Chinese in Hawaii that he formed the first revolutionary party of China, Hsing 
Chung Hui, in 1894, and took refuge after the first of many revolutionary 
attempts in China. From the people of Hawaii he raised funds, sold bonds, and 
gained volunteers to fight in China, including in the later years, stimulating 
China’s first air force with funds and pilots from overseas Chinese. Dr. Sun 
Yat-sen came to Hawaii six times, living a total of seven years in Hawaii. His 
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closeness to Hawaii and the confidence he felt in being a kamaaina, a person 
of the land of Hawaii, is reflected in his statement to a newspaper report in 
1910: “This is my Hawaii. Here I was brought up and educated; and it was 
here that I came to know what modern, civilized governments are like and 
what they mean.”343 
Doo’s introduction puts Hawaii front and center for Sun’s political education. The 
people of Hawaii, regardless of its political identity as a sovereign Kingdom or a 
dependent Territory, were “principal contributors” to Sun’s thought, values and career 
(from 1894 to 1911 through 1925). The close-knit Xiangshan community in Hawaii is 
explicitly credited with brotherly and patriotic support of Sun and his initiatives, and 
Sun himself is cast as a “kamaaina”, a Hawaiian son of the soil. Sun’s “my Hawaii” 
sentiments are a key piece of Sun remembrance in Hawaii, as also evinced by the 
quote’s prominent place in the previously mentioned Dr. Sun Yat-sen Memorial Park 
at the corner of Hotel and Bethel in Honolulu’s Chinatown.344 
Following the Chinese textual tradition of multiple prefaces and introductions 
particular to biographies, a second introduction by Lum and Lum underscores the 
central place of Sun in world history and Hawaii’s place in Sun’s life, thus elevating 
Hawaii through Sun: 
Sun Yat-sen (Sun Wen), the father of modern China, is one of the most 
 
 
 
343 Lum and Lum, viii. 
344 Unfortunately, the park was closed for construction when I attempted to visit in January of 
2020, and so this cannot be verified firsthand. However, a web search shows a plaque with 
the quote prominently displayed by the statue. 
City and County of Honolulu. 
Dr. SYS Hawaii Foundation, “How Many?” 
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honored and revered statesmen in the world. At the turn of the twentieth 
century, he led the Chinese people in a revolutionary movement that 
succeeded in overthrowing the Manchu dynasty, thus ending more than two 
thousand years of imperial rule in China. In October 1911, a republic was 
established, and he was elected the first provisional president. The Republic of 
China was also the first republic ever to be established in Asia.345 
The description of Sun as “one of the most honored and revered statesmen in the 
world”, is curious title considering that Sun spent little time as a statesman and most 
of his time as a revolutionary and political organizer. Though Sun has an undeniable 
record as for revolutionary longevity, persistence, and leadership, he was only the 
President of the ROC for several months, and never again attained high office. The 
inclusion of Sun in the category of “statesmen” elevates Sun to the likes of national 
icons like the Roosevelts, Churchill, or de Gaulle, thus providing an immediate frame 
of reference for the unfamiliar American reader. Similarly, the establishment of the 
first Asian republic makes Sun not simply a Chinese statesman, but more grandly, an 
Asian statesman providing inspiration for Asians more broadly and invoking the 
democratization of Asia according to U.S.-style democratic-republican models. 
Unsurprisingly, given the location and the agenda of the Dr. Sun Yat-sen 
Hawaii Foundation, the introduction continues to highlight the significance of Hawaii 
in Sun’s life: 
Hawaii and its people played an important role in the life of Sun. Hawaii was 
 
 
 
345 Lum and Lum, xv. 
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known as Sun’s second home for he spent his teenage years here. He had 
family and many friends in these islands, where he carried out important 
revolutionary activities. During his years in exile outside of China, he was not 
allowed to land in many countries, for example, the Dutch Indies (now 
Indonesia). Even in Japan, where he spent many years, using it as a base for 
his activities, he occasionally found himself not so welcomed. But he never 
had any difficulties in returning to the Islands. The Hawaiians, especially 
those of Chinese ancestry, wholeheartedly supported him financially and 
politically. In many instances, they risked their lives to support the revolution. 
Sun once said: “Hua Qiao [overseas Chinese] is the mother of the revolution.” 
The Chinese in Hawaii are well worthy of such an honor.346 
Significant here is the phrase “the Hawaiians, especially those of Chinese ancestry”. 
While elsewhere making explicit reference to Chinese sojourners abroad (Huaqiao) 
and the Chinese in Hawaii, the editors here include non-Chinese Hawaiians among 
Sun’s “wholehearted” supporters. By including non-Chinese Hawaiians, the majority 
of Hawaiians (native, white, Japanese, or Filipino) thus become the financial patrons 
and political backers of Sun’s revolutionary anti-monarchist project. Sun and his 
revolution are not framed as a historical footnote in a minority history within Hawaii, 
but rather part of mainstream Hawaiian history. This also serves to elevate the role of 
Chinese in Hawaiian history along with the Hawaiian Chinese in Chinese history. 
Hawaiians’ welcoming attitude towards Sun moreover contrasts with fickle Japanese 
or cold colonials in the Dutch Indies and the Straits. This further situates Hawaii as an 
 
346 Ibid. 
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incubator of an international democratic movement. 
 
Such emphasis on Hawaii’s place in Chinese history is further evinced in the 
final paragraph: 
Hawaii played a historic role in the birth of modern China. It was known that 
the cradle of the Chinese revolution because it was here in the Islands that Sun 
founded the first revolutionary organization, the Hsing Chung Hui (Revive 
China Society) 興中會, which later developed into a strong political party 
called the Tung Meng Hui, which overthrew the Manchu regime. It was 
reorganized in 1912 to become the Kuomintang (Nationalist Party) 國民黨. It 
was in Hawaii that Sun and a little more than a hundred Chinese first vowed 
to bring down the Manchus, and this little spark ignited into a prairie fire that 
burned down the decaying Manchu regime.347 
 
This specific and historically accurate focus on Sun’s small network in Hawaii 
partially mitigates the prior suggestion of widespread, wholehearted Hawaiian 
support. In any case, the foundation of the Revive China Society in Honolulu in 1894 
becomes the “little spark” that “ignited a prairie fire” that “burned down the decaying 
Manchu regime”. Lum and Lum also note that Sun adopted his focus on land reform 
as a key goal of the Revolutionary Army during his time organizing the Tongmenghui 
and its related organizations in Hilo in 1910.348 This places the RCS at the foundation 
of the Xinhai Revolution and Hawaii as a factor in the shaping of his revolutionary 
 
 
 
347 Ibid. 
348 Ibid., 31. 
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mission. As noted earlier, other narratives of the anti-Qing revolution emphasized 
instead Sun’s time in London, Sun’s time in Cuiheng, Sun’s lessons from the 
Taipings, and Sun’s lessons from the Bolsheviks. Though the last of these plainly 
developed after the fall of the Qing, we might recall that Communist narratives of 
Sun focused on the evils of the feudal structures of Chinese society and not the actual 
Qing monarchy, which was simply the latest dynasty to sit atop an old hierarchy. In 
any case, by placing the Revive China Society at the forefront of the narrative, 
Hawaii becomes the wellspring of the Chinese revolution and Republic. 
iv: The Nanyang Chinese and the Isle of Penang 
 
Chinese Americans, and the Chinese of Hawaii more pertinently, have a 
particular history and identity that necessarily colored Sun Yat-sen’s local image. For 
the purpose of comparison, we now turn to the Chinese of Nanyang, or the Southern 
Sea, who illustrate a different history of the Chinese diaspora. Nanyang, in Chinese, 
means “the southern ocean” and refers essentially to Southeast Asia. I will use the 
term Nanyang interchangeably with the Southern Sea, though note that this term 
would generally include the climes of northern Indian Ocean. The Chinese of the 
Southern Sea, like their Hawaiian/American counterparts, are a sizeable group within 
global Chinese diaspora consisting chiefly of Chinese economic emigres. However, 
the Nanyang Chinese have a long history of trade and residence in Southeast Asia 
with complicated implications in the present, much of which is beyond the scope of 
this thesis. Nevertheless, a brief sketch of this diverse group may usefully frame a 
more focused discussion of the Chinese in Penang. This discussion, in turn, is limited 
to the necessary context for analysis of Sun Yat-sen in Penang, written by Khoo 
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Salma Nasution. 
 
As a novice on Penang, I will refrain from making comprehensive arguments 
about the region’s history and will focus mostly on the Sun book and what it reveals 
as one Nanyang Chinese perspective on Sun, represented here by the Penang Chinese. 
Penang, with its shifting demographics and complicated relationship to both British 
colonialism and Malaysian nationalism, is an interesting space in which to consider 
Sun representations and the communities that create them. Khoo’s book, like the Lum 
and Lum book, is not serving any state-sanctioned political project, as many of my 
sources in the prior three chapters do. Rather, it is an individual work for a 
community organization, serving to illustrate how non-state actors interpret and 
portray Sun for their own purposes. In Khoo’s case, her book serves to incorporate 
Sun into the local history of Penang and elevate the place of Penang in world history. 
It also serves to commemorate the successful restoration of her family’s old property 
at 120 Armenian Street, the once-headquarters of the Tongmenghui’s Nanyang 
branch. 
Unlike the state histories in prior chapters, one difficulty in discussing the 
Nanyang Chinese is the lack of convenient borders, spatial and temporal. Even the 
history of the Chinese in the United States and Hawaii is helpfully bound by the 
confines of overlapping American and Hawaiian history. The history of the Nanyang 
Chinese, however, spills over several national, imperial, and transnational histories. 
We might note that the Chinese of Borneo had quite different lived experiences than 
the Chinese of Rangoon or Phuket, that Chinese in Malacca during the 15th century 
had a different view of things than their descendants some five centuries later, and 
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that Chinese migrants to Johor, the Straits, or Sumatra in the 19th century came from a 
different China (and different places and backgrounds within this China) than those 
that fled the chaos of the Ming-Qing transition. 
Key for our purposes is the binary between the prosperity of Chinese traders 
in Southeast Asia and the penury of Chinese miners, plantation workers, and petty 
merchants. Well-developed networks of traders, largely hailing from the southern 
maritimes of China, made great profit over the centuries. The Peranakan Chinese (or 
baba nyonya), as the locally-acculturated, longtime “non-Chinese Chinese” residents 
of Malaysia, southern Thailand, and Java are generally known, often profited as 
mediators and middlemen in global trade networks.349 The eminent scholar Wang 
Gungwu describes the Peranakan Chinese as “a proto-national community” 
descended from a pre-national network of emigrant trades in Southeast Asia with 
particular significance for understanding the political machinations of national 
identities, having been “made” Chinese by the national empires of Britain and the 
Netherlands.350 During the era of imperial excursions into Southeast Asia, these 
imperial powers competed over strategic locales like the Straits of Malacca, spice 
islands like Palau Run, and entrepots like Rangoon and Batavia (now Yangon and 
Jakarta) and worked to categorize the people there; the Peranakan Chinese were noted 
for their active participation in the Dutch and British imperial systems and their 
ability to mediate between local culture, the imperial culture of Britain or the 
Netherlands, and the Chinese culture of newcomer Chinese (Totok or sinkeh). Within 
 
349 Jamie Koh, “Peranakan (Straits Chinese) Community”, Singapore Infopedia, 8-30-2013, 
https://eresources.nlb.gov.sg/infopedia/articles/SIP_2013-08-30_181745.html 
350 Wang Gungwu, Nanyang: Essays on Heritage (Singapore: ISEAS, 2018), 76-78. 
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the British Straits Settlement, later-comers born in the Straits territories and 
Peranakan Chinese would both be labeled “Straits Chinese,” but more recent arrivals 
often lacked the social connections that enabled Peranakan Chinese and the Straits 
Chinese to so effectively serve as middlemen. They also responded far more 
enthusiastically to the promulgation of Chinese nationalism by figures like Sun Yat- 
sen and Kang Youwei than did the proto-national Baba, who Wang describes as being 
Chinese but not Chinese enough to meet the standards of this brand new national 
Chinese identity.351 
Due to the wealth of these big-time Chinese merchants, particularly in the 
open Straits Settlements, both Qing officials and anti-Qing revolutionaries made 
fundraising trips to Nanyang. Sun Yat-sen himself made many trips to the region for 
exactly this purpose, and even lived in Singapore and Penang for some time. Battles 
between reformers, revolutionaries, and the Qing establishment would be fought in 
the press of colonial entrepots as each side sought to capture hearts, minds, and 
wallets. After the success of the Xinhai Revolution and the descent of the Republic 
into warlordism, Malaya and the Straits remained an important zone of recruitment, 
fundraising, and optics-shaping for the Tongmenghui’s successor, the GMD.352 
Sinkeh Chinese were often zealously receptive to Sun and the GMD’s proselytizing, 
but the Peranakans had a more mixed response. The proto-national Peranakans “were 
aware of what it meant to be part of a great nation” due to their existence within the 
Dutch and British national empires, but their receptivity to Chinese nationalism was 
 
 
351 Ibid. 81. 
352 C. F. Young and R. B. McKenna explore this topic in their The Kuomintang Movement in 
British Malaya, 1912-1949. 
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tempered by their own ambiguous local identities and comfortable connections to 
European empire, Qing officialdom, and local communities.353 The Peranakan would 
largely be subsumed into the Sinkeh in British Malaya and the Straits Settlements due 
to the great amount of Sinkeh migrants in the late Qing and early Republic, but 
remained a more prosperous and distinctive group in the Dutch East Indies due to the 
relative dearth of Sinkeh migration in the same period. 
The general historical trajectory after Sun left the Straits is generally narrated 
in this fashion: the European empires lost control of their colonies and independent 
nations rose in their place. Given the Straits Chinese’ active participation in the 
preexisting imperial systems, this has not necessarily worked to their advantage. 
Nanyang Chinese in post-independence Indonesia faced violence, discrimination, and 
assimilationist pressures, while Chinese in Malaysia experienced forced deportations 
and executions during the Malayan Emergency and continued discrimination due to 
bumiputera laws that legally favor ethnic Malays for housing, work, and loans. 
Perhaps because it was booted from Malaysia in 1965, Singapore has emerged as a 
premier business, financial, and transit center, much due to the work and to the 
benefit of Singapore’s large Chinese population. Because Singapore was expelled 
from Malaysia after only two years of membership in the federation, it—unlike 
Penang—was able to set its own policies. Penang, once a Crown Colony like 
Singapore, suffered as part of Malaysia for want of autonomy. Indeed, while both 
Singapore and Penang started from similar circumstances, the two city-states had 
quite different trajectories. By examining the history of Penang with the different fate 
 
353 Wang Gungwu, 87. 
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of Singapore in mind, we can more effectively understand Khoo’s work as well as 
complicated place of the Chinese in Penang, Penang in the world, and the general 
history of Nanyang. 
Penang, a city off and on the coast of the Malay Peninsula, was one of the 
largest and most significant port cities of the imperial era. Technically speaking, 
Penang now refers to the state of Penang, comprised of the isle of Penang (today 
entirely filled by the capital city/borough of George Town) and the mainland borough 
of Seberang Perai (home to the city and district of Butterworth). Before this time, 
Penang was a sparsely populated island off the coast of Kedah, a sultanate under the 
umbrella of Siam. Penang, renamed Prince of Wales Island, was ceded to the British 
East India Company (EIC) by the Sultan of Kedah in 1786 in exchange for Captain 
Francis Light’s promise of military aid.354 This aid never materialized. The densely 
populated coastal lowlands of Seberang Perai, or Province Wellesley, were seized 
from Kedah by the EIC in 1800. The mainland borough, a crucial source of foodstuffs 
for George Town and later tin for the British Empire, would expand thrice before 
reaching its current borders in 1870. In 1823, the colony of Penang was absorbed into 
the larger EIC colony of the Straits Settlements, in league with Dindings (the present 
Manjung District), Malacca, and Singapore. The colony itself was managed under the 
Presidency of Bengal within the EIC’s Indian government. After the Crown’s 
usurpation of the British East India Company’s governmental responsibilities in 1858, 
the Straits Settlements were governed by the British Raj. Following local 
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dissatisfaction in the Straits with the poor quality of colonial administration, the 
Straits Settlements were declared a Crown Colony in 1867. Thus, administration of 
Penang shifted from Bengal to Singapore and the British Colonial Office in London. 
Penang, like most of Britain’s East Asian and Southeast Asian holdings, was 
occupied by Japanese forces from 1941-1945. During Japanese occupation, European 
residents were largely evacuated by the British government while Chinese and Tamil 
residents were killed en masse by Japanese forces in a systemic massacre known as 
the Sook Ching. The Sook Ching was most pervasive in the Straits Settlements, 
though Japanese forces attempted to extend it into the Malay heartland of the 
Federated Malay States. In 1946, Penang became a member of the Malayan Union, 
succeeded in 1948 by the Commonwealth Federation of Malaya. This was not 
universally popular, and some in Penang unsuccessfully pushed for an independent 
Commonwealth state of Penang out of a strong sense of British Straits identity and a 
“fear of the resurgence of Malay power” among the Straits Chinese in particular.355 
Many Penangites looked enviously at Singapore at this time, which was not 
amalgamated into the Malay Federation.356 During the Malayan Emergency, a 
Communist insurrection against British colonial authorities, “alien squatter” 
Chinese—those not residents of Malaya—were deported in an attempt to remove 
potential PRC agitators from the colony. Many innocent Malayan-Chinese were 
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caught up in the dragnets. 357 
 
In 1963, the Malayan Federation united with the colonies of Singapore, Sabah 
(formerly British North Borneo), and Sarawak. The merger formed the 
Commonwealth nation of Malaysia, though Singapore would be expelled from 
Malaysia within two years. Following Singapore’s expulsion, Penang became the 
largest city in Malaysia. Its status as a freeport was rescinded by the Malaysian 
government in 1969, and its preeminence in Malaysia has since been eclipsed by the 
capital of Kuala Lumpur and the surrounding suburbs of the Klang Valley.358 Penang, 
nevertheless, remains the economic center of Northern Malaysia and a major city of 
Southeast Asia, although the city’s economy struggled for many years following the 
revocation of freeport status. 
Penang is an ethnically diverse state, with George Town (or Penang Island) 
majority Chinese and Seberang Perai plurality Malay. Both boroughs have 
historically had significant Eurasian, Thai, and Indonesian populations (of course, 
Wang Gungwu would caution against mapping present national identities onto the 
pre-national era), as well as a small but powerful colonial minority of British 
administrators and, briefly, Japanese occupiers. The Penang Chinese largely came 
from Zhangzhou, Fujian Province, if the predominance of Zhangzhou Hokkien may 
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be considered evidence of origin.359 Attracted by Penang’s status as a freeport, many 
emigres (especially from the Five Clans of Tans, the Yeohs, the Lims, the Cheahs and 
the Khoos) came to Penang from China or elsewhere in Nanyang to take advantage of 
Penang’s special status.360 While many Penang Chinese came directly from China, 
some were Peranakan Chinese from elsewhere in Southeast Asia. However, the 
Peranakan were less numerous and less influential in Penang than elsewhere in 
Southeast Asia due to the sheer amount of new arrivals from China and the 
newcomers’ domination of local business.361 In telling the tale of Penang’s diverse 
population, Khoo’s narrative of Penang is not one of limits, of closed doors. Rather, 
she celebrates a “liberal haven” and a “cosmopolitan melting pot” for the world’s 
people, attributes of Penang’s unique “Straits culture.”362 By emphasizing Penang as 
a “Straits” cultural zone, she thus frames Penang separately from the Malay mainland 
and carves out a niche for it in the vein of Singapore. We might speculate that 
establishing the unique Straits culture of Penang of the former Straits Settlements 
may stem from a nostalgia for colonial days, but perhaps it instead reveals a longing 
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for a Penang distinct from a Malaysia that has swallowed it. 
 
Economically, Penang grew on spice, tin, and shipping. Freeport status, key to 
Penang’s growth in an area surrounded by closed Dutch ports, was also crucial in the 
rise of Singapore. Singapore emerged as the more important of the two ports due 
largely to geography. Situated at a crucial bottleneck in the Straits of Malacca, 
Singapore emerged as the center of the British Straits Settlements. Malacca itself was 
a closed Dutch-controlled port until the Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 1824 rearranged the 
balance of the two colonial spheres of influence in the region. The capital of the 
Settlements would shift from George Town to Singapore in 1836, reflecting 
Singapore’s preeminence. Regardless, Penang remained a crucial port in Southeast 
Asia with particular importance to the tin industry of the Malayan peninsula, the Aceh 
black pepper trade, and the local coconut oil trade.363 
v: Sun Yat-sen Revolutes in Penang 
 
With this context in mind for understanding the history and geography of the 
Chinese presence in the region, we now turn to the commemorative history Sun Yat- 
sen in Penang by Khoo Salma Nasution. Unlike other works previously discussed, 
Khoo’s book is largely linked with efforts to preserve a specific historical site, and as 
such has somewhat different priorities. Rather than prioritizing Sun’s connection to 
local history, Khoo is as much telling the history of 120 Armenian Street in George 
Town as she is telling the history of Sun in Penang. Unlike Sun Yat-sen in Hawaii, 
there is no significant attempt to localize Sun or claim him as a native son, 
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presumably due to the distinctive timing of Sun’s sojourn in Penang. By this point, he 
was already a mature and established revolutionary; arguing that local Penang society 
shaped Sun’s already-formed character is thus more tenuous than the Hawaiian claim 
on Sun. 
The specific focus of Khoo’s book is clarified on the very first page: 
 
This book highlights an episode in Dr. Sun Yat Sen’s career as leader of the 
Chinese Republican Revolution, before he became the first President of the 
provisional government of China. From Penang, Sun Yat Sen planned the 
famous Second Guangzhou Uprising [Huanghuagang Uprising] which took 
place in the spring of 1911. Through the dedication of his Penang supporters 
[italics added for emphasis], the Nanyang Headquarters also played an 
important role in shoring up the Xinhai Revolution after the Wuchang 
Uprising on 10th October, 1911. The Nanyang Headquarters operated from 
120 Armenian Street. From here, the Kwong Wah Yit Poh was first published 
as a revolutionary newspaper. This house been preserved to remember the role 
that a group of people in Penang played in 1911 Chinese Revolution, a major 
event in world history.364 
This blurb gives the Chinese of Penang, one group within Penang, credit in helping 
carry forward the Chinese Republican Revolution, as Khoo terms it. It also defines 
the Xinhai Revolution as world history, and thus allows non-Chinese to lay claim to it 
in some sense, perhaps a necessary addendum for an Overseas Chinese writer to 
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make. Not being a Chinese national yet feeling a sense of Chinese identity, claiming 
Chinese history as world history perhaps strengthens the individual’s connection to 
this history and allows the claiming of this history. After all, a Malaysian citizen 
claiming Chinese history as one’s own would presumably arouse questions from both 
Chinese nationals and one’s own Malaysian compatriots, but certainly the same 
citizen could claim world history without too much difficulty.365 
This seems to help overseas Chinese sidestep issues of nation and identity in 
discussing personally relevant if strictly extranational history while avoiding claims 
of competing nationalisms that draw unfavorable historical associations. We might 
think to the Malayan Emergency and Malayan suspicion of the Chinese in Malaya as 
being agents of the PRC, or think back earlier to the Japanese occupiers’ suspicion 
that all Chinese—Sinkeh or Baba—were necessarily agents of the Chinese state and 
partisans in the making. Drawing less extreme examples, competing loyalties could 
be extrapolated from Straits Chinese ties to the Qing court and to anti-Qing secret 
societies in conjunction with professed loyalty to the British or Dutch empires. Given 
the real and legally sanctioned status of non-Malay Malaysians as second-class 
citizens through bumiputera laws, the caution of Malaysian Chinese in directly 
claiming ownership of Chinese history seems warranted. That the Hawaiian Chinese 
more freely claim ownership of Chinese national history suggests, in turn, that the 
Hawaiian Chinese feel more assured in their American identity than the Malaysian 
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Chinese do in their Malaysian identity, but perhaps also reveals that the Hawaiian 
Chinese, in turn, are more assimilated into mainstream American culture than their 
Malaysian counterparts. 
On the note of historical ownership, an introduction by Lynn Pan, a noted 
scholar in the field of overseas Chinese studies, celebrates Sun Yat Sen in Penang for 
“allowing the people of Penang to rediscover their own history”, for Khoo’s work in 
restoring 120 Armenian Street, and in underscoring the connection of Chinese in 
China and abroad.366 Pan makes two noteworthy statements in the introduction, most 
notably the on the portrait of the archetypical Chinese “Revolutionary”, whom she 
notes as Janus-faced. One such face of the revolutionary in China is that of the globe- 
trotter Sun Yat-sen, while the other is that of the deep-rooted Mao Zedong.367 We 
might extrapolate that the two faces of the Revolutionary underscore the tensions in 
contemporary Chinese nationalism between cosmopolitanism and nativism, between 
the worldly yang and the parochial tu—or, to invoke the River Elegy dichotomy, the 
dynamic blue China of the southern coasts and the stagnant yellow China of the 
interior. She also notes the love-story of the fiery orator Wang Jingwei and the 
Chinese daughter of Penang Chen Bijun as “one of countless examples of the close 
connections forged between the Chinese in China and the Chinese overseas.”368 Pan 
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does not bring in the later baggage of Wang and Chen, but rather remembers them for 
their ocean-crossing romance and joint attempt on the life of Zaifeng, Prince Regent 
of the Qing, which brought together domestic and overseas dreams of transforming 
China. To Pan, such dreams demonstrate that Chinese, in China and without, hold a 
role in the ultimate destiny of the Chinese nation, and so claims the ethnic Chinese 
abroad as overseas compatriots. 
The book consists of eight sections. The first part of the book is titled “Dr. 
Sun Yat Sen and the 1911 Chinese Revolution”, the second part “Mobilizing the 
Nanyang Chinese”, third “The Tongmenghui in Penang”, fourth “Dr. Sun Yat-sen and 
the Nanyang Headquarters in Penang”, fifth “Revolution and Martyrdom”, “Dr. Sun’s 
Family in Penang”, seventh “The Legacy of Sun Yat Sen’s Supporters in Penang”, 
eighth “120 Armenian Street Then and Now”. The book ends with some photographs, 
a timeline, and a bibliography. 
Khoo does not make significant departures from the general outlines of Sun’s 
life as presented in Marie-Claire Bergère’s biography. She does, however, emphasize 
Sun’s time in Nanyang in particular, stating that he established 20 branch offices and 
recruited 3,000 members for the Tongmenghui in Nanyang.369 
She then moves away from a Sun and China-centered story into a brief 
discussion of the Chinese in Malaya and Penang, a local history. Divisions were 
many and wide. First among these divisions was the distinction between Straits 
Chinese, those residing in the Straits Settlements before their organization as a British 
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colony or having been born in the colony, and Qing subjects who emigrated to the 
Straits. While Straits Chinese (here not distinguished from Peranakan Chinese) 
“adopted local customs and dress”, “[knew] how to work with the British 
government”, and “embraced modernity” through English education, the newcomers 
(Sinkeh) were “shopkeepers, artisans, mechanics, and coolies” in the mines and 
plantations of Southeast Asia.370 Penang, the capital of the Straits till 1836, served as 
a gateway to Southeast Asia for migrant Chinese in Khoo’s narrative. Aside from this 
salient distinction between Straits Chinese and Qing migrants, she also brings 
regional identities into her discussion of Nanyang Chinese. She notes that Chinese in 
the Southern Sea were generally Hokkien, Cantonese, Teochew, Hakka, and 
Hainanese from Guangdong and Fujian provinces. While we might imagine that 
being overseas may have fostered a sense of Chineseness in contrast with other 
contact groups in areas like Penang and Singapore, regional identities by no means 
simply fell away. As in Hawaii, regional identities remained an important system of 
social organization, with the bang cliques of the Straits being perhaps even more 
exclusive than the village cliques of the largely Xiangshanese, increasingly 
assimilated Hawaiian Chinese. 
Noting the multiplicity of political sympathies among Chinese in Penang, 
Khoo frames the overseas Chinese as holding three attitudes towards national revival, 
that nation being China. That the overseas Chinese felt strongly about plans for 
Chinese revival demonstrates that most did not feel strong attachment to the national 
empire of Britain, nor did they feel common cause with the Malay sultanates. First, 
371 Ibid., 26 
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conservatives sought the protecting of Qing rule. Indeed, Khoo notes Sun had trouble 
courting the elite, as the elite Chinese of Penang were generally conservatives wooed 
by the Qing government with titles in exchange for funds. The second common 
attitude towards national revival Khoo notes was reforming Qing rule, as Kang 
Youwei and his Baohuanghui members advocated. The third, and most contentious 
opinion, was toppling Qing rule outright. Sun, finding Nanyang Chinese to be 
generally in favor of the reformists, “engaged in a polemical war” against them to 
secure the patronage and support of the Nanyang Chinese in his mission to topple the 
Manchu Qing dynasty. Sun and his allies Huang Xing, Hu Hanmin, and Wang 
Jingwei are remembered as being key to Sun’s proselytizing efforts in the Straits and 
British Malaya.371 They had considerable success in gaining funds and converts to the 
revolutionary cause. 
Beyond political sympathies, Khoo’s narrative emphasizes the diversity of 
identities and beliefs within the Penang Chinese community. She notes the 
community’s generalized connection to China and to other Chinese communities 
overseas approvingly. Manifesting her own opinions, Khoo also lauds the hard work 
and self-sacrifice of Penangites like Wu Shirong (Goh Say Eng) in supporting Sun 
and his revolution. So loyal were the Penang Tongmenghui members to Sun that Sun 
relocated his Nanyang headquarters to Penang to distance himself from his detractors 
at the Singapore branch. Members of the Philomathic Union would even pool their 
finances to support his family monetarily during his time in Penang, providing a 
373 Ibid., 53. 
260 
 
monthly stipend of $120-130.372 By highlighting this episode, Khoo makes the 
Penang Tongmenghui the benefactor and lifeline of Sun Yat-sen, the Father of the 
Chinese Revolution, as well as the true party faithful in a time of great 
disillusionment. In so doing, she elevates the Penang revolutionaries to be pivotal 
members of the Tongmenghui and generous revolutionaries of uncommon dedication. 
Further emphasizing the place of Penang in Sun’s life and, hence, in the 
history of China and the world, Khoo portrays Sun’s Penang conference as a crucial 
moment for the Chinese Revolution. In this moment, Sun brought together his most 
loyal supporters and pushed for another uprising in Guangzhou. This was a difficult 
sell after some fifteen years of failed uprisings and many thousands of dollars spent in 
support of these uprisings. Sun framed it as the “Last Battle” of the Tongmenghui, the 
final chance to realize the Chinese Revolution and topple the Manchu Qing 
despots.373 While he was successful in rallying supporters and funding to his cause, 
the Huanghuaguang Uprising did not succeed in toppling the Qing, nor was it the end 
of Sun’s efforts to realize this goal. He did not give up. As mentioned previously, he 
was fundraising in the United States when the Xinhai Revolution broke out in 
October of 1911. And so, the Penang Conference is at once a pivotal moment in 
which Sun rallied the doubting faithful for a final battle against the Qing despots but 
also largely meaningless, for it produced nothing but another failed uprising and 
another fundraising trip. This episode itself demonstrates a central question of Sun 
narratives and political biography as whole: did the event actually matter? To bolster 
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Sun’s connection to Penang, it must, and so it does in Khoo’s narrative. A dismissive 
reader might write it off as yet another of Sun’s failures, but in a sympathetic 
narrative aimed at elevating the place of Penang and the Penang Chinese in Sun’s life, 
it become a crucial juncture in the fate of the Chinese nation and the world at large. 
However, as Khoo makes clear, Penang was not a Chinese city, but rather a 
cosmopolitan entrepot within the British imperial system. British authorities and the 
European elite of the Straits did not take Sun’s presence very seriously at first. News 
of his relocation to Penang sparked a newspaper editor for the Straits Echo, clarified 
by Khoo to be European, to remark that “The only fault we have Dr. Sun Yat Sen as a 
revolutionary is that he doesn’t seem to revolute…” and that Sun had nothing to show 
for the considerable sums of money he collected from residents of Penang, Singapore, 
and elsewhere.374 Nonetheless, the authorities later proved to have a weighty presence 
on Sun’s operations in the Straits and beyond as concern with his agitation among the 
Chinese there grew. After Sun’s incendiary “Last Battle” speech in late 1910, John 
Anderson, Governor of the Straits Settlements, banished Sun from the Straits. Sun 
was effectively forced to leave Asia. As Khoo notes, Sun found most doors closed at 
this point: 
By the time he came to live in Penang in 1910, Dr. Sun was already a wanted 
man in China, as well as a persona non grata in Japan, French Indo-China, the 
Dutch East Indies, Thailand, and British Hong Kong. Conditions in Singapore 
were unfavorable due to heavy British surveillance and internal dissension 
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within the Tongmenghui. 
 
Penang was Dr. Sun’s last stronghold in the region. After he was banished by 
the British colonial government of Malaya and Singapore, there was not a 
place in the Nanyang where he was allowed to set foot.375 
Khoo’s narrative of Sun concludes with the success of the Xinhai Revolution, the 
financial and other contributions of Penang Chinese to the Chinese Revolution, and a 
brief discussion of Sun’s family. As Sun Mei, caretaker of Sun’s wife Lu Muzhen and 
their children, was exiled from Hong Kong, Sun Mei brought the family to Penang. 
There Sun, Lu, their two daughters, and Sun’s mistress Chen Cuifen were in close 
contact. Interestingly, Chen Cuifen is referred to as Sun’s second wife, despite her 
general absence in other narratives, Here she is referred to explicitly as the “Nanyang 
wife” (Nanyang po).376 Sun’s supporters are credited with jumpstarting Chinese 
education in the Straits and founding schools like the Chung Ling School. Relevant 
organs like the party paper Kwong Wah Yit Poh are celebrated as long-running 
institutions of Chinese Nanyang society. A brief history of 120 Armenian Street 
concludes the narrative, showing the Tongmenghui and the Kwong Wah Yit Poh 
moved out by 1912, explaining the neighborhood’s explicit connection to underworld 
societies before their prohibition and suppression following the Penang Riots of 
1867.377 
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Khoo concludes by showing photos of the Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir 
Mohamed and Chinese Premier Hu Jintao visiting the site on separate occasions, 
demonstrating that Sun and his connection to Penang have current, extra-local 
implications. The visit of Hu Jintao in 2002 is worth considering in the frame of 
ROC/PRC politics with regards to overseas Chinese, mentioned earlier. As Malaysia 
recognizes the PRC as the legitimate Chinese state, naturally Hu and not his Taiwan 
contemporary Chen Shui-bian would be invited to visit. Hu’s public visit to the 
former headquarters of the Tongmenghui reinforces the PRC’s connection to Sun 
Yat-sen and thus further legitimates the PRC narrative of Sun Yat-sen as the 
democratic forebear of the Chinese socialist revolution and, later, the pioneering 
revolutionary of the modern Chinese nation. Mahathir’s visit, made on the occasion 
on the First Chinese New Year Open House and the opening of a related exhibit on 
Sun in 2001, is beyond my focus, but we may simply note that the visit of a sitting, 
democratically-elected Malay Prime Minister to the site on such an occasion serves to 
emphasize the importance of the Chinese vote in Penang, the significance of the 
Chinese in contemporary Malaysian politics, and the sometimes tense relationship 
between Penang, a former crown colony, and the rest of Malaysia.378 We might think 
back to the Penang secession movement, the example of Singapore, and Penang’s 
unusual demographics and history in comparison to the rest of Malaysia in 
considering why the Prime Minister of Malaysia might make an effort to court the 
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Penang Chinese. We should note here that Mahathir had enjoyed years of support 
from Malaysian Chinese for his promulgation of a more inclusive Malaysian national 
identity (bangsa Malaysia)—one that made space for Malaysia’s significant Chinese 
and Tamil populations— as opposed to a more strictly ethnic Malay national identity 
(bangsa Melayu), and so his honoring of Sun may in turn have had implications for a 
sense of Chinese-inclusive Malaysian nationalism.379 Even if this is so, what is it 
about the figure of Sun Yat-sen specifically that reverberates among the Chinese of 
Penang? 
Perhaps, as argued above, it is because Sun Yat-sen was indeed a globetrotter. 
A nationalist with an eye to modernizing China, a traveler with tracks in many lands, 
Sun is uniquely suited to serving both as an emblem of modern China and as a 
Chinese figure with some connection to overseas Chinese populations. By honoring 
Sun, overseas Chinese may celebrate their Chinese heritage by honoring this symbol 
of a vaguely defined modern China, a worldly revolutionary with concrete goals and a 
vague ideology, with widespread if shallow roots in so many places. In considering 
what Sun represents in a given place, we must necessarily consider the history of the 
place and its relation to the broader history of the Chinese nation, of Chinese 
migration overseas, global imperialism, and local nationalisms. For the Chinese of 
Penang, Sun was a down-on-his-luck revolutionary who fought hard against slim 
odds and the weight of a largely disapproving world order. Given that the Chinese of 
Penang are largely descended from Sinkeh, migrants who eked out a living on the 
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margins of British and Chinese realms, that perhaps holds special significance to local 
self-images. In remembering him through Sun Yat Sen in Penang and in restoring the 
former TMH headquarters at 120 Armenian Street, Khoo, one Penangite of Chinese 
descent, honors the far-sightedness, the charity, the Chinese patriotism, and strong 
local roots of some Penang Chinese, thus ensuring that the story of the Chinese in 
Penang and their role in world history is preserved. 
vi: Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, overseas Chinese have complicated relationships with China, 
Chineseness, and with its modern symbol Sun Yat-sen. These relationships are 
heavily influenced by local history, competing nationalisms, the disputed nature of 
“China,” and the contentious and— at times—culturally and politically suspect 
character “Chineseness.” In Hawaii, Lum and Lum—writing on behalf of the 
prominent Dr. Sun Yat-sen Hawaii Foundation—emphasize Sun as a hero of modern 
world history, a democrat, and a humanist. Moreover, they frame him as deeply 
influenced by his time in Hawaii, and so elevate the role of Hawaii in world history. 
In Penang, Khoo—writing largely to commemorate a successful historical 
conservation project—is not so triumphant, nor does she paint such deep connections 
between Penang and Sun. Partly this is because Sun spent only a year in Penang, and 
this was long after his revolutionary die was cast. However, as we have seen 
throughout this paper, Sun’s image remains malleable in various respects and presents 
certain opportunities for redefinition. Khoo frames Sun as a pioneer of the Chinese 
revolution, a zealous and honest man suffering to realize his selfless goals, and 
frames the Chinese of Penang as a conflicted bunch. Some oppose Sun, some help 
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him, and some die for his cause, the cause of toppling the Qing and establishing the 
Republic of China. 
Although this analysis does not dwell on how the sitting governments of 
China—the PRC and the ROC—attempt to shape Sun’s image overseas, we may 
nonetheless note the hand of Kaohsiung City in donating the Nuuanu statue, the hand 
of Zhongshan City in donating the Gateway Park statue, and the face of Hu Jintao 
himself among the shelves of 120 Armenian Street. By presenting Sun statues and 
shaping what they mean, the governments of the PRC and the ROC have attempted to 
reinforce their own narratives of nationhood and bolster their own ties with overseas 
Chinese communities in a bid for some level of loyalty or connection. We see local 
Chinese ancestry groups in the United States and Malaysia competing to define Sun’s 
legacy with monuments in public places, with official celebrations and recognitions, 
and with commemorative histories. We also see Mayor Hanneman commenting on 
the rededication of Gateway Park in Honolulu and Prime Minister Mahathir browsing 
the exhibit at 120 Armenian Street, clearly exhibiting that local politicians and 
communities too use Sun for their own political purposes and so recast the image of 
Sun to fit more neatly into their own non-Chinese state contexts. Any further 
statements would overstep the bounds of this present study, but it may be worth 
considering the competition over Sun Yat-sen’s political legacy in overseas Chinese 
spaces in conversation with preexisting literature on international politics and the role 
of diaspora groups in contests of legitimacy. 
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CONCLUSION: A GALLERY OF SUN YAT-SENS 
 
But finally, it’s not a question of which is right. I mean, reality is kind of 
made up of these different layers. So maybe in that reality you were serious 
about trying to kill me, but in this reality you weren’t. It depends on which 
reality you take and which reality I take. 
—Haruki Murakami, The Wind-up Bird Chronicle 
 
 
i: Introduction 
 
Centuries ago, the English writer Samuel Johnson ended his story of the 
Abyssinian prince Rasselas with “The Conclusion, in which Nothing Is Concluded.” 
His quip might well serve for my own conclusion here. There can be no 
comprehensive conclusion; Sun’s afterlives march along their own respective paths, 
and will to continue to do so for the foreseeable future. They will continue to shape, 
and be reshaped by changing actors, forces, and needs in their various dynamic 
environments. The thesis explores multiple and divergent features of Sun Yat-sen’s 
political legacy, illustrating, in the process, something of the politics of historical 
interpretation and public memory. 
While I have no comprehensive conclusion to offer, this thesis has indeed 
shown that the figure of Sun Yat-sen has taken on multiple forms and meanings since 
the man’s passing on March 12th, 1925. This conclusion amplifies this rather 
mundane truth by briefly raising an encounter with Sun memory that remains beyond 
the scope of this thesis. Doing so will help to illustrate the ongoing political stakes of 
Sun’s posthumous trajectories in other contexts. Here I simply want to note the space 
of encounters among variant Sun memories, and an evanescent attempt to construct 
an enduring image of Sun Yat-sen the Confucian humanist, a border-crossing Chinese 
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figure explored and tentatively established at a January, 1994 transnational 
conference in Hangzhou that drew together ROC, PRC, and overseas Chinese 
contingents of historians, philosophers, and institutions. Finally, I will briefly reiterate 
the main points of the four body chapters and dwell on the significance of Sun and his 
images. 
ii: Sun Yat-sen the Confucian Humanist 
 
In a collection of papers titled Sun Yixian sixiang yu rujia renwen jingshen 
lunwenji (Collection of Papers on Sun Yat-sen’s Thought and the Humanist Spirit of 
Confucianism),380 scholars from around the Chinese-speaking world came together in 
conversation to discuss Sun Yat-sen’s thought and its relationship to Confucianism. 
This collection was printed on the occasion of the Fifth International Conference on 
Sun Yat-sen’s Thought and the Twenty-First Century, a conference hosted by the Sun 
Yat-sen Research Communication Fund (Sun Wen Xueshu Sixiang Yanjiu Jiaoliu 
Jijinhui, registered in Taipei in 1992)381 in January of 1994. The conference, 
sponsored by National Taiwan Normal University and hosted in the PRC city of 
Hangzhou—with site visits to Suzhou and Nanjing—, reflects a then-new 
development: the 1992 Shanghai Consensus, in which both PRC and ROC 
representatives agreed to uphold a “one-China consensus” in which both sides agreed 
that there was one China, and that they only disagreed as to which government 
represented this China. This consensus is invoked explicitly in the volume as an 
 
380 Sun Yixian sixiang yu rujia renwen jingshen lunwenji (Collection of Papers on Sun Yat- 
sen’s Thought and the Humanist Spirit of Confucianism), Sun Yat-sen Research 
Communication Fund, 1994. 
381 “Foundations”, Office of Legal Counsel TW, 
https://foundations.olc.tw/foundations/view/59817160-cfd4-445c-9886-11e2acb5b862 
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aspirational framework. The 1992 consensus led to a great interlinking of the PRC 
and the ROC-Taiwan economically, socially, and culturally. However, this 
interlinking was and is not without tension. We see from this conference, and in 
particular in the opening addresses to this conference, cautious optimism that the 
reopening of communication, trade, and travel between the PRC and ROC was 
enriching both sides and serving to defuse tensions between them. To further 
underscore their shared history and culture, shared ties that provided the basis for 
upholding a one-China consensus, representatives from both the PRC and ROC put 
forward this conference to discuss Confucian influences on Sun Yat-sen’s thought, 
thus bringing together an ancient and modern symbol of China with which both sides 
could identify. We might note extensive and enthusiastic cooperation from both sides, 
but that Ru Xin’s address, discussed in detail later on, suggests PRC initiative in 
organizing the conference. 
The foreword for the conference proceedings begins by carving a unique 
niche for Sun Yat-sen as a great philosopher who linked Eastern and Western 
philosophy: 
Dr. Sun Yat-sen was one of the great thinkers of the twentieth century. His 
Three People’s Principles and Sun Wen Xueshuo not only disseminated 
Chinese culture, but also brought Eastern and Western thought together in the 
same pan. Moreover, he became the founder of the first republic in Asia and 
brought countless millions under its shield. His influence is vast, his person 
270  
beyond compare.382 
 
 
 
Figure 13: The conference attendees visit the Sun Yat-sen Mausoleum in Nanjing.383 
 
 
 
 
382 Ibid. The original text is: “孫逸仙先生爲二十世紀最偉大的思想家之一，其所著三民
主義、孫文學説，不僅傳承中華文化，融合東西學術於一爐，而且成爲亞洲第一個民
主共和國的創始人，使億萬人民蒙其庇蔭，其深遠影響，并使無出其右。” 
383 Sun Yixian Lunji, preface. 
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Aiming to keep Sun Yat-sen studies up to date, the conference participants discussed 
the humanist aspects of his thought. The chief recurring theme in the essays is Sun’s 
fusion of Western and Eastern thought, a sort of updated zhongti xiyong (Western 
learning with a Chinese basis) in which Western science combines with Confucian 
morality to form an ideal system of humanistic political philosophy. While the 
Confucian revival has been discussed in detail elsewhere, Sun’s inclusion in the broad 
milieu of Confucian humanism is telling of a more nationalistic than humanistic 
project. 
 
In an opening address from the first day of the conference, January 21, 1994, 
Zhao Lingling frames the conference’s purpose as providing a chance to explore “Sun 
Yat-sen’s Sino-Western cultural views, his philosophy of the people’s welfare and 
cultural ideals”; “changing societal and cultural mores on both sides of the Strait in 
the process of seeking modernization”; “Confucianism’s contemporary significance 
and value in constructing a societal order”; “the connection between Confucian ethics 
and East Asian economic development”; “how, in the midst of the materially-rich and 
spiritually-poor society in which modern people live, to use Confucian humanistic 
mores to settle the heart and increase our quality of life”; and “how to use 
Confucianism as the main axle in driving cultural development, raising national spirit, 
exhibiting cultural ideals, so as to build a culturally-affirmative basis belonging to 
21st century Chinese with which to complete national unification.”384 Zhao’s use of 
 
 
384 Ibid. Zhao Lingling, “Sun Yixian sixiang yu nianyi shiji guoji xueshu xilie yantaohui 
kaimu dianli—zongzhaojiren Zhao Ling Ling boshi zhici” (Opening Ceremony for the 
International Conferences Series on the Thought of Sun Yat-sen and the 21st Century— 
Director Dr. Zhao Lingling’s Remarks) , 1. 
272  
boilerplate political phraseology in this framing illustrates that this was hardly an 
apolitical undertaking for mainland institutions. She also notes that this conference 
was only possible because the preceding one, the Fourth Conference in Beijing, had 
gone so well. Details on other conferences in this series are, unfortunately, unclear; I 
was unable to confirm or deny the existence of a Sixth Conference or ascertain details 
of the apparently successful Fourth Conference. 
 
The focus on Sun Yat-sen and the Western-inflected humanistic Confucianism 
to which he supposedly subscribed and its political implications for Chinese of the 
Sinosphere385 was reiterated in another opening address. An address from Ru Xin, 
vice president of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, framed mainland interest 
in the conference as providing an opportunity for fellow Chinese to come together to 
discuss something they share in common—their revered Sun Yat-sen and the 
Confucian tradition of humanistic thought. Indeed, while I use the term “Sinosphere” 
above, the common glue of Chinese identity, according to Ru Xin, is the veneration 
of Sun and the cultural influence of Confucianism, making more of a “Sunosphere’: 
 
Dr. Sun Yat-sen, whom we all revere, was the great revolutionary forebear of 
China, a great patriot. He struggled his whole life to save China, to build a 
united, prosperous, and strong China. He was also one of modern China’s 
 
 
385 The Sinosphere is a shorthand term for the Chinese-speaking world, taking the mainstream 
usage of Sinitic languages (Mandarin, Cantonese, Hokkien, Wu, and so forth) as the key 
marker of Chinese identity. I use the term here as the speakers make special reference to 
overseas Chinese and, in particular, to the Chinese of Singapore as being in the same boat as 
mainland and Taiwanese Chinese. Such a marker, being members of a larger Chinese nation 
defined by language, serves this purpose, but raises questions over who counts as Chinese 
and why. After all, many citizens of the PRC do not speak a Sinitic language natively, and 
many overseas Chinese are not proficient in Sinitic languages. 
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prominent thinkers. While he sought rationality from the West, he was also 
eminently concerned with ensuring the continuity of the excellent aspects of 
our traditional thought and culture. To use his own words, “To take our 
ancient culture and brighten it by means of world culture.” As for his take on 
Confucian thought, he mercilessly criticized the outdated, negative aspects of 
Confucian thought that hampered China’s progress, but as for the positive 
aspects, like the datong idealism of “All under Heaven is for the common 
good,” “the people are the root of the country” and “the people are what is 
valuable,” and “education for all”, he gave his full affirmation. However, he 
was not simply keeping the old, purely carrying it forward. Rather, he sought 
to bring it in step with the times, and so provided new explanations and 
interpretations. His attitude towards Confucianism, towards our modern 
cultural construction and spiritual civilization was very enlightened. 
Consequently, our conference’s theme is not only of ethical significance, but 
of practical significance. I hope that, by means of free academic discussion, 
everyone might come to a deeper understanding of the research on Sun Yat- 
sen’s thought. 
In recent years, the links between schools have developed quite a bit; this is a 
joyous thing. We are all Chinese, the blood that flows within our veins is all 
Chinese blood. I believe that, if only we can establish the one-China 
consensus [italicized to emphasize the aspirational nature of this consensus], 
establish that we are all Chinese, if everybody can sit down and talk, then the 
biases and problems between us will all be gradually resolved. In this respect, 
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academic communication has a great positive use. It helps establish dialogue 
and understanding between two sides, communicates thought, does away with 
misunderstandings, builds friendship. It is also of benefit that it’s good for the 
progress of scholarship itself. We at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences 
have, in these recent years, been working tirelessly towards developing 
scholarly communication between the Two Shores of the Taiwan Strait. 
Although our capabilities are limited, we are willing to exhaust them and, 
from today on, will continue to work hard to promote scholarly cross-Strait 
dialogue to do some things. We hope that we can get the support and 
cooperation of our friends in Taiwan.386 
Ru Xin’s address serves to establish that Sun and Confucianism are both common ties 
 
 
386 Ibid. Ru Xin, “Dalu Zhongguo Shekeyuan Ru Fuyuanzhang Xin Zhisi” (Mainland China 
Academy of Social Sciences Vice-President Ru Xin’s Address), 3. The original text is: “孫
中山先生是我們大家都憧憬的中國革命的先行者，偉大的愛國主義者，他爲了救中  
國，建設一個統一的繁榮富强的中國奮鬥了一生。他又是中國近代史上一位傑出的思
想家，他在向西方尋求真理的同時，也十分重視繼承和法償我國傳統思想文化中的優
秀的成分，用他自己的話來説，就是“發場吾固有之文化，且吸收世界之文化而光大之
”。以他對儒家思想的態度來説，他對儒家思想中的落後的阻礙中國進步的消極因素是加以
無情批判的，但對其中的一些積極因素加“天下爲公”的大同理想，“民為邦本”， “民爲
貴”的思想，“有教無類”的教育思想以及道德觀念等等，是給予充分肯定的。但他也不
是原樣照搬，單純繼承，而是根據時代的要求，而給予新的解釋和發場。他對儒家思
想的這種態度，對我們今天的文化建設和精神文明也仍然很有啓發的。因此，我們這
次研討會的主體不僅有理論意義，也有實際意義。希望通過自由學術討論，使大家對
孫中山思想的研究更深入一步。 
近幾年來，連按之間的學術交流有進一步的發展，這是可喜的現象，我們都是
中國人，在我們需管理流的的都是中國人的血，我相信，只要確認一個中國確認我們
自己是中國人，大家坐下來談，我們之間的分歧核問題慢慢都是可以解決的。在這方
面學術界的交流能夠其很好的促進作用，它有助於雙方增進相互瞭解，溝通思想，消
除隔閡，建立友誼，對於學術研究本身的進步，也是大有益處的。我們中國社科院， 
這幾年來一直致力於開展兩岸之間的學術界，我院雖然能力有限，但願意竭盡微薄的
力量，今後繼續努力在推進兩岸之間學術交流方面做一些事，希望能夠得到台灣學術
界朋友們的合作和支持。” 
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between the two sides, reflecting the status of both as symbols of China and the 
desire, on the part of PRC-affiliated conference organizers, to use these symbols to 
develop a stronger, more holistic sense of Chinese national identity. This came at a 
time of newly open relations between the PRC and ROC, but before Taiwanese bentu 
political identities came to the fore of ROC-Taiwan politics, and so illustrate the 
mood of the time. 
 
Both Zhao Lingling and Ru Xin served to represent mainland institutions, but 
the list of sponsors and associated entities explicates that this was hardly a mainland- 
only initiative. Many ROC-Taiwan institutions, leaders, and private citizens either 
sponsored or participated in the conference, while others sent regards to mark its 
undertaking. Lee Teng-hui, sitting President of the ROC, sent ceremonial remarks to 
express his good wishes and the good wishes of the ROC government. The names of 
the ROC Unity and Self-Strengthening League (Zhonghua minguo tuanjie ziqiang 
xiehui); ROC Ministry of Education; ROC Cultural Construction Committee (under 
the Department of Culture); GMD Party History Committee (dangshihui); Furen 
University and National Taiwan Normal University all appear as sponsors. Clearly 
there was a substantial ROC involvement in funding and branding this conference, 
but lacking numbers, it is difficult to determine the specific breakdown of how the 
conference was funded and organized. We might note that the conference itself was 
hosted on the mainland and featured many mainland scholars, including Zhao 
Lingling (Peking University), Mao Jiaqi (Nanjing University), as well as scholars of 
the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. Such a list of sponsors, participants, and 
associated individuals seem intended to illustrate that this was a joint initiative, and 
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one that—as previously mentioned—explicitly aimed to provide a common platform 
for discussing Chinese issues—here embodied by Sun Yat-sen and Confucianism— 
among Chinese scholars of different citizenship. This description only scratches the 
surface of the conference proceedings, which would serve as a rich resource for 
another thesis on ideological re-framings of Sun in the context of cross-strait 
relations. For such a project, one might imagine chapter titles such as Sun the 
Communist, Sun the Confucian, Sun the Christian, Sun the liberal democrat, Sun the 
fusion. Of course, a limitation of such a structure would be that Sun is so often 
presented as a fusion of modern and traditional, of West and East, that such divisions 
could be prove rather arbitrary. 
iii: Conclusion 
 
This thesis has explored key threads of Sun’s historical afterlives in different 
Chinese spaces, state and non-state. In the introduction, I introduce Sun Yat-sen in 
consideration of various biographies, which each paint distinctive portraits of Sun that 
serve particular uses. James Cantlie, a Scottish doctor who taught Sun in Hong Kong, 
presented Sun favorably to a British audience so as to garner sympathy in wake of his 
London kidnapping and, later, upon the founding of the Republic of China. M. N. 
Roy, an Indian revolutionary disappointed by Sun in life, presented Sun unfavorably 
to a broad audience of Germanophone and Anglophone readers—the intended 
audience presumably of a Marxist inclination—to “scientifically” illustrate why the 
Xinhai Revolution failed. Jiang Xingde, a Chinese historian of the early-to-mid 20th 
century, presented a zhuan-style biography of Sun that served to make him a moral 
exemplar according to the virtues of the Chiang Kai-shek GMD. Finally, Marie- 
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Claire Bergère, a contemporary French historian, aimed to cut through some of the 
polarized tendencies of much Sun scholarship to find the man behind the myths. This 
diverse set of texts and perspectives served both to introduce Sun and the politics (and 
aesthetics) of historical interpretation in distinctive contexts. This discussion revealed 
that even the details of Sun’s life, like where he learned English, are largely 
politicized to shape particular images of Sun. 
The first chapter considered Sun Yat-sen’s political afterlife in the pre-1949 
Republic of China. I found this required a hefty amount of contextualization; just as 
the introduction required its own biographical contextualization, the substantive 
chapters of the thesis each required significant historical context to reveal what was 
significant about Sun’s image in a given time and place. In the pre-1949 ROC the key 
interpretive context lay in the fractious nature of the Guomindang and the position of 
Sun as the ideological lynchpin of the party. Factions, seeking to legitimate their own 
aspirations and ideals, turned to Sun, as demonstrated most intensely during the 
Second Sino-Japanese War, in which the Chongqing government of Chiang Kai- 
shek—united with the Communists—and the Nanjing government of Wang 
Jingwei—collaborating with the Japanese—invoked their own images of Sun as 
guofu, the Father of the Nation. Chiang’s Sun was a great man of uncommon ability 
who demanded obeisance and obedience, while Wang’s Sun was a great 
revolutionary of all Asia who worked through his party—not his army—to effect 
change. 
The second chapter looked at Sun’s afterlife in the People’s Republic of 
China. To evoke the broad trajectory, I used People’s Daily reports on official 
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commemorations of Sun’s decennial birthday celebrations (1956, 1966, 1976, 1986, 
and 2016) with context to understand the significance of particular speakers and their 
invocations of Sun. The precise politics underlying the 2016 address remain obscure, 
but it serves to present the trajectory of Sun’s image in the PRC more clearly. In this 
gallery of PRC public memory, rhetorical focus largely articulates changing political 
priorities and values among the changing PRC elite, a varied group of people with 
shifting stations and discordant priorities. In the Soviet-aid years of the 1950s, Sun’s 
admiration for the Soviet Union was explicit, his status as the bourgeois forebear of 
the democratic revolution noted; in the Cultural Revolution years of the late 1960s, 
Sun was made into a Mao of his time, a fierce anti-imperialist nationalist and, to 
some, a flawed hero. Following the Reform and Opening Up, Sun’s militant anti- 
imperialism and status as the forebear of the democratic revolution were 
deemphasized, while his modernization projects and “patriotism” took on newfound 
preeminence. 
Chapter Three turned to Sun’s afterlife in the ROC-Taiwan. Following a 
discussion of Taiwan’s unique historical and political context in relation to mainland 
China, I analyzed Sun through the figure of the Taiwanese activist Chiang Wei-shui. 
Key here are the rhetoric of the official Pictorial History of the Republic of China and 
Chiang Wei-shui, as well as Chiang Kai-shek’s speech dedicating Chung-shan Hall 
upon the centennial birth of Sun Yat-sen. We see that Sun was first presented as he 
was by Chiang in the mainland ROC, that is, as guofu, but that the problematic place 
of Chiang Kai-shek and the GMD in Taiwan’s fractious political climate forced those, 
like the curators of the SYS Memorial Hall in Taipei, with an interest in saving Sun 
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from the maw of a contested history to redefine Sun through the figure of Chiang 
Wei-shui. Chiang Wei-shui, once framed as a Chinese patriot from Taiwan, is now 
framed as a Taiwanese nationalist working within the Japanese imperial order, 
reflecting changing understandings of history in Taiwan. Sun, for his part, becomes 
newly significant as an Asian revolutionary and a great inspiration to Chiang. Both 
Sun as guofu and Sun as an Asian revolutionary, narratives designed alternately to 
reinforce the Sinitic identity of Taiwan as the ROC or to establish Taiwan as its own 
unique nation, make space for Sun in the contentious Taiwanese cultural arena, in 
which bentu identity is increasingly dominant over a sense of Chinese Taiwan. 
The fourth and final chapter moved beyond the PRC, Taiwan, and cross-strait 
relations to examine Sun’s afterlives among overseas Chinese, or ethnic Chinese 
living outside China. To take the heterogeneity of the overseas Chinese experience 
into consideration, I chose two sites—Hawaii and Penang. Both sites have real 
historical ties to Sun, and actors within the Chinese communities there have laid 
locally and globally inflected claims to Sun. In Hawaiian statues and text, we 
observed a general narrative of Sun Yat-sen, the great modern democratic hero of 
China, deeply influenced by Hawaiian society and culture. In Penang, a preliminary 
and limited encounter with local Sun interpretation suggests a usage of Sun that 
serves mostly to elevate the place of the Penang Chinese in world history and 
reinforce their claims to the Xinhai Revolution. The Penang Sun appears as a largely 
down-on-his-luck revolutionary with big dreams and empty coffers, an image that 
perhaps resonates with the Chinese of Penang for particular historical reasons. We see 
in both cases the active and obvious hand of politicians, local and international, 
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honoring Sun for their own varied political purposes, demonstrating that these 
Chinese diaspora communities are not only politically significant entities in their own 
communities and nations, but are also significant to Chinese state projects. Although I 
present Hanneman, the Kaohsiung City council, the Zhongshan City council, Hu 
Jintao, and Mahathir, I did not address this topic in great detail; it would be a 
promising avenue for further exploration. 
I am aware that there are many shortcomings to this thesis, as well as avenues 
for further exploration. There is no dearth of material on Sun Yat-sen, and that is the 
central rub of this thesis. I chose materials that I believed would illustrate different 
aspects of Sun’s life, and selected different media to bring together a diverse set of 
materials. This has some limitations. Plainly, comparing China’s Destiny directly 
with the People’s Daily is an awkward and peculiar exercise, as one was a major 
ideological tract and one a party newspaper. Public statuary and museum exhibit- 
books introduce new variables. A media studies scholar would surely find such 
comparisons problematic, absent engagement with media theory. Nonetheless, the 
exercise serves the purpose of the thesis—exploring Sun Yat-sen’s political 
afterlives—admirably, with contextualized critical readings of all materials, as 
manifold forms of historical memory, as its methodological hinge. A future writer 
could certainly glean more from greater contextualization of particular types of 
sources, for example, considering the People’s Daily as a newspaper, the history and 
tropes of the People’s Daily, or the interpretation of monuments as a medium to glean 
new insights into Sun representation. 
One of my initial impulses was to compare different pictorial histories of Sun 
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Yat-sen, given that I had found several that could serve to more precisely contrast the 
different narratives of Sun by limiting variables. However, I found myself unable to 
incorporate these pictorial histories into my thesis, just as I have omitted films, 
documentary and otherwise. We might consider that a thesis that put several PRC, 
ROC, and American pictorial histories in conversation with The Pictorial History of 
the ROC, Remembering Chiang Wei-shui, Sun Yat-sen in Hawaii, and Sun Yat Sen in 
Penang (all, roughly speaking, pictorial histories in a sense) would have been more 
cleanly framed. Nonetheless, such a thesis would have also missed different aspects 
of Sun’s afterlives, such as his use in grand ideological tracts, his presence in 
newspapers, and on street corners. 
We might consider, also, that smaller annual commemorations of Sun take 
place in different spaces, and that a different thesis might have limited its scope solely 
to Sun commemoration ceremonies. Such a thesis could distinguish between major 
and minor Sun celebrations in different spaces and times to explore broader trends, or 
dive into a single time or space to fully flesh out a single topic. For instance, as I 
wrote the section on CCP commemorations, I had originally planned to put the 
People’s Daily publishing commemorative speeches in conversation with similar 
events in the ROC. I had some material difficulties with finding relevant events in the 
resources available to me, but I imagine such a study—perhaps even analyzing Sun 
commemorations only in Nanjing, Beijing, Taipei, or Kobe—would reveal much 
about Sun’s changing images. However, I believe focusing solely on public 
commemorations and their associated news coverage, much like focusing solely on 
pictorial histories, would not achieve my goal of presenting varied images of Sun 
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Yat-sen as effectively as putting pictorial histories, commemorations, and political 
tracts in conversation with one another. 
I regret not being able to fully analyze each time and place; for instance, I had 
sought to incorporate a book titled Zhongguo tese shehui zhuyi yu Minsheng zhuyi 
(Socialism with Chinese Characteristics and the Principle of the People’s Livelihood) 
into the PRC section to further analyze how Sun and his political ideas are being 
framed in the contemporary PRC, but found myself unable to due to time constraints. 
Moreover, I had sought to incorporate a more complete discussion of Chiang Wei- 
shui’s biography into the ROC-Taiwan chapter, a more detailed discussion on 
Chinese state appeals to overseas Chinese and the framing of the Penang Conference 
in Chinese history in the overseas Chinese chapter, and a more comprehensive 
consideration of Sun Yat-sen’s figure in GMD political oratory in the ROC chapter. 
Finally, my discussion in the fourth chapter is limited by my relative ignorance of 
ethnic Chinese issues and my particular ignorance of the history of Penang. In any 
case, I believe my analysis of the materials selected nonetheless articulates distinctive 
features of Sun’s afterlives in these respective times and places. 
What are the deeper implications of the existence of distinctive Sun Yat-sens 
explicated in this comparative study? Much as we know different aspects of people in 
life, we know different aspects of people’s afterlives. To some, Sun Yat-sen was a 
great hero of traditional China, to others a revolutionary heralding the dawn of the 
people’s democratic revolution. To yet others, he was a saint of democracy and 
humanism, to others a modern Confucian sage, and others still saw him as the guide 
of weak peoples and a revolutionary inspiration. Of course, there are other Sun Yat- 
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sens. He was also a petit-bourgeois moron, a Christian patriot appealing to British 
sensibilities, a precocious child born for greatness, and a media superstar changing 
hats to fit his preferred images. Even this, still, is only a handful of images. He was 
also a troublemaker son, a rebellious brother, a doting husband and father, a deadbeat 
dad, a medical student, a shopboy, a professional schmoozer, a failed “revoluter,” a 
democratic revolutionary, an autocratic warlord, a Christian convert of questionable 
conviction, and a quasi-Confucian intellectual. All this to say that a careful look at the 
afterlives of Sun Yat-sen reveals that there is no unitary figure of Sun Yat-sen, and 
that we cannot help but consider the multiplicities of his image when considering the 
significance of his life. This is not unique to Sun Yat-sen. Much as there are a 
seemingly infinite portraits of Sun Yat-sen, at least enough to fill a wing at the Met, 
there are many disparate, distinctive, and dissonant images of Mao Zedong and 
Franklin D. Roosevelt. Much as any attempt to find “China”, whether one China, two 
Chinas, yellow Chinas and blue Chinas, is doomed to fail, any attempt to find the 
definitive Sun Yat-sen must take into account the multiplicity of his afterlives in 
pursuing the truth of his antemortem days. We might even venture so far to say that 
there cannot be an objective image of Sun Yat-sen, but this would risk a turn into 
historical nihilism. At least, the nuanced biographies of professional historians who 
incorporate materials from Sun’s multiple lives and locations—such as that of Marie- 
Claire Bergère—provide the basis for understanding the man. Understanding his 
legacies, nonetheless, requires a broad and detailed engagement with these portraits, 
their painters, and their provenance. I hope this thesis has served to provide a useful 
gallery for these contentious images of Sun Yat-sen. 
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Thinking about this multiplicity of Sun Yat-sens and different dimensions of 
historical memories, we might think about Toru Okada and May Kasahara, characters 
in Haruki Murakami’s The Wind-up Bird Chronicle. Okada, or “Mr. Wind-up Bird’ to 
Kasahara, following the advice of two aging Kwantung Army veterans, had been 
sitting at the bottom of a dry well in suburban Tokyo looking for his wife and for self- 
understanding. The two, it would turn out, are closely linked. His neighbor Kasahara, 
being something of a sadistic teenage girl and knowing of Okada’s plans, pulls up the 
rope ladder Okada used to get in the well and puts the cap on it. The epigraph is taken 
from a conversation after Okada, thanks to third-party intervention, manages to get 
out of the well. Okada posits that Kasahara wanted to kill him, while Kasahara denies 
this, saying she only wanted to push him to his limits. Okada, having moved between 
the real world and a questionably real dream world during his time in the well, then 
muses that, perhaps in one reality, she was indeed trying to kill him, but in another 
she wasn’t. 
In this moment, Okada and Kasahara are occupying different realities with no 
hopes of reconciliation beyond a turn to relativism. Kasahara cannot square with her 
actions, having—accidently, purportedly—killed her boyfriend a year or two prior, 
while Okada cannot forget that she pulled up the ladder in conjunction with earlier 
troubling statements she made. Moreover, Okada can still not square with the 
infidelity and departure of his wife. Perhaps in one reality, his wife loved him, but in 
another, she did not. The differences between our Sun Yat-sens are not quite so stark, 
but, like these alternate realities, these different afterlives cannot coherently coexist in 
the same framework. One must be true, but how to know? For Okada, the process of 
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knowing involves a great deal of self-searching (or, less charitably, hallucination) in 
the musty earth of Setagaya; for us, a considerable amount of historical research into 
the lives and doings of others. It is only with great effort and careful analysis that we 
can move beyond shallow relativism and map, with limitations, the contours of 
reality, its various interpretations, and the significance of these interpretations and the 
contexts that inform them. It is no easy task, but perhaps one does need to push one’s 
limits to truly understand. 
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APPENDIX 
 
 
NOTE ON ROMANIZATION 
 
 
I use Pinyin romanization for Chinese names except for conventional names 
widely known in the West (ie. Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek) and in use in the 
local area (i.e. the more common use of Wade-Giles and Gwoyeu Romatzyh in 
Taiwan and Romanized Hokkien in Penang). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
 
 
SYS—Sun Yat-sen CKS—Chiang Kai-shek 
GMD—Guomindang/Kuomintang/Nationalist Party KMT—see GMD 
CCP—Chinese Communist Party DPP—Democratic 
Progressive Party 
PRC—People’s Republic of China ROC—Republic of China 
NRA—National Revolutionary Army RCS—Revive China 
Society 
GGT—Governor-General of Taiwan GGK—Governor-General 
of Korea 
Comintern—The Communist International 
RevComm—The Revolutionary Committee of the Guomindang 
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